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Abstract	
In 2008, the lack of a robust estimate for the proportion of patients experiencing preventable 
deaths in English acute hospitals was fuelling debate and hindering progress in tackling the 
underlying problems associated with serious patient harm. In this thesis a narrative literature 
review and a study of harm measures in a single acute hospital are used to guide the choice 
of method for a study to determine the proportion of preventable hospital deaths.  
A subsequent retrospective case record review (RCRR) of 1000 randomly sampled deaths 
from 10 English acute hospitals found the proportion of preventable deaths to be 5.2% (95% 
CI, 3.8% to 6.6%) which would equate to 11,859 (95% CI 8712 to 14 983) preventable 
deaths per year in NHS hospitals in England, 60% of whom had a life expectancy of less 
than 1 year.  The proportion was lower than previous estimates based on US RCRR studies 
but consistent with a recent Dutch study which reviewed 3,983 hospital deaths.  
 
The majority of underlying problems in care were related to clinical monitoring, diagnostic 
error and drug and fluid problems, and 44% occurred during ward care. Problems were more 
likely to occur in surgical than medical patients (23.6% vs12.7%).  Three-quarters were 
omissions, rather than commissions, in care and accumulated throughout the hospital 
episode. While there was a strong positive correlation between proportions of preventable 
deaths in hospitals and MRSA bacteraemia rates (r=0.73; p<0.02) there were no other 
significant associations with common measures of safety, including HSMR.  
 
Improvements are needed to reduce human error and to provide better quality of care for 
acutely ill older people to reduce serious harm in acute hospitals. A national mortality 
review process, based on this study, is to be rolled out across the NHS and will provide one 
mechanism for monitoring progress.  
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Glossary	
Acts of Commission: affirmative actions related to the active delivery of care, such as 
incorrect treatment or management 
Active Failures: errors committed at the interface between the health professional and the 
patient 
Acute Hospital: a hospital providing care for both elective and emergency patients across a 
broad range of medical and surgical specialties 
Adverse Event: an unintended injury or complication resulting in prolonged hospital stay, 
disability at the time of discharge, or death caused by healthcare management rather than by 
the patient’s underlying disease process 
Care Delivery Problem: a problem that arises in the process of care due to actions or 
omissions by staff 
Clinical Technical Processes: the processes related to diagnosis and management that are 
targeted at the patients’ presenting problems 
Complications: unexpected harm where care had been delivered to an acceptable standard 
and was error free, such as a drug reaction on the first dose of a new medication  
Contributory Factors: underlying or intervening variables at individual, team or 
organisation level which lie behind the failure of processes of care   
Explicit Review: case record review that uses predetermined criteria to assess processes of 
care 
Harvard Medical Practice Study: the largest retrospective case record review study which 
examined 30,121 randomly selected case records from 51 New York acute hospitals in the 
1980s  
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Hospital Standardised Mortality Ratio: a measure calculated from the ratio of a hospital’s 
observed death rate to an expected death rate derived from a regional or national average. 
Scores above the average are said to identify organisations with excess deaths  
Implicit Review: reviews of the case records conducted without any pre-set criteria, and 
which use clinician judgements based on knowledge and experience to assess whether 
processes of care were of an acceptable standard 
Latent Failure: error- provoking conditions within the organisational environment that can 
increase the likelihood of patient harm  
NHS Outcomes Framework: a collection of national indicators used by the English 
Department of Health to hold the NHS to account 
National Patient Safety Agency: a national agency established in the early 2000s to lead 
and contribute to improvements in patient safety across the NHS  
National Reporting and Learning System: a national patient safety incident reporting 
system housed by the National Patient Safety Agency  
Non-Technical Processes: processes related to the wider aspects of healthcare delivery 
beyond the clinical doctor- patient encounter and determined by organisational factors such 
as leadership, modes of communication or teamwork  
Omissions: inactions such as failure to diagnose or treat   
Patient Safety Incident: an unintended or unexpected incident that could have harmed, or 
led to harm of NHS patients 
Problem in Care: patient harm resulting from:  
a) Acts of omission (inactions), such as failure to diagnose or treat 
b) Acts of commission (affirmative actions), such as incorrect treatment or 
management 
c) Unintended complications of healthcare. 
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Retrospective Case Record Review: traditionally a two-stage process consisting of an 
initial nurse-led screening stage followed by an in-depth review of screen positive records by 
a senior doctor to identify whether patients were harmed by healthcare 
Service Delivery Problem: a problem associated with decisions, procedures and systems at 
organisational level 
Summary Hospital-level Mortality Indicator: a measure derived from routine hospital 
data calculated from the ratio of a hospital’s observed death rate to an expected death rate 
derived from a regional or national average. It differs from HSMR by including all in-patient 
deaths and deaths within 30 days of discharge in the analysis 
System-Related Harm: harm that arises from factors related to the structure or 
organisational aspects of care delivery 
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Chapter	1	Introduction	
 
1.1	Context	
Around 15 million people are admitted to hospital each year in England and Wales, and the 
majority are treated safely and discharged, satisfied with the outcome.1-2 Unfortunately, for 
some patients something will go wrong, resulting in harm and sometimes death. Florence 
Nightingale was one of the earliest figures to attempt to assess the degree of harm caused by 
healthcare through closely observing the outcomes of her patients. Yet it was not until after 
the Second World War, when new and more complex therapies were rapidly being 
introduced, that consciousness began to spread amongst health professionals of the risks 
attached to such therapies. In 1964, Schimmel described as ‘noxious episodes’ all untoward 
events, complications, and mishaps resulting from diagnostic or therapeutic procedures 
instituted in the hospital.3 His clinical staff reported that 20% of patients receiving hospital 
care experienced a noxious event. Despite the gradually emerging evidence, a strong belief 
in technological innovation as a force for good led to a prevalent attitude amongst healthcare 
professionals that healthcare benefits outweighed the risks of harm.4  
Rising litigation costs in the US from the 1950s onwards saw a renewed focus on the scale 
and scope of healthcare related harm. In California, as part of an investigation into the 
feasibility of a state-wide, ‘no fault’ insurance scheme, the first large-scale investigation into 
the proportion of such adverse events was undertaken using retrospective case record 
reviews (RCRR).5 The seminal Harvard Medical Practice Study (HMPS), conducted in the 
late 1980s, examined 30,121 randomly selected records from 51 acute hospitals in New 
York and for the first time established a baseline for such events.6 Over the next two 
decades, replica healthcare harm studies were undertaken across the developed world and, 
more recently, such studies have begun to emerge from the developing world.7  
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Although awareness of healthcare related harm grew steadily amongst healthcare 
professionals during the half century after the second World War, it was not until the 
publication in the US of the Institute of Medicine report, To Err is Human: Building a safer 
healthcare system in 1999,8 that acknowledgement of its potential scale spread to a wider 
community of  politicians, policy makers, patients and the general public. The report 
estimated that between 44,000 and 98,000 Americans died each year as a result of the 
healthcare they received, and concluded that this harm represented the eighth leading cause 
of death in US hospitals. In 2000, the UK Department of Health’s (DH) Chief Medical 
Officer (CMO) published a review of patient safety in the National Health Service (NHS), 
entitled An organisation with a memory,9  in which he extrapolated figures from the US 
studies to estimate that between 60,000 and 250,000 patients might be suffering severe 
injury or death as a result of NHS care. The report indicated that settlement of the resulting 
clinical negligence claims cost the NHS around £400 million per year, and that the 
additional hospital bed days cost as much as £2 billion annually. Furthermore, highly 
publicised failures such as at Bristol Royal Infirmary (high death rates following paediatric 
surgery)10 and Stoke Mandeville Hospital (deaths following an outbreak of Clostridium 
difficile),11 were leading to increasing concern that the true burden of healthcare related 
harm in the NHS had not been uncovered. 
During the early 2000s, debate increased over the scale and scope of severe harm, and its 
ultimate outcome - preventable death in acute hospitals. The estimates in the CMO report 
had been drawn from the findings of two studies conducted in the 1980s and 1990s: the 
HMPS study and a subsequent study of 14,000 patient records in Utah and Colorado.6 12 A 
range of alternative estimates for the proportion of deaths in the NHS associated with 
healthcare harm were also in circulation. In 2001, the Bristol Inquiry report quoted 25,000 
deaths annually.10 This figure was based on the US estimate of 98,000 deaths per year 
approximately adjusted for the size of the UK population. In 2004, Aylin et al cited the 
figure of 40,000 deaths,13 which was followed in 2005 by citation of the figure of 34,000 
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deaths in the National Audit Office report, A Safer Place for Patients: Learning to improve 
patient safety.14 Both of these estimates were based on a pilot RCRR conducted by Vincent 
et al in 1999, which reviewed the records of 1014 patients from two London hospitals.15 The 
accuracy of these estimates is questionable, reliant as they are on relatively small numbers of 
deaths in the study sample. In contrast, a Dutch RCRR undertaken in 2005 of 8,415 patient 
records, including nearly 4,000 deaths, found preventable harm associated with death in 
4.1% of patients.16 This would equate to a figure for the NHS of 11,250 preventable deaths 
per year. 
Although traditional RCRR studies are designed to measure the proportion of preventable 
harm in patients who die, they are not designed to assess the causal association between the 
preventable harm and the subsequent death, i.e. whether the harm caused the death. This 
would require the reviewer to also take into consideration factors such as the acuity of 
presentation, co-morbidities or typical prognosis that also have a bearing on the risk of 
death. A single study from the US, which examined 116 deaths across Veterans 
Administration System hospitals, did consider these factors and found the proportion of 
preventable deaths to be 6%.17 This study also showed that the majority of patients 
experiencing preventable deaths had very limited life expectancies. This was in contrast to 
the Institute of Medicine report which, by suggesting that US deaths caused by healthcare 
harm are equivalent in number to two jumbo jets crashing every day, created the impression 
that the problem was as likely to impact on the young as the old.8  
Hospital safety incident reporting systems can offer another approach to understanding the 
nature of serious healthcare-related harm. The National Patient Safety Agency’s National 
Reporting and Learning System (NRLS) collected 6,688 reports of incidents associated with 
serious harm or death from acute hospitals in 2005-06, accounting for 1.3% of all reported 
incidents from a total of 526,599.18 A special analysis of the serious incidents associated 
with death identified 425 deaths that were potentially avoidable.19 Unfortunately, serious 
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under reporting occurs in such systems and this is particularly the case for harm at the severe 
end of the spectrum if staff fear they will be blamed.20  
Following the Bristol Inquiry, the DH had put much faith in the power of publicly available 
comparative data on hospital mortality to identify outliers for quality and patient safety. The 
Hospital Standardised Mortality Ratio (HSMR) and more recently the Summary Hospital-
level Mortality Indicator (SHMI), case-mix adjusted ratios of observed to expected hospital 
deaths, easily calculated using routinely collected hospital administrative data, were 
developed for this purpose. These statistics have been used to infer that hospitals towards the 
higher end of the ratio distribution have higher levels of avoidable deaths, an assumption 
that has been questioned primarily because of the lack of rigorous evidence to back it up. In 
fact, there have been only four studies, all from North America and published between 1987 
and 2008, that have looked at the association between HSMR and the proportion of 
preventable deaths detected by case record review and none for SHMI. Across the studies, 
the preventable deaths were from selected specialties,21-22 diseases,23 or interventions,24 and 
therefore had a limited capacity to predict relationships between HSMR and preventable 
deaths in broader groups of patients. The studies were also limited by sample size (ranging 
from182-347 patients, except for one with 739 patients22) and did not analyse the 
relationship at the level of individual hospitals, but as aggregated data from groups of high 
and low HSMR hospitals. Three of the studies either found no correlation,21-22 or a non-
significant negative correlation.24 Only one study, the smallest, found a significant positive 
association in hospitals with a high HSMR and preventable deaths, and that was confined to 
patients in a single disease group (pneumonia).23 Conducting similar correlation studies in 
England has been limited by the lack of a reliable estimate for preventable deaths in 
hospitals. 
In 2006, the House of Commons Public Accounts Committee commented that the ‘…lack of 
accurate information on serious incidents and deaths makes it difficult for the NHS to 
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evaluate risk or get a grip on reducing high-risk incidents…’,25 a perspective reiterated in 
2009 by a House of Commons Health Committee which also looked at patient safety.26 This 
uncertainty applied not only to the numbers of preventable deaths, but also to the problems 
in healthcare that led to these deaths and to the subpopulations most affected. At the time 
there was no information available as to whether preventable deaths were occurring 
predominantly in those with an already limited life expectancy, or were foreshortening lives 
by a substantial number of years. Since then, the publication of failings at the Mid 
Staffordshire Hospitals Trust,27 has ensured that the debate around the scale of serious harm 
including the number of preventable deaths has remained active amongst the public, 
politicians and policy makers.  Clearly it is incumbent upon health services to minimise the 
risk to patients, and seek to implement good systems that prevent unnecessary harm, 
including death. Continuous debate over the numbers of preventable deaths in acute 
hospitals in England, and whether current measures such as HSMR and SHMI, correlate 
with these deaths, is at best a distraction, and at worst leads to inappropriate decisions on 
priority setting for improving safety. Providing a clear picture of the size and nature of 
safety related deaths in hospitals requires a robust multicentre study of deaths in order to 
develop a good understanding not only of the size and impact of the problem, but also the 
main causes and underlying causal factors.  
 
1.2	Aims	and	Objectives	
The overall aim of this thesis is to identify the most appropriate method for measuring 
severe harm, principally in regard to preventable death in acute hospitals, and to determine 
the proportion of preventable deaths, the nature of those deaths and how this proportion 
correlates with other patient safety indicators.  
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The specific objectives are: 
• To describe the strengths and weaknesses of current measures of patient safety for 
identifying harm in hospitals 
• To compare the scale and scope of hospital harm identified by different measures of 
patient safety 
• To determine the proportion of preventable deaths, causes, contributory factors, 
subpopulations affected and years of life lost in acute hospitals in England 
• To determine whether the proportion of preventable deaths across hospitals 
correlates with other patient safety indicators 
 
1.3	Conceptual	Framework	
In his 2008 report High Quality Care for All, Lord Ara Darzi identified patient experience, 
effectiveness of interventions and patient safety as key domains of the quality of healthcare 
provided in the NHS.28 This thesis is grounded in the third domain of patient safety, and 
focuses on the area of harm measurement.  
1.3.1	Defining	Harm	
There are many different ways that healthcare can harm patients, and any overarching 
definition has to have a broad scope if it is to be applied to a general population of adult 
inpatients. The Oxford English Dictionary defines harm as a ‘physical injury, especially that 
which is deliberately inflicted’.29 Harm in the context of healthcare has been defined by the 
World Health Organisation/ World Alliance for Safer Healthcare as ‘harm arising from or 
associated with plans or actions taken during the provision of healthcare, rather than an 
underlying disease or injury’.30 This definition clearly links such harm to the provision of 
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healthcare, but fails to incorporate harm that arises from failures to undertake plans or 
actions. For the purpose of this thesis, I use a broad definition that includes any harm arising 
from the provision of healthcare. I further classify healthcare harm as harm due to: 
• Acts of omission or inactions such as failure to diagnose or treat   
• Acts of commission or affirmative actions related to the active delivery of care such 
as incorrect treatment or management 
• Unintended or unexpected complications of healthcare: the occurrence of harm 
despite care that was delivered to an acceptable standard and was error free, such as 
an adverse drug reaction following the first dose of a new medication. 
Since the HMPS, the occurrence of healthcare harm has been customarily labelled as an 
‘adverse event’ (see Box 1 for definition).6 More recently, the NPSA customised this term 
for use in the NHS, naming harm events as ‘patient safety incidents’.31 My research uses a 
novel term, ‘problem in care’, to describe healthcare related harm. Its definition is designed 
to extend the focus on harm beyond discrete incidents, thus ensuring that it includes injury 
resulting from multiple omissions in care, particularly if these occur over days or weeks.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Box 1.1: Definitions of patient harm 
• Adverse Event: An unintended injury caused by healthcare management 
rather than the patient’s disease that resulted in temporary or permanent 
disability, death or prolongation of hospital stay (Harvard Medical 
Practice Study) 
• Patient Safety Incident: Any unintended or unexpected incident that 
could have or did lead to harm for one or more persons receiving NHS 
healthcare (National Patient Safety Agency) 
• Problem in Care: Patient harm resulting from acts of omission 
(inactions), such as failure to diagnose or treat, or from acts of 
commission (affirmative actions), such as incorrect treatment or 
management, or harm as a result of unintended complications of 
healthcare. 
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1.3.2	Design	of	a	Conceptual	Model	for	Safety	and	Harm	Measurement	
Understanding the theories underlying the generation of harm in healthcare is essential when 
considering the development of research into patient safety measurement. As part of 
developing the Donabedian Model, a framework for measuring quality in healthcare, the 
physician Avedis Donabedian described healthcare organisations as having structures, 
processes, and outcomes.32 An organisation’s structure is the context in which care is 
delivered, and reflects both physical (e.g. facilities) and organisational (e.g. proportion of 
trained staff) characteristics. Processes are activities related to the provision of healthcare 
including the actions of doctors, nurses and patients, and spanning from prevention to cure. 
These processes are sometimes broken down into technical processes that describe how care 
related to diagnosis and treatment is delivered to the patient, or non-technical processes 
reflecting wider aspects of healthcare delivery, encompassing the interactions between 
people and knowledge sharing determined by organisational factors such as modes of 
communication, teamwork and leadership.33 Structure and processes combine to culminate 
in health outcomes. Harm can be considered an adverse outcome of structural and process 
factors within healthcare organisations.  
In a paper exploring the conceptualisation of patient safety, Brown et al adapted 
Donebedian’s model to show how breakdowns at each point in the framework can become 
part of the causal chain in harm generation (Figure 1).34 The causal chain model explains 
how structural factors influence clinical technical processes and thence harm mediated by 
intervening variables (also known as contributory factors) such as shift work, team structures 
or modes of communication (non-technical processes).35 This model also draws on the work 
of James Reason, a psychologist, who has been an influential thinker in the field of patient 
safety. He conceptualises a healthcare organisation as a complex system made up of the 
activities taking place between clinicians and patients, the organisation’s design and 
procedures and the influence of external factors. He describes errors that occur at the 
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interface between the clinician and the patient as ‘active failures’ and those which are related 
to how the organisation is run as ‘latent failures’. These ‘latent failures’ can be seen as 
creating the climate in which ‘active failures’ are more likely to occur.36  
Figure 1.1 Conceptual model outlining points where harm can occur and preventative 
interventions focused  
 
 
Reproduced from Brown C, Hofer T, Johal A, Thomson R, Nicholl J, Franklin BD, et al. An epistemology 
of patient safety research: a framework for study design and interpretation. Part 1. Conceptualising and 
developing interventions. Qual Saf Health Care 2008;17(3):p.160 
 
Thomas and Petersen proposed a framework for harm measures which also builds on the 
work of Reason (Figure 2).37  The framework places different measures along a continuum.  
At one end are measures that provide information on the context in which the harm 
occurred, therefore shedding light on error provoking environments or latent/ system 
failures. These include malpractice claims files, incident reports, and morbidity and 
mortality meetings. Although such sources can provide valuable information on system-level 
issues, they cannot be used to determine incidence because of reporting and selection biases. 
At the other end of the spectrum are methods that collect information on harm prospectively, 
including direct observation and prospective clinical surveillance, which will be more likely 
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to identify active failures at the level of patient and practitioner. These approaches can be 
used to measure incidence, and are therefore better placed to allow the measurement of the 
impact of interventions to improve safety.  
Figure 1.2 Thomas and Petersen’s framework for harm measures 
 
Reproduced from Thomas EJ, Petersen LA. Measuring errors and adverse events in health care. J Gen 
Intern Med 2003;18(1):p.64. 
 
I have combined these two models to create an overarching conceptual model for healthcare-
related harm measurement, in order to inform my research (Figure 3). The proposed 
conceptual framework models the causal chain of harm generation after Brown et al,34 and 
acknowledges that different harm measures are likely to identify different types of problems 
in care (system or clinical) as outlined by Thomas and Petersen.37 It extends the models 
proposed by these two groups by adding other safety related measures to the components of 
the causal chain, and categorising harm measures by health services or research orientation. 
Interpretation of this conceptual framework leads to the prediction that there should be a 
correlation between measures related to components of the causal chain and harm. 
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The evidence linking structural factors to safety, though still limited, has been accumulating 
since the 1970s. It suggests that factors such as numbers and qualification levels of nursing 
staff,38 work scheduling for junior doctors,39 presence of hospital quality improvement 
systems,40 and hospital design features41 all have an impact on levels of patient harm. 
Amongst organisational measures, the most developed are those for evaluating safety 
culture. Safety culture can be conceptualised as the values, attitudes and behaviours that 
influence an organisation’s commitment to patient safety improvement.42 Organisation 
scores using safety culture measurement tools have been shown to be associated with 
frequency of hospital acquired infection, pressure ulcers and drug errors.43-45 Direct 
observation has been used to measure important intervening variables, such as teamwork, 
and has identified the importance of multidisciplinary team composition and knowledge 
sharing in harm prevention in intensive care units and surgical operating theatres.46-47 The 
links between clinical processes and patient harm are well established through numerous 
RCRR studies of harm.48  
The conceptual framework can also help highlight one of the key debates in patient safety 
measurement; whether it is better to measure patient harm, or the underlying errors (both 
active and latent) that lead to that harm. Harm measurement might seem the obvious 
approach, responding as it does to the fundamental principle of care provision, i.e. that it 
causes no unnecessary injury. Its measurement can prove an effective way of gaining the 
attention and involvement of healthcare professionals in quality and safety improvement.  
This is particularly the case in systems such as the NHS, where errors can be more easily 
regarded as trivial, or an inevitable part of its unreliable functioning.49-50 However 
measurement of harm is complex, particularly at the severe end (including death), as such 
events are relatively rare phenomena. Moreover, different approaches to defining and 
detecting harm lead to different findings. Even with the most clear cut events such as death, 
the debate over the use of HSMR highlights the challenges of case mix adjustment when 
such measures are used to compare organisations.51-53  
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In contrast, others argue that measurement of error is superior because errors are more 
common than harm, therefore offering greater precision in measurement.54 Furthermore, the 
study of errors in the processes of care, can more easily identify exactly where such care 
needs improving in relation to both human knowledge and skills at the clinical interface, and 
for system level issues.55-56 Outcome measures such as harm, being dependent on multiple 
variables, can be poor indicators of where to target improvement.57 However, there are a 
number of disadvantages of error measurement that mean it is unlikely to ever replace harm 
measurement as a reliable metric.  Firstly, like harm, definitions of error are subject to 
debate. Over time there have been a plethora of definitions, from error as an underlying 
causal factor, to error as an event (process definition), as well as error as an outcome.58 Only 
in the last decade, influenced by the work of James Reason, has the process definition of 
error become the most commonly adopted view.59 Confusion between the different notions 
of error can lead to a loss of clarity over what should be measured, and against which 
standards (if these standards exist at all).  Secondly, a focus on error rather than harm also 
has the potential to stigmatise staff and reinforce a culture of blame.60 Despite the evidence 
that system or ‘latent’ factors often underlie an individual’s error (active error), the 
individual’s error is often more visible and focussed on, especially in organisations with 
weak safety cultures.61 Because of its multifactorial origins, attention on harm moves the 
safety improvement focus away from individual error towards the less stigmatising 
identification of system flaws.62 It also acknowledges that not all harm is caused by 
underlying errors and provides an opportunity to work towards increasing the safety of care 
through risk reduction.63  
My conceptual model is crucial in fulfilling the aims of this thesis, and will be used to direct 
an exploration of different measures of patient harm. In turn this will enable the 
development of an understanding of which harm measure might best fulfil the requirements 
of a study to establish a baseline proportion of preventable death, and identify underlying 
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problems in care contributing to such deaths. It will also help identify which patient safety 
measures one might expect to correlate with preventable hospital death. 
In this thesis the focus will be on deaths that occur during a hospital admission. Examination 
of hospital deaths would seem a logical approach to measuring the quality and safety of 
hospital care, being an easily defined outcome of such care and one held to be important by 
the public, politicians and clinicians alike. However, deaths occur in less than 5% of hospital 
admissions,64 and many of these deaths are expected, as up to 50% of the UK population will 
come to hospital to die.65 Outcome measures can be poor at indicating where interventions 
for improvement should be focused and many other factors apart from quality and safety can 
influence these measures, for instance differing lengths of stay and availability of alternative 
provision for end of life care will influence the proportions of deaths that occur in hospital.53 
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1.4	Structure	of	the	thesis	
Chapter 2 presents a narrative literature review which examines the background to harm 
measurement, describes the most common measures, outlines the epidemiology of harm 
derived from these measures, looks at issues to be considered when measuring harm, and 
compares the performance of the different harm measures. Chapter 3 (Research paper 1) 
describes an exploratory study conducted in one hospital, which examined the utility of a 
range of information sources to provide information on patient harm. This work, in 
association with the literature review, contributed to the development of the methodology for 
measurement of preventable deaths. Chapter 4 draws on the findings from Chapters 2 and 3 
and describes the development of the methodology used in the study to determine the 
proportion of preventable hospital deaths and their nature. Chapters 5, 6 and 7 comprise 
three research papers. The first covers headline findings from my RCRR study of 1000 
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deaths across ten English acute hospitals, related to the proportion of preventable hospital 
deaths and their causes, the second describes in more detail the causes of preventable deaths, 
and the third explores correlations between hospital preventable death proportions and other 
measures of patient safety. The final Chapter is an overview of the main findings and 
discusses the limitations of the thesis, as well as opportunities for future research, along with 
policy and practice implications. 
 
1.5	Contribution	to	the	thesis	
I undertook the background literature review. I took the lead in the design of all studies 
which make up this thesis and was supported in this by the research study co-authors. I 
collected all data for Paper 1(Chapter 3). Dr Sisse Olsen and Dr Graham Neale acted as 
second reviewers for the case record reviews. Dr Frances Healey was second reviewer for 
the case narratives explored in Paper 3 (Chapter 6). I undertook all data analysis and was 
provided with statistical support by Dr Jenny Neuburger and Mr Andrew Hutchings.  All co-
authors of the research papers contributed to data interpretation. Professor Charles Vincent 
and Dr Frances Healey provided guidance on presentation of the findings in Research Paper 
3 and Professor Nick Black for Research Paper 4 (Chapter 7). I produced the first draft of 
each research paper and made changes in response to co-authors’ and peer reviewer 
feedback.  
The main study was funded by National Institute of Health Research (NIHR), under the 
Research for Patient Benefit Programme. The candidate was the Chief Investigator, and 
Professors Black, Vincent, Thomson, and Drs Neale and Healey were co-investigators. 
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1.6	Overall	contribution	of	the	thesis	to	the	field	of	study	
My thesis examines the field of harm measurement to identify which approach is best in 
determining the proportion of preventable deaths in acute hospitals. Chapter 3 (Research 
paper 1) describes the findings when using a range of approaches to measuring harm in a 
single acute hospital Trust. The paper concludes that different information sources identify 
different patient harms, but that these are not harnessed in tandem to allow the development 
of a better understanding of key risk areas.   
In Chapter 4, my thesis outlines the methodology behind the development and 
implementation of the largest study of preventable death ever undertaken in the UK. The 
results of this study, including a robust estimate of the proportion for preventable death in 
English acute hospitals, are presented in Chapter 5 (Research paper 2). A proportion of 5.2% 
was found, which was lower than previous estimates based on extrapolations from US 
studies, but consistent with findings from a more recent Dutch RCRR study. The majority of 
problems in care that contributed to preventable death were related to clinical monitoring, 
diagnostic error, and drug and fluid problems. The study methodology has been actively 
drawn upon to guide the development of an approach that can be used to measure such 
deaths at a national level. This measure will become a new NHS Outcome Framework 
indicator in 2014, entitled ‘hospital deaths due to problems in care’.67   
Chapter 6 (Research paper 3) presents the findings of a novel content analysis of the case 
narratives for each preventable death collected during the case record reviews, and reveals 
more detail of the nature of underlying problems in care linked to such deaths. Problems that 
have been previously identified, such as failure to monitor anticoagulant medication, poor 
management of fluid balance, and failure to adequately assess patients and to give indicated 
drugs, appear still to be common within the NHS, despite a number of national policies and 
campaigns directed at such issues over the last decade.31 68-70  The fact that around 70% of 
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such problems were related to omissions of care indicates that there are persistent failures to 
tackle reliability within the health service.  
Chapter 7 (Research paper 4) outlines findings from an examination of the association 
between the proportion of preventable deaths found in acute hospitals and other safety 
measures including the HSMR. No significant correlations were found, with the exception of 
MRSA bacteraemia rates. This finding casts doubt on previous assumptions that HSMR/ 
SHMI measure preventable deaths. One recommendation of the Keogh Review71 of 14 NHS 
acute hospitals carried out in 2013 in response to quality and patient concerns, was that my 
colleagues and I should extend our RCRR of hospital deaths to a further 24 hospitals. 
Combined with the findings from the first ten hospitals, there will then be adequate 
statistical power to determine if a clinically and statistically significant association exists 
between preventable deaths identified by case record review and HSMR/ SHMI.
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Chapter	2	Measuring	Harm	in	Healthcare:	Background	
 
2.1	Introduction		
This chapter is framed partly by my conceptual framework, and partly by drawing on 
previous work on specifications for quality measures.72-73   It draws on an extensive body of 
literature drawn from a wide ranging search strategy (see Appendix 1). The chapter begins 
with a brief description of the history of harm measurement. Then, guided by my conceptual 
framework, I identify the main measures of patient harm, reviewing current use and scope 
for measuring different types of harm. These measures are grouped by measurements more 
commonly used in hospital practice, and those with more of a research focus. There follows 
an overview of the epidemiology of patient harm, with a focus on findings from RCRR 
studies.  
As harm can be regarded as an outcome indicator for poor quality care,34 the next section 
explores harm measurement against criteria that have been developed to assess the technical 
attributes of healthcare quality indicators. These criteria draw on those developed by the 
Institute of Medicine in the US as part of its Medicare Quality Assurance Programme, and 
the World Health Organisation Performance Assessment Tool for Quality Improvement in 
Hospitals (PATH).72-73   The harm measures are then directly compared against these criteria 
and each other.  
The chapter concludes with consideration of which approach may be best for measurement 
of the scale and scope of preventable deaths in hospitals in England. The work presented in 
this chapter and the following chapter guided me in the choice of harm measure for a study 
to ascertain a national estimate of the proportion of preventable hospital deaths in England 
and their underlying causes. 
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2.2	The	Development	of	Harm	Measurement	
Receiving healthcare can be a hazardous business for a patient. The driving force of all 
patient safety initiatives is to prevent patient harm as a consequence of healthcare. More 
specifically, patient safety can be defined as  ‘…the avoidance, prevention and amelioration 
of adverse outcomes or injuries stemming from the processes of healthcare.’74 Attainment of 
such goals is dependent on identifying problems that occur in healthcare, the harm that 
results and their frequency.  Florence Nightingale and later, Ernest Codman, a 19th Century 
US surgeon, can be seen as the founders of the modern safety measurement movement. Both 
took an interest in the outcomes of healthcare interventions, particularly in the numbers of 
patients who died following such interventions, and the causes of those deaths. However, it 
was the emergence of peer review organisations in the US from the 1970s, combined with a 
growing interest in establishing the contribution of hospital related harm, that really 
stimulated the development of harm measurement.5 75 Retrospective methods for analysing 
the contents of case records emerged and became formalised as the RCRR approach, 
traditionally a two stage process consisting of an initial nurse-led screening stage followed 
by an in-depth review by a senior doctor of screen positive records. Researchers from 
Boston, when designing the first large scale epidemiological study based on RCRR, the 
HMPS, built on these foundations; they improved reliability by introducing a structured 
review form, systematic training of reviewers, and a proportion of double reviews at the 
screening and full record review stages. Over 50 years later, the RCRR remains the 
internationally recognised method for the measurement of patient harm in hospital settings.  
In the UK, the traditional forums for examining patient harm were Mortality and Morbidity 
meetings, principally run amongst surgical specialties. In the 1930s, the first national 
Confidential Enquiry was established, with the aim of identifying problems in care 
associated with maternal deaths in a more systematic fashion.76 Many more national 
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confidential enquiries were introduced, including the National Confidential Enquiry into 
Perioperative Deaths (NCEPOD) in 1986.77  
Over this period, growing concern aroused by increasing litigation in the NHS led to the 
development of hospital risk management programmes, which had already successfully 
reduced the number of health-related legal claims in the US.78 Such programmes specified 
the need for an incident reporting system similar to those used to improve safety in the high 
risk industries of aviation, nuclear power, and oil.79 In An organisation with a memory, 
published in 2000, the CMO for England exposed the scale of harm in the NHS and put 
forward a national programme for its amelioration.9 One specific action was to set up a 
national incident reporting system, and the NRLS was established in 2004. It was to be run 
by a new agency, the NPSA. The hope was that the NRLS would initiate a step change in 
learning from harm. Much effort was put into promoting openness about error and patient 
harm in NHS organisations which, in turn, it was hoped would lead to good reporting rates.31 
New mechanisms were devised to disseminate learning and ensure that recommendations 
were acted upon. The NRLS drew on information fed in from local reporting systems, as 
well as independent NHS staff reports, via a web-based portal. Although incident reporting 
has gradually increased over the last decade, reaching a total of just over a million reports 
made by 2012/13, analysis of reporting patterns indicates persistent under-reporting. 
Combined with the lack of denominators, the result is that the utility of this source in 
providing an accurate picture of harm in the NHS is limited.80-81  
The latter half of the 20th Century proved a fertile period for innovation in safety 
measurement. James Reason’s highly influential work exploring the nature of error and harm 
from a psychological perspective was instrumental in influencing how harm is 
conceptualised and investigated.59 Interest in organisational culture and its influence on the 
proportion of errors and harm has led to a burgeoning of approaches to evaluating safety 
culture by surveys or direct observation within hospitals.44 82    The addition of questions on 
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the witnessing of harm and incident reporting to the annual NHS staff survey acknowledged 
the patient safety intelligence held by NHS frontline staff. The emergence of new dangers, 
such as healthcare acquired infections (e.g. MRSA or Clostridium difficile) have led to the 
establishment of new monitoring systems to track incidence and promote a sense of urgency 
in addressing these serious problems.83 
In the last decade, there has been a movement towards developing a more systematic 
understanding of patterns of mortality as part of a suite of approaches that can be used to 
identify preventable harm and other quality failings across hospitals and, in doing so, focus 
improvement efforts.84-85 Death statistics were first published over one hundred years ago, 
and have appeared intermittently in the public domain since then.76 Following the 
Government’s increased interest in the potential of these statistics to benchmark hospitals 
and provide an early warning system for poor care, The Dr Foster organisation began to 
publish comparative HSMRs for all acute hospitals in England from 2002.86 Debate has 
continued since the introduction of this measure as to the validity of these estimates, and the 
nature of the ‘excess deaths’ identified, in terms of just how many of these are actually 
preventable. With the emergence of reports of hospitals gaming the system, and research 
indicating that many other factors apart from the quality and safety of patient care have an 
impact on the value of these statistics, calls have been made to abandon the use of HSMR.51 
87   
Drawing on the work of the US Institute for Healthcare Improvement88 and the UK’s 
Modernisation Agency,89 the NHS Institute for Innovation and Improvement has 
subsequently advocated the use of case record based mortality reviews for identifying 
patient harm and focussing safety efforts.90 This approach was also recommended by NHS 
national safety campaigns in England and Wales.69 85 Furthermore, the need to better 
understand their own fluctuations in HSMRs has generated bottom-up momentum within 
hospitals to expand the review of deaths beyond Mortality and Morbidity meetings. The 
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differential impact of these forces has resulted in the emergence of a variety of approaches to 
the mortality review process. Morbidity and Mortality meetings, RCRR, incident reporting 
and HSMR have emerged as the main approaches to measuring serious healthcare-related 
harm in the UK. The next section describes these measures and others in common use in 
more detail, including an exploration of their scope. 
 
2.3	An	Exploration	of	Harm	Measures	
Harm measures can be divided into those that have been developed for use in a health 
service setting, and those that are currently more frequently used in patient safety research.  
Some measures, such as RCRR, analyses of claims and inquest records, and prospective 
surveillance span both spheres and others are likely to move from research into the health 
services over time. Different measures are likely to identify different types of error or harm.  
2.3.1	Health	Service	Orientated	Measures	
2.3.1.1 Routine Data 
Routine data must be collected by hospitals as part of corporate resource management, and 
therefore provide a cheap and easily accessible source of information on hospital activity. 
The utility of the data can be enhanced through links with other data sources such as Office 
of National Statistics (ONS) mortality data.  There are three main harm measures derived 
from routine data: the 41 ICD-10 diagnosis codes for adverse events and misadventures, 
standardised mortality ratios and Patient Safety Indicators (PSI). Such measures can provide 
information on harm at individual consultant, department or hospital levels, as well as for 
different patient subgroups.91 However, only standardised mortality ratios are used as an 
indicator of safety in today’s NHS. 
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The 41 adverse event and misadventure codes are primarily limited to surgical and obstetric 
harm, with the codes identifying problems during and after procedures or complications 
related to devices, grafts or foreign bodies. None of the codes relate specifically to death. 
One English study of hospital episode statistics from between 1999-2003 and covering over 
50 million episodes of care found at least one of these codes in 2.2% of all admissions.13 A 
similar study from Australia found the codes in 4.75% of admissions.92  
In the US there has been much more interest in developing indicators of patient safety from 
routine data than in the UK, which probably reflects the better quality and depth of coded 
activity information available. Early on, attention focused on deriving case mix adjusted 
measures of hospital mortality using sophisticated algorithms that standardised for age, 
deprivation, gender, urgency of admission, co-morbidities and diagnosis. Professor Brian 
Jarman and his team at Imperial College developed the first such measure for use in the UK, 
the HSMR, in 1999. 93 The measure was calculated from the ratio of a hospital’s observed 
death rate to an expected death rate derived from the national average. Values above 100 are 
interpreted as ‘excess deaths’ with the assumption that at least some of these deaths are 
preventable.  Linkage between hospital administrative data and the Office of National 
Statistics data also allows inclusion of deaths within 30 days of discharge.  
In the 1980s, cardiothoracic surgeons in New York were the first medical specialists to make 
their death rates, at individual surgeon level, available to the public.94 Since then there has 
been increasing international political interest in the use of such data for hospital 
performance management and benchmarking.95 The UK Government believed publication of 
league tables for hospital mortality rates would lead to the earlier recognition of problems 
with hospital safety, and avert future scandals similar to the one uncovered at Bristol Royal 
Infirmary.76 Marshall et al, in their review of the impact of publicly released mortality data 
in the US found that publication of such information did lead to changes, both in the 
processes and outcomes of care; responses being driven by factors such as sensitivity to 
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public image and the legal risk posed by underperforming doctors.94 A subsequent review of 
outcomes following feedback of mortality data to cardiothoracic surgeons in England, also 
found a reduction in mortality from cardiac surgery.96 However, other studies have found 
little or no impact of such information.97 Smith highlighted that there were also a range of 
unintended consequences as a result of publishing such data, including measure fixation, 
tunnel vision, misinterpretation and gaming.98 Like other summary outcome measures, 
HSMR is limited in its ability to indicate where resources for improvement should be 
focused. To date, HSMRs continue to be used for benchmarking hospitals in England 
alongside the SHMI, a measure similar to HSMR whose calculation is based on a broader 
range of in-hospital deaths and also takes into account deaths within 30 days of discharge. 
More recently, the Care Quality Commission, the national organisation charged with 
ensuring quality and safety standards are maintained in NHS organisations, has commenced 
monitoring of disease-specific mortality ratios. The measures are being used as triggers for 
further investigations of hospital practice. 
An alternative approach to harm measurement, again largely developed in the US, has been 
to use signal or indicator codes known to be linked to hospital harm.99 The algorithms for 
PSI are created by combining primary and secondary diagnoses with procedure codes. 
Sophisticated systems can identify those diagnoses present only after admission.100 The first 
indicators focused on specific causes of harm, such as hospital acquired infection and drug 
errors.101-102 In the 1990s, Iezzoni et al in the US broadened the scope to 27 indicators 
including post-operative haemorrhage, post-operative pneumonia, sepsis and wound 
infection as part of the Complications Screening Programme Study.103 Building on this 
work, the US Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ) created a suite of PSIs 
for use in inter-hospital comparisons. Again, the majority of PSIs are designed to identify 
complications following surgical procedures and obstetric trauma rather than medical harm, 
as more of the codes used in these specialties are clearly linked to harm.104 Two PSI codes 
look for potentially avoidable deaths: ‘failure to rescue’ includes deaths per 1,000 patients 
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with specified treatable complications of care (e.g. pneumonia, sepsis, gastrointestinal 
bleeding) develop during hospitalisation, and ‘deaths in low mortality diagnosis related 
groups’ includes in-hospital deaths per 1000, in patients with an admission diagnosis that 
has a less than 0.5% expected mortality. Interest in using PSI is developing in the UK, and 
some initial work has been done to adapt the algorithms to make this possible.105  
Harm identified by adverse and misadventure codes or patient safety algorithms is more 
likely to be related to acts of commission rather than omissions, and clinical rather than 
system-based. The introduction of the electronic patient record holds promise for more 
sophisticated data linkage, and measurement of a wider range of harms using routine data.106  
2.3.1.2 Incident Reporting 
Incident reporting systems encompassing the reporting, collating and learning from safety 
incidents were initially designed to identify specific, usually rare, events like blood 
transfusion reactions,107 or problems occurring in the high risk settings of anaesthetic rooms 
or intensive care units.108 The UK was the first country in the world to develop a national, 
voluntary, confidential incident reporting system in 2004.9 Other countries now have similar 
systems, but none on the scale of the NRLS. Reports to the NRLS provide descriptive details 
of the incident, contributory factors and mitigating actions along with an assessment of the 
degree of harm. Such systems are able to shed light on harm as a consequence of system 
factors such as low staffing levels, as well as those with a clinical origin, but do tend to pick 
up more harm linked to acts of commission.  A national system is particularly useful for 
identifying rare harms and high risk areas, and for tracking responses to interventions that 
address these problems over time.109   
Although the number of reports has increased steadily since its inception, patterns of 
reporting have remained similar with two-thirds of reports being no-harm incidents. Falls 
remain the most common type of incident reported, at approximately 30%.18 Less than 0.1% 
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of reports relate to a death.110 Analysis of trends in patient safety incident reporting to the 
46NRLS, shows that hospitals with the highest reporting rates overall (in the top 25%) report 
fewer incidents linked to no-harm and falls as other types of incident reports take their place. 
Higher reporting rates are considered to be a feature of a positive safety culture.111 However, 
across all organisations, doctors report fewer incidents than nurses do, leading to an under 
representation of incidents linked to clinical diagnosis, assessment and management.112-113  
2.3.1.3 Morbidity and Mortality Meetings 
In the early 20th century, Ernest Codman, an American surgeon, began to keep records of 
outcomes following surgery, documenting errors and subsequent harm. This approach 
developed into the modern day Mortality and Morbidity (M&M) meetings. M&M meetings 
are the traditional forums for discussing and learning from unexpected deaths or serious 
complications that occur in surgical and anaesthetic specialties, and have been a prerequisite 
in NHS hospitals hosting surgical training programmes since the 1960s.114 Increasingly, 
meetings to review deaths have been adopted by other specialties, attracting participation 
from the wider multidisciplinary team and, more recently, reframed as an approach to 
pinpoint patient safety risks in healthcare provision.115  
The meetings are a potentially rich source of information on serious harm, especially when 
post mortem findings are also available. A systematic review has shown that up to 25% of 
post mortems reveal an unsuspected principal diagnosis, or primary cause of death, 
providing evidence of missed diagnoses.116 With the decline in frequency of post mortems, 
this valuable source of learning is being lost.117 Although there is potential to collect 
information on system-related harm as well as clinical harm, to date there has been little 
systematic collection and analysis of this information. Recent initiatives have looked to 
standardise the process of case selection, analysis and feedback, in an effort to improve 
institutional learning alongside educational and peer review elements.118 
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2.3.2	Health	Service	and	Research	Orientated	Measures	
2.3.2.1 Retrospective Case Record Review 
The HMPS was the first rigorous application of the RCRR method. The study reviewed 
30,121 randomly selected records from hospitals across New York State; it was designed to 
investigate the epidemiology of healthcare related harm and to build on the findings from 
earlier smaller studies that had used non-random samples. Traditionally the method consists 
of a nurse-led initial screening process followed by a detailed clinical review by one or more 
senior physicians. Doctors are asked to make judgements as to whether harm occurred as a 
result of healthcare rather than a patient’s own illness, the degree of harm, and its 
preventability. The rich material found in the record can provide the reviewer with a picture 
of care from admission through to discharge, in addition to information on the context in 
which care was delivered, and other contributory factors. The technique uses implicit 
review, whereby reviews of the case record are conducted without any pre-set criteria, and 
use clinician judgements, based on knowledge and experience, to assess whether processes 
of care were of an acceptable standard. 
Seen as an approach that can shed light on a broad array of harms, especially those at the 
more severe end of the spectrum, those generated by the actions of doctors and those caused 
by omissions in care which are difficult to identify using other measures, it has often been 
used as the ‘gold standard’ against which other measures are compared. However, case 
record content is more likely to contain information on technical aspects of care, 
encompassing processes related to diagnosis and management that are targeted at the 
patient’s presenting problems. Limited information on non-technical aspects of care which 
relate to the way care is delivered at the clinician-patient interface and on the organisational 
context in which it is delivered make it more likely that reviews will identify problems 
related to an individual’s actions as opposed to those due to underlying system failure.119-120  
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Confidential Enquiries can be seen as a form of implicit review designed to determine if 
adverse outcomes, particularly serious harm and death, were associated with the processes of 
care delivery for particular specialties or procedures. Some enquiries look at all deaths 
within a specialty, such as obstetrics, whilst others will undertake themed reviews. In recent 
years the NCEPOD has undertaken investigations into deaths following in-hospital cardiac 
arrest, deaths in older patients, and deaths as a result of acute kidney disease.121-123 The aim 
of these investigations is to make recommendations that will address identified problems, 
and in so doing will improve safety.  These studies can be useful for generating hypotheses 
around the nature of preventable mortality and key contributory factors that can be 
subsequently tested. Wider generalisations can be limited by a lack of denominator data and 
controls.77  
2.3.2.2 Global Trigger Tool 
Trigger Tools are a form of explicit review in which sentinel events or ‘triggers’ linked to 
harm, are pre-specified in a list which is then used to screen a case record. The approach 
originated to address concerns that traditional RCRR was too resource intensive, both in 
terms of review time and the requirement for senior doctors to undertake assessments. In the 
1970s, Jick et al first developed a pre-determined list of sentinel words or conditions 
associated with medication harm that could be used to find high risk records for further more 
extensive review.124 Subsequently, Classen et al used this trigger list to search electronic 
patient records. 125 Under the auspices of the US Institute of Healthcare Innovation (IHI), 
Rozich went on to develop a tool which could be applied to a wider range of harms, and 
named it the Global Trigger Tool (GTT). 126-127  
Since its introduction, use of the GTT has spread to a number of developed countries 
including the UK, and new trigger lists have been developed for use in subsets of patients 
including those in intensive care or children, along with flexibility for customisation to suit 
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local needs.128 The choice of triggers in the GTT determines the range of specific harms (e.g. 
cardiac arrest, surgical site infection or medication-related harm), it can be used to 
measure.129-130  It is designed to find harm related to acts of commission, and generally those 
that are clinically focused. As yet it has not been adapted for use in patients that die during 
admission.   
The GTT approach involves a 20 minute screen of the case records, searching for up to 32 
triggers including cardiac arrest, prescription of naloxone, or deep vein thrombosis, followed 
by a limited review of the case record by a doctor if any triggers are found to allow 
confirmation of harm. Nurses usually undertake the initial screening review, but other staff, 
including clinical audit personnel, can be trained to do so. When compared to patient safety 
indicators and incident reporting systems, GTT appears to be more efficient in finding harm 
events confirmed by case record review, finding up to 10 times more such events.131-132 Care 
has to be taken that hospitals do not confuse triggers with actual harm when tracking trends. 
IHI introduced the tool for internal quality assessments only and not for comparisons of 
harm between hospitals, due to limits in the specificity and sensitivity of some of the 
triggers.34 133  
2.3.2.3 Claims Files 
Closed claims files contain a range of information including case record extracts, patient, 
relative, clinician and lawyer statements, and descriptions of final judgements. Interest in the 
potential of information collected as part of medical negligence claims to identify patient 
harm has been apparent since the 1980s, when the American Society of Anaesthesiologists 
set up the first database of information from all closed claims related to the specialty.134-135 
Using data on the nature of problems in care, subsequent harm and contributory factors, 
problems causing serious harm related to intubation, equipment misuse and nerve injury 
were brought to the attention of the profession.135 As well as a source of information about 
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serious harm including death, closed claims files pick up system factors underlying harm. In 
the case of the American Society of Anaesthesiologists, this enabled the development of new 
safety standards.136 They can be most useful in identifying rare causes of harm such as 
retained medical instruments or wrong site surgery.137-138 Analyses of claims records have 
also highlighted the role of missed or wrong diagnoses in generating serious harm, and the 
contribution to this harm of unsupervised patient assessments by junior doctors.139 One 
group studying drug related adverse events leading to claims found that 73% of the events 
identified were preventable.140 Measuring harm using claims files can be hindered by their 
relative inaccessibility. In addition, more claims are related to surgery, orthopaedics, 
obstetrics and accident and emergency than other specialties, and there is a bias towards the 
more serious forms of harm.141 This may be related to the fact that harm in these 
circumstances is more visible to both the patient, relatives and clinical teams, thus prompting 
more litigation, against a backdrop of the relatively small proportion of patients harmed by 
healthcare who take legal action.142 
2.3.2.4 Prospective Surveillance 
Based on approaches that have been used to track hospital acquired infections and surgical 
complications, prospective methods for identifying other errors and harm have been 
developed.101 143 These methods, which often triangulate direct observation, interaction with 
staff, and review of records, have the advantage over retrospective methods of being able to 
estimate incidence. Generally confined to research because of resource intensiveness, a 
recent study from Canada has explored the possibility of using this approach for the routine 
measurement of harm on hospital wards. 144 Nurse researchers gathered reports of harm from 
staff, case records or during periods of direct observation on four different specialty wards 
(general internal medicine, obstetrics, intensive care and cardiac surgery intensive care) 
across a single hospital.  The approach not only identified more diagnostic and therapeutic 
type harm events than traditional RCRR, but was also able to elucidate different types of 
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errors underlying harm in each ward. This finding opened up the potential to better tailor 
interventions to improve patient safety. Two previous studies comparing prospective 
methods to RCRR found that the methods identified both similar numbers and severity of 
harm events.145-146 Prospective approaches have the advantage of being able to collect more 
information on immediate and wider contextual system factors through interactions with 
staff, which is helpful in supporting decisions around preventability. However, investigator 
training is critical to the success of this method and even then, rare or more slowly emerging 
harms may be missed.144 147  
2.3.3	Research	Orientation	
2.3.3.1 Direct Observation 
Qualitative ethnographic methods based on direct observation have been used to measure 
error and harm associated with particular tasks such as drug administration,148 or in 
particular settings such as intensive care,149 or accident and emergency.150 The approach can 
be useful in providing a picture of communication patterns or teamwork issues and other 
underlying contributory factors.151 Direct observation works best for detecting harm when 
care tasks are predictable, or where staff have defined roles. Structured data collection tools 
improve reliability, especially if more than one observer is involved in data collection, and 
training is also vital in maximising the identification of errors and harm.152  
2.3.3.2 Patient Reported Harm 
Interest in patient reporting of errors and healthcare related harm initially developed in the 
US, when consumer questionnaires completed after hospitalisation revealed just how 
commonly patients identified such events.153 Weingert et al interviewed 228 adult patients 
during admission to a general medicine ward in a US teaching hospital, and by telephone ten 
days after discharge. Patients were asked about problems, mistakes or injuries they had 
experienced. Eight per cent of patients reported harm and, in a quarter of cases, this harm 
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had serious consequences. Only half of the 20 harm events identified were documented in 
the case record, and none were documented in the hospital incident reporting system.154 In a 
similar study in England, 80 inpatients reported an average of three patient safety incidents 
each, encompassing both clinical problems and those associated with the organisation of 
care such as communication.  Overall 83% of these adverse events were found in their 
records.155 Forster et al interviewed 400 patients after discharge, and combined their 
narratives with discharge summaries and laboratory reports to form case histories. These 
histories were reviewed for adverse events by physicians, and 19% of patients were found to 
have experienced such an event.156 Patients report similar rates of hospital acquired 
infection, pressure ulcers and drug errors to those found by RCRR studies.157 Methods used 
to gather information from patients include surveys (phone or web), face to face interviews, 
and patients’ own written reports. Face to face interviews using open ended questions and 
conducted during or soon after discharge have been found to elicit more reports of adverse 
events than those conducted by telephone, or several months after the admission. 158 
However, health professionals’ attitudes and the interview setting have a strong influence on 
how patients feel about reporting harm.159-160  
2.3.3.3 Case Control Studies 
Case control studies compare cases with an outcome of interest, such as healthcare related 
harm or death, with those that do not and, in doing so, determine if there are differences in 
particular factors between cases and controls. These studies have been traditionally used to 
explore the relationships between harm associated with drug events or hospital acquired 
infection, and lengths of stay or costs.161-162 A small number of studies have looked at the 
relationship between death and specific harms, such as hospital acquired infection or a wider 
range of adverse events, in order to identify the relative risk of adverse events in hospital 
patients who die compared to those discharged alive.163-164  
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Garcia-Martin and colleagues examined the case records of 529 adult patients that had died 
during hospital admission, and a similar number of controls who were discharged alive. 
Cases and controls were matched on date of admission and primary diagnosis. The reviews 
identified adverse events that occurred during hospitalisation, which were defined as 
problems in care potentially related to clinical or organisational aspects of management 
rather than underlying disease. Case and controls were similar in terms of patient sex, length 
of stay and quality of medical records, but cases were older and admitted with more severe 
illness. The study found a significantly increased number of adverse events amongst cases 
(57.1%) compared to controls (42.9%). The presence of at least one adverse event was 
significantly associated with a 60% increased risk of death. This relationship was stronger in 
patients with lengths of stays of more than 48 hours, than for those with shorter stays. As 
part of the analysis undertaken of data collected from a Dutch RCRR study Zegers et al 
compared the proportions and types of adverse events found in patients who died and those 
discharged alive. They found twice as many adverse events in those that died (10.7% (95% 
CI 9.8-11.7) vs. 5.4% (95% CI 4.7-6.1)), with the proportion of harm events linked to 
diagnostic processes, medication and clinical management also higher, and those linked to 
surgical or other technical procedures lower in the deceased.165 
This design is particularly useful for identifying the risk factors associated with rare 
outcomes, such as retained instruments. Using closed claims files, Gawande et al identified 
cases where a retained instrument or swab had been found after surgery and matched these 
cases with controls.166 They were able to identify a number of risk factors for retained 
instruments and swabs including emergency surgery, a change of plan during surgery, and 
high body mass index. Issues of selection bias and confounding such as quality of care 
threaten the validity of the case control method in patient safety research. 
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2.4	The	Epidemiology	of	Harm	
RCRR has been the main method used for epidemiological investigations of healthcare-
related patient harm over the past 50 years.  Table 1 shows the findings from the largest of 
these studies. Across patients, the majority of whom were discharged alive, the proportion of 
harm events has varied widely from 3.2% (Utah and Colorado) to 16% (Quality in 
Australian Healthcare Study (QAHCS)). A systematic review of the first eight major 
RCRRs, covering 74,485 randomly selected patients, found a median proportion of 9.2% 
patients experiencing adverse events, with 43.5% of these events classified as preventable.48 
These statistics are similar to the figures found by the two largest English RCRRs to date. 
The variation in proportion of harm found between studies is likely to be related to 
differences in how the RCRR methodology is applied. A comparison of the Utah and 
Colorado and QAHCS studies showed differences in sample selection (the inclusion or 
exclusion of pre-admission harm), and in the cut off levels used by reviewers to determine 
levels of severity and preventability.167 When records from the QAHCS study were 
reanalysed taking the Utah and Colorado approach, the proportion of adverse events in that 
study fell from 16.6% to 10.6%.167 
The systematic review found that whilst more than half of patients experience minimal harm 
(56.3%) as a result of an adverse event, 7% sustained permanent disability, and in a further 
7% the adverse event was associated with death.48  Across studies, harm associated with 
surgical operations was the largest category (39.6%) followed by drug-related events 
(15.1%). Drug, diagnostic and management related harm tend to have higher preventability. 
Older people appear more likely to suffer harm during hospital admission, and this harm is 
more likely to be severe or result in death.168 This phenomenon seems to be linked to both 
complexity of condition and longer lengths of stay. Exploring underlying causes of harm, 
both the HMPS and the QAHCS study found omissions in care, were more common than 
errors of commission,.169-170 Omissions were also found to be more often preventable. 
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Hutchinson et al, in a UK based RCRR, identified the greater impact on harm generation of 
multiple small omissions spanning the care pathway, rather than via single acts of 
commission.171  
It is important to acknowledge that in these studies, relatively few records reviewed were 
from patients who died during their admission, as death is an infrequent outcome (around 
2% of all admissions172). This reduces the reliability of any extrapolations made from this 
subsample of cases. Furthermore, traditional RCRR studies were not designed to make a 
specific determination of whether any deaths were preventable.  Nonetheless, sub analysis of 
the causes of harm associated with severe outcomes, including death, from these studies can 
be helpful in giving an impression of the likely causes of preventable death. This analysis 
reveals that diagnostic problems are the most common cause of harm in patients who die 
during admission, in contrast to harm resulting from technical problems related to surgery, 
the most common underlying cause in patients who leave hospital alive.170 173 More recently, 
a Dutch RCRR study of 8,415 cases records which purposively oversampled patients who 
had died (3983 patients), confirmed this finding. The researchers found that the proportion 
of patients who died having experienced harm due to problems with the diagnostic process 
was twice the proportion compared to those discharged alive (14.8% vs. 6.3%).174
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Table 2.1 Summary of findings on harm of the largest international RCRR studies  
Name Harvard 
Medical 
Practice 
Study6 
Quality in 
Australian 
Healthcare 
Study169 
Utah and 
Colorado 
Study12 
Vincent et 
al Study 
(London)15 
Adverse 
Events in 
New 
Zealand 
Public 
Hospitals175 
Canadian 
Adverse 
Events 
Study176 
Danish 
Adverse 
Events 
Study177 
Sari et al 
(York)178 
Dutch 
Adverse 
Event 
Study174 
Dutch 
Adverse 
Event 
Study 
(follow 
up)179 
Country US Australia US England N. Zealand Canada Denmark England Netherlands Netherlands 
Year 1984 1992 1992 1998 1998 2000 2000 2005 2005 2008 
Sampling Representative Representative Representative 4 specialties  Representative Representative Representative Random Random Random 
No. of cases reviewed 
 
30,121 14,179 14,700 1,014 6579 3745 1097 1006 8400 4023 
% patients with adverse 
event 
3.8 16.6 3.9 10.8 11.2 6.8 9.0 8.7 4.1 6.2 
% patients with adverse 
events that were 
preventable 
1.0 8.5 0.9 5.2 4.8 2.8 3.6 2.7 1.8 1.6 
% of all adverse events 
that were minimal harm 
56.8 45.6 53.3 66.4 7.9 61.6 73.8 56 56.8 86.6 
% of all adverse events 
that were moderate harm 
16.5 29.8 31.6 19.1 3.5 19.0 21.0 30.4 
% of all adverse events 
that were severe harm 
6.5 13.4 8.4 6.4 0.3 10.2 26.2 11 5.0 4.8 
% of all adverse events 
that were associated with 
death 
13.6 4.8 6.6 8.2 0.6 4.5 10 7.8 8.6 
% patients admitted 
experiencing preventable 
death (where calculable) 
0.3 0.55 0.12  0.36 0.13   0.7 overall 
4.1% (for 
deaths) 
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2.5	Key	Issues	in	Harm	Measurement	
Two key requirements for any measure employed to estimate preventable hospital deaths are 
firstly that its scope is broad enough to detect problems in care contributing to such deaths 
across the full range of adult acute inpatients, and secondly that it collects enough contextual 
information to allow the assessment of preventability. Judgement of harm measures against 
these two criteria are discussed in the next section, along with judgement against additional 
criteria that have been derived from work completed by the US Institute of Medicine and 
WHO, on technical specifications for quality of care indicators.72-73 Findings are summarised 
in Table 2. 
2.5.1	Scope	of	Harm	Measured	
Different harm measures identify different harms.37 This may be as a result of design. For 
instance approaches such the GTT, where measurement is based on the identification of 
specified events or triggers, will not be useful in identifying omissions in care.127 Even 
though prospective surveillance and RCRR find the broadest range of harms, harms are 
more likely to be clinical and related to individual error, than systems-based.119-120 This is 
also a feature of Mortality and Morbidity meetings.115  Prospective surveillance will tend to 
miss harms that are slowly emerging, and if based on direct observation, are necessarily 
narrow in focus, while incident reporting systems tend to under-report severe harm.110 148 180-
181   Given the variety of healthcare harm it is unlikely that the full spectrum can be captured 
by a single measure. Different methods identify different numbers and types of harm, with 
surprisingly limited overlap between sources.145-146 178 181   From a single organisation’s point 
of view, triangulating information from a variety of sources is likely to provide the best 
insights into harm. 
The scope of harm measured will also be determined by the definitions used. The majority 
of studies have defined patient harm as an adverse event encompassing ‘unintended injuries 
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or complications which lead to longer lengths of stay, disability at the time of discharge or 
death and are caused by healthcare management rather than by the patient’s underlying 
disease’.6 12 169 Use of this definition allowed traditional RCRR studies to take a broad view 
of harm, inclusive of the range one finds in hospitals.  Although this definition has the 
advantage of being well-known and in widespread use, which can be helpful when making 
comparisons, it tends to draw reviewers’ attention towards ‘discrete’ harm events.171 This is 
a limitation in light of current theories of harm generation that recognise the key role of 
multiple small omissions in harm generation.171 Poor clinical decisions, delays in key 
investigations, or inadequate monitoring can combine across an admission to cause harm, 
especially in the frail and sick whose defences against such small insults are not as robust as 
those of younger, fitter patients.182 The term ‘cascade iatrogenesis’ has been coined in the 
US to describe this process.183   
In some early RCRR studies, harm had to be accompanied by evidence of healthcare falling 
below an acceptable standard in order to be counted (similar to definitions used in the 
medicolegal world as part of the determination of negligence) .6 In others, the interpretation 
of harm was much broader, encompassing the consequences of known complications of 
appropriately delivered care such as unpredictable adverse drug reactions or surgical 
complications, as well as minor and major errors.169 The consequence of using narrow 
definitions is highlighted by a study in a Massachusetts hospital. When record reviewers 
were oriented towards identifying cases of where processes fell below accepted standards, 
they found a rate of harm of 2.7%. However when the same records were examined using a 
different approach that recorded any harm from healthcare, the rate rose to 11%.167 184  
2.5.2	Judgment	of	Preventability	
It has been argued that if the main purpose of harm measurement is to improve safety, then 
the focus of such measurement should be on the preventable element of harm.173 
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Preventability in this context would be the degree to which harm could be avoided if 
different healthcare processes were employed. However, such a focus on preventability 
could lead to reduced efforts to decrease the risks to patients posed by appropriately 
delivered care such as complications of certain surgical procedures and thus stall the 
development of interventions that might tackle such high risk areas.  
Preventability is not absolute, and is usually measured with an interval scale to reflect its 
probabilistic nature. A six point Likert scale is the norm, where ‘1’ represents ‘virtually no 
evidence of preventability’ and ‘6’ represents ‘virtually certain evidence of preventability’. 
The cut-off point for preventability of harm on the Likert scale can be a reflection of 
decisions by researchers to take either a broader or a narrower view of harm measurement. 
Most RCRRs, emulating the HMPS, have used the cut-off point of ‘4’ which is defined as 
‘preventability more likely than not, more than 50:50’. On the other hand, studies including 
QAHCS and the Adverse Events in New Zealand Public Hospitals study, elected to use the 
lower cut-off point of ‘2’ (‘slight evidence for preventability’). As a consequence, the 
QAHCS found approximately half of all harm events detected were deemed at least partly 
preventable, compared to one third in the HMPS.169 The explicit aim of both the QAHCS 
and the New Zealand studies was to initiate quality improvement, and therefore these studies 
aimed to capture the wider harm burden, even those harms with a limited chance of 
preventability in current times.  
The estimation of preventability depends on the availability of adequate information about 
the context in which harm occurs. The richest source of contextual detail comes from the 
direct observation of healthcare processes. However, direct observation is resource intensive, 
which can lead to a narrowing of its focus. Written accounts from case records can provide a 
reasonable substitute but may not contain the level of detail required. For some measures, 
such as those derived from routine administrative data or incident reports, the lack of 
contextual information hinders a direct assessment of preventability and for others, such as 
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GTT, collecting this information is not a requirement of the method.127 Assessment of 
preventability of hospital deaths can be particularly difficult, as many patients who die in 
hospital are elderly and frail with complex conditions and multiple co-morbidities.17 The 
contribution to a death by a problem in care can be challenging to separate from the 
underlying illness, with a large number of such patients ultimately dying whether or not a 
problem in care had occurred. Measures that include the largest amount of contextual 
information, such as prospective surveillance or RCRR, are likely to be the best methods for 
untangling the complex interplay of factors contributing to patient death and allowing such 
judgements to be made.17 37 185  
2.5.3	Validity	
The validity of a measure is the extent to which it measures what it is supposed to 
measure.186 Three key categories of validity important in harm measurement are: face 
validity, construct validity, and criterion validity:187 (see Box 2) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Box 2.1: Definitions of validity categories applied to harm 
 
Face Validity: Is there a consensus amongst users and experts that the measure 
covers an important dimension of patient safety? 
 
Construct Validity: Is there evidence of expected relationships between the 
measure and other relevant or linked factors? 
 
Criterion Validity: Is there evidence that the measure is associated with other 
measures of patient safety? 
Adapted from the WHO Performance Assessment Tool for Quality Improvement 
in Hospitals (PATH) Implementation Manual, p10: WHO Europe, 2006 
http://www.pathqualityproject.eu/upLoad/file/path_implementation_manual_200
6.pdf Accessed 4th January 2013 
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With regard to face validity, Walshe surveyed 150 doctors working in clinical medicine and 
public health in the UK, and found broad support for the use of adverse event measurement 
to monitor safety.188 Preventable deaths, being at the most serious end of healthcare-related 
harm, are seen as undoubtedly worthwhile to measure by patients, the public and politicians. 
Acute hospital Trusts have been extending the use of mortality reviews beyond traditional 
Mortality and Morbidity meetings in recent years as an approach to identifying high risk 
areas,189 and more recently the Department of Health has been exploring the potential of 
creating a national safety indicator of avoidable deaths based on these reviews.67  
To test construct validity, one would expect to find that patient harm is more likely to occur 
in patients admitted as emergencies, those undergoing complex procedures, and those with 
complicated underlying conditions, and as a consequence, such patients would be subject to 
longer lengths of stays and higher treatment costs. A range of studies of different harm 
measures has shown that these relationships hold true. The HMPS study found that harm 
was more common in the elderly, and a further study indicated that older patients were more 
likely to experience permanent disability or death from harm than younger patients.168 170 
Moreover harm does occur more commonly in patients admitted as emergencies.190 
International RCRR studies have provided estimations of the impact of harm on length of 
stay and cost of care. The QAHCS estimated that patients exposed to harm stayed an 
average of 7.1 extra days in hospital as a result.169 Following a study of harm across 1014 
London inpatients in two acute hospitals, Vincent et al estimated that the NHS was spending 
up to £1 billion per year on three million additional bed days, as a consequence of harm.15 
Zhan and Miller also showed an association between the AHRQ PSIs and increased lengths 
of stay and extra costs.191 Postoperative sepsis alone accounted for an average of 10 extra 
bed days and $57,727 in extra charges per patient. Raleigh et al applied the PSI to English 
NHS inpatient data, and confirmed that patients found to have these indicators had longer 
lengths of stay (the stays ranged from 0.2 days for obstetric trauma to 17.1 days for 
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postoperative hip fracture, p<0.001) and increased mortality (the rates ranged from 5.7% for 
infections due to medical care to 27.1% for postoperative sepsis, p<0.001).105 
Turning to criterion validity, there have been relatively few correlation studies looking at the 
relationships between harm measures, and those that do exist are limited in scope. These 
studies have provided evidence for both positive, negative and no correlation. The largest 
collection of studies focus on measures derived from routine hospital administration data, 
such as HSMRs and PSI. Surprisingly few correlation studies exist which compare harm 
identified by RCRR with other harm measures, despite RCRR often being regarded as the 
gold standard measure for harm. Four North American studies compared HSMR with 
preventable deaths identified through RCRR. Three studies either found no correlation,21-22 
or a non-significant negative correlation.24 One study (the smallest) found a statistically 
significant association between hospitals with a high HSMR and preventable deaths for one 
out of three medical conditions (pneumonia but not stroke or acute myocardial infarction) 
(5.70% vs. 3.25%, p<0.05).23  
For PSIs, most studies have been conducted as part of indicator validation. In the 
Complications Screening Programme, a US study, cases flagged as positive for one or more 
indicators underwent record review, in order to confirm the presence of harm. Indicators 
were found to be better at identifying surgical rather than medical complications with 
relatively high specificities but low sensitivities. Only 27% of the medical complications 
identified were found to be harm events, and just 16% were due to problems with the care 
provided.192 Two PSIs are focused specifically on death.  ‘Failure to rescue’ and ‘deaths in 
low mortality diagnosis related groups (DRGs)’. ‘Failure to rescue’ has been shown to be 
associated with HSMRs and with other structural measures, such as the bed to nurse ratio, 
trained nurse mix, hospital size and status, and quality of care measures amongst Medicare 
patients.193-194 Evidence remains patchy as to the validity of ‘deaths in low mortality DRGs’ 
as an indicator of safety problems due to low sensitivity.195 As a confirmation of the 
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potential of ‘failure to rescue’ for use as an indicator of harm, Isaac et al found it to be the 
only indicator out of four (including deaths in low mortality diagnosis related groups, 
decubitus ulcer, and infections related to intravenous lines and catheters) to be positively 
correlated with quality of care variables and disease specific death rates.194 
The ability of any measurement tool to measure what it is supposed to measure is limited by 
other systematic factors that cause deviation from true measurement. The validity of the 
findings from the Mortality and Morbidity review process are compromised by the small 
numbers of cases that are examined, case selection bias, and lack of involvement of all 
members of the multidisciplinary team. 115 196-197  Incident reporting is well known to offer a 
poor reflection of overall harm and to miss serious harm due to under-reporting, particularly 
by doctors.178 20  Time pressures, perceptions that notification will not lead to any 
improvement and fear of blame have been found to play a role in this under-reporting.198-199 
Information in claims files can lack objectivity, and is found to often reflect past care 
practices due to the length of time it takes for claims to be resolved.139 Direct observation 
will miss harm that occurs when the observer is not present and also those harms that take a 
longer time to evolve.152 All measures dependent on interrogation of the written record will 
be vulnerable to information bias if the record is not complete. Finally, any retrospective 
method will be prone to hindsight bias, whereby a reviewer’s judgment is altered by prior 
knowledge of the outcome. These biases are discussed in more detail in the following 
sections. 
2.5.4	Reliability	
Reliability is dependent on the explicitness of measure specification, uniformity of data 
collection, and the consistency of judgements.187 The explicitness of trigger definition is 
particularly important in determining the sensitivity and specificity of the GTT. Being 
dependent on explicit screening criteria allows a uniformity of data collection when these 
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tools are used by different professional groups.200 Structured data collection forms have also 
been found to improve the reliability of harm measurement in RCRR and direct 
observation.152 201 
The uniformity of data collection within incident reporting systems hampers wider use of 
this dataset for tracking harm. Studies show variable levels of reporting to such systems.202 
Under reporting is found at both ends of the harm spectrum, and amongst doctors to a 
greater degree than nurses.79  Prompted incident reporting, either by direct verbal 
encouragement or via electronic prompts, has led to an increase in adverse event reporting 
by junior doctors.145 203 An additional issue is the level of inaccuracy in classification and 
coding of self-reported submissions, particularly when attempting to code levels of harm.81   
The consistency of judgements around the origins of patient harm and its preventability are 
captured in the measurement of inter-rater reliability, or the degree to which measures taken 
are reproducible between two different reviewers.187 The Cohen Kappa statistic is normally 
used to assess inter-rater reliability in these studies, and is categorised into poor (K<0.2), fair 
(K>0.21 to K<0.4), moderate (K.0.41 to K<0.6), substantial (K>0.61 to K<0.8), and good 
(K>0.8).204 Poor inter-rater reliability can result in over- or underestimation of harm. 
Measurement methods such as RCRR that rely on subjective judgement of complex 
healthcare scenarios where not all relevant information may be accessible, are prone to poor 
inter-rater reliability.187 Concerns about the reliability of reviewer judgements of harm and 
preventability go back as far as the HMPS, which achieved moderate agreement between 
reviewers for the presence of an adverse event (kappa=0.57), but only weak agreement on 
preventability (kappa=0.24).184 The QAHCS produced similar results with a kappa of 0.55 
for adverse events identification, and 0.33 for preventability.169 An RCRR study by Hofer of 
111 hospital deaths, which focused on the identification of preventable deaths, found an 
inter-rater reliability for judgments of preventability of K= 0.34.17 It is important to put these 
findings into context; although reliability of RCRR falls below an ideal level, it is similar to 
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findings seen when two reviewers are asked to interpret common diagnostic tests such as 
mammography.205 
Analysis of the performance of reviewers in the HMPS indicated that agreement was higher 
between more experienced reviewers, and for some types of harm events (e.g. wound 
infections and drug side effects) than others (e.g. omitted therapy or failed diagnosis).184 
Reviewers were also found to be consistent outliers for high or low numbers of events 
detected. Approaches to decision making also make a difference. Consensus and majority 
decisions, as opposed to unanimous decisions, will identify more adverse events.206 
However, Hofer and Hayward showed that whilst discussion between a pair of reviewers 
increases agreement between them, when the same records are reviewed by a new pair of 
reviewers, there is no improvement in agreement between the two sets of reviewers.207 Rubin 
found that only when five or more reviewers were used did the classification of reliability 
reach levels of 90% accuracy.208 In a subsequent study, Hayward et al trained 12 internists to 
undertake an RCRR of 675 patient admissions with 20% duplicate reviews.209 They 
concluded that unless resources permit the use of many reviewers per case record, the 
reliability of single or double review (whilst inadequate for making judgments in a single 
case) is adequate for comparing mean performance across wards or hospitals. The findings 
from a recent large Dutch RCRR study confirmed no advantage for reliability in having 
paired reviewers as opposed to a single reviewer.210   
Lilford et al conducted a systematic review of inter-rater reliability of case record review.211 
The evidence suggested that the use of explicit rather than implicit criteria improved 
reliability (mean Kappa change 0.39 to 0.62). Separate studies have found that the GTT does 
have good inter-rater reliability for both identification of triggers and subsequent harm. 
However, the reliability of some individual triggers is poor, particularly those that are less 
well-defined or recorded in the case record.212 In a recent report on the use of hospital 
records to assess quality of care, Hutchinson et al found inter-rater reliability to be moderate 
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to good for explicit criterion based measurement and good for implicit scores, as long as 
reviewing pairs for the implicit reviews were from the same professional group and training 
was provided.  
Senior doctor time is an expensive resource, and RCRR can be a time consuming process. 
As a consequence, interest has developed in whether other healthcare personnel can be used 
without jeopardising reliability.  Hutchinson found only weak to moderate agreement on 
quality of care, whether assessed by implicit or explicit review of case records with mixed 
reviewing teams.200 In line with previous research, he found that during the reviews, nurses 
and doctors tend to identify problems related to different aspects of care.200 213 Nurses are 
more likely to focus on issues such as whether routine clinical observations were completed, 
or the timing of medication, whereas doctors focus on the wider clinical aspects of care such 
as whether the correct diagnosis was reached, or whether appropriate treatment was 
implemented, and were more likely to give global ratings of overall quality. Hutchinson goes 
on to advocate a nurse-doctor pairing, if resources permit, to maximise opportunity for 
identifying patient harm.200 
Ashton identified a number of ways to improve the reliability of judgements in RCRR, 
including the provision of guidance on the types of information a reviewer should look for, 
and on assessment criteria, use of a structured data collection form or algorithms developed 
to identify specific events.201 Training, particularly focused on reviewing and discussing 
cases, has also been shown to improve reliability.169 214 Rubenstein stressed that this should 
be to ensure that reviewers fully understand the process overall, definitions and rating scales 
rather than to change their judgements.215 Investigator training is also critical to the success 
of prospective approaches, including direct observation, in identifying errors and harm.144 147  
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2.5.5	Retrospective	versus	Prospective	Approaches	
Hindsight bias is an inherent weakness of harm measures that have been designed for use in 
investigations after the problems of care have taken place (retrospective). Retrospective 
methods include RCRR, Mortality and Morbidity meetings, case control studies and reviews 
of claims files. Reviewers have been shown to detect more harm when the final outcome 
was poor, as in the case of a patient death.17 216 Researchers have attempted to avoid this bias 
by masking observers to patient outcome through practices such as the re-dictation of case 
notes. However, this risks the omission of important information and is expensive to 
undertake.54 Alternatively, training can be used to reduce hindsight bias by orientating 
reviewers to examine processes of care before ascertainment of harm, and by getting them to 
imagine ‘walking in the shoes’ of the patient’s original clinical team as the story unfolds, 
rather than jumping to premature conclusions. 
Retrospective measures can be conceptualised as reactive and generally identifying issues 
from the past that may no longer apply to current performance.217 Prospective approaches 
can avoid these pitfalls. By combining activities such as daily interrogation of case records 
or administrative databases, interviews with staff or patients, or direct observation, these 
methods allow harm events to be both measured and investigated as they occur. The fact that 
staff are more likely to remember key details surrounding the origins of the harm if 
interviewed around the time of occurrence is useful for quickly grasping an understanding of 
underlying contributory factors, and for allowing the speedy resolution of investigations. 
Comparative studies have found that prospective methods are able to identify similar 
numbers of harm events as RCRR, in addition to finding other events and contributory 
factors that are not captured in the written record.146-147 However, as well as potential to miss 
those harms that take longer to evolve, prospective approaches are more disruptive to 
ongoing ward care, can change staff behaviour, and are open to observer bias as the 
investigator builds relationships with staff.147 Furthermore, for those studies with more 
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reliance on observation, episodes of harm will be missed when observers are absent. The 
high costs involved when using prospective approaches has limited their current use to date.  
2.5.6	Content	and	Context	
Missing content, whether due to failure to record details, poor legibility, sparse entries or 
inconsistent filing, presents the possibility of information bias. For RCRR, an incomplete 
record may lead to more harm missed compared to a complete record, which has the 
potential to result in organisations with better quality records having an apparently higher 
proportion of harm, particularly for severe harm at the clinical interface between doctor and 
patient.120 218 Missing content is a particular issue when using claims data to investigate 
patient harm. Within the file, descriptions of problems in care or harm may be from a limited 
number of subjective perspectives. Furthermore, the long period for claim resolution 
provides an opportunity for key material to go astray.141 Incident reports can also be difficult 
to interpret because of a lack of contextual information or details of contributory factors 
supplied on the reporting form.80 219 Routine data sources and GTT collect little or no 
information on the context of harm, which limits their use in determining preventability. 
The validity of routine hospital administrative data is challenged by the completeness and 
accuracy of coding within the system.220-221 Studies have found up to 40% of diagnostic 
codes used in US hospital discharge data are wrong when compared to the recorded 
diagnoses in the case records.222 In addition, a lack of flags to indicate if particular diagnoses 
were present on admission makes identifying the temporal sequence of events difficult.223 In 
the late 1990s, McKee et al pointed out that the use of a ‘failure to rescue’ indicator was not 
feasible in the NHS due to the poor standard of secondary diagnosis coding.224 However, a 
recent analysis would indicate that improvements in coding over the last decade have 
changed this situation, especially for surgical patients.225 
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2.5.7	Denominators	
The clinical researcher Peter Pronovost, reflecting on the challenges of measuring safety, 
identified the absence of information on the population at risk (the denominator) as a key 
issue when calculating rates of harm from a number of measures including incident reports, 
the GTT, and claims files.226 Although these systems can be useful for identifying rare harms 
when large numbers of reports are pooled, they cannot be used to make comparisons 
between organisations unless a denominator is created. The difficulty then arises as to which 
denominator is most appropriate, especially when different subpopulations of patients may 
have different risks of exposures to particular harms. The choice of denominator used in the 
calculation of rates will have a substantial impact on the outcome of such analyses be it 
admissions, bed days or particular healthcare processes. As rates play a key role in 
comparisons, it is important that the impact of using different denominators is appreciated. 
Focusing on the measurement of specific harms using agreed definitions and denominators 
that represent the patients at risk of such harms is probably the best option. This approach 
has been shown to improve the specificity of PSI.91   
2.5.8	Sampling	
Some harm measures are applied to whole patient populations but, depending on the 
resource intensiveness of the measure, this may not always be possible. Random sampling 
will allow generalisation of findings to other settings; the use of stratification ensures that 
relevant subpopulations are represented, and that populations sampled reflect the range of 
patients receiving treatment. It should be acknowledged that random samples may miss rare 
harm events. When the aim of the investigation is local quality improvement, rather than 
external comparisons, purposive sampling such as examining the records of consecutive 
patients admitted to a certain area will be adequate.  
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Sampling can be adjusted to improve the yield of harm events. Findings from previous 
RCRRs have indicated that higher levels of problems in care resulting in harm are found in 
patients who die.174 In Wales, where hospital mortality review is well established, a range of 
techniques have been used to target the identification of deaths with higher risks of harm, 
namely targeting mortality review at deaths in low risk diagnostic categories, deaths 
identified using the Institute for Healthcare Innovations Categorisation Matrix (which 
categorises deaths according to whether they are a palliative care death, and an expected or 
unexpected death) and deaths in specialties with high standardised mortality ratios.227 
However, although this approach might be useful where resources are stretched, it is likely 
to uncover a relatively small fraction of preventable deaths, as the majority of these deaths 
are still to be found in low risk groups. 
Clarity of inclusion and exclusion criteria for a sample is an important consideration if there 
is an intention of making comparisons with the findings from previous studies. A study that 
investigated the differences in proportion of harm in the Utah and Colorado RCRR12 (3.2%) 
and QAHCS169 (16.6%) RCRR studies found that the US study counted only those adverse 
events that led to the index admission or those which occurred and were discovered during 
that admission. On the other hand, QAHCS counted events whether they occurred before, 
during or were discovered after the index admissions.167 Alternatively, a large Dutch RCRR 
included adverse events with their origins before admission only if they were associated with 
a previous admission to hospital.174  
Sampling also needs to consider the impact of inclusion of certain population subgroups.  
All previous RCRR studies have excluded psychiatric patients, and a number have also 
excluded obstetric patients and children under 18 years.174 176 Justification for exclusion of 
the latter groups was based on the fact that these specialties are responsible for very few 
hospital deaths and including them requires the recruitment of specialist rather than 
generalist reviewers. When drawing samples for cases and controls in case control studies, 
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consideration of patient characteristics is vital. Failure to adequately match on characteristics 
associated with harm, such as severity of illness, will lead to biased findings. 
2.5.9	Case	Mix	Adjustment	
As patient characteristics such as age, co-morbidities or disease severity are independently 
associated with harm outcomes such as death, case mix adjustment then becomes important 
for comparing such outcomes across organisations.  Indicators of harm derived from routine 
administrative data such as HSMRs or PSIs are particularly vulnerable to criticisms 
regarding the adequacy of case mix adjustment, especially as essential information for 
stratifying risk, such as severity of primary and secondary diagnoses, is not adequately 
captured in algorithms used to derive the measures.228 Complexities involved when 
comparing organisations’ harm rates have led to suggestions that the focus should instead be 
on comparison of processes of care.54 However, scientific evidence linking processes, such 
as skin marking prior to operation, with outcomes, such as wrong site surgery, often does not 
exist.226  
For RCRR, the appropriateness of the healthcare the patient receives is assessed before 
judgements of harm occurrence are made. As such decisions on standards of healthcare 
processes are independent of patient age and co-morbidity, the need for case mix adjustment 
is avoided. However, Richard Lilford and colleagues have recently challenged the 
assumption that error and harm rates can be measured without consideration of the 
opportunity for error or harm (e.g. opportunity for harm would be more for longer lengths of 
stay which are themselves case mix dependent).54 These researchers have proposed that 
opportunity for error or harm would be a more appropriate denominator. This proposal 
remains theoretical, as other academics have challenged the feasibility of discerning a set of 
opportunities for error or harm in patients with complex conditions given the normal level of 
detail found in patient records.200 
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Table 2.2 Comparison of harm measures 
 Adverse Event   
Misadventure 
Codes 
Patient 
Safety 
Indicators 
Hospital 
Standardised 
Mortality Ratio 
Incident 
Reporting 
Surveillance Direct 
Observation 
Patient 
Reported 
Harm 
Retrospective 
Case Record 
Review 
Case Control Global Trigger 
Tool  
Mortality & 
Morbidity 
Meetings 
Claims Files 
Scope Mainly 
related to 
surgery and 
acts of 
commission. 
No indication 
of degree of 
harm. 
Good for rare 
harms, which 
can be 
tracked over 
time. 
Mainly 
related to 
surgery and 
acts of 
commission
. 
Difficult to 
determine 
degree of 
harm. 
Values above 
100 
interpreted as 
the proportion 
of ‘excess 
deaths’ 
compared to 
national 
average. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Majority of 
incidents are 
no or low 
harm. Patient 
falls form 
biggest 
category 
overall, 
followed by 
drug errors. 
Mixture of 
omissions 
and 
commissions, 
but bias 
towards acts 
of 
commission. 
Good for rare 
harms, which 
can be 
tracked over 
time. 
Narrow focus on particular 
area or process (direct 
observation) or broader care 
processes (surveillance). 
Direct observation and staff 
interaction can capture 
context and contributory 
factors, particularly system 
factors such as 
communication or teamwork.  
Identifies both omissions and 
acts of commission and 
allows assessment of degree 
of harm. 
 
Identifies 
wide 
spectrum of 
harm 
particularly 
that related to 
system 
problems 
such as 
communicatio
n or 
coordination. 
Less good at 
identifying 
diagnostic 
error.  
Wide 
spectrum of 
harm 
identified, 
especially 
clinical 
problems. 
Some 
information on 
contributory 
factors. 
Finds a 
mixture of 
omissions and 
commissions. 
More 
omissions 
than most 
sources.  
Good at 
identifying 
serious harm 
not reported 
elsewhere. 
Establishes 
risk factors 
associated 
with harm 
(very useful for 
rare harms). 
Determines 
relative risk 
poor outcomes 
associated 
with problems 
in care. 
Pre-specified 
list of triggers 
may be broad 
or narrow.  
Only detects 
errors of 
commission.  
Identifies 
harm across 
the spectrum. 
Mainly 
focused on 
diagnostic 
errors and 
technical 
clinical 
problems. 
Contributory 
factors may 
not be 
discussed. 
Main focus is 
on severe 
harm and 
preventable 
death 
Majority of 
harm is related 
to diagnosis.  
Can identify 
some 
contributory 
factors.  
Claims most 
often result 
from surgery, 
orthopaedics, 
obstetrics and 
A&E. 
Mixture of 
omissions and 
commission. 
Good for rare 
harms  
Judgement of 
Preventability 
Not possible Not reported 
directly. 
Limited 
inference can 
be drawn 
from 
mitigating 
actions and 
contributory 
factors 
Can be determined Patients may 
not be able to 
determine in 
some cases 
without expert 
input 
Can be 
determined if 
adequate 
contextual 
information 
available 
Usually does 
not assess  
Does not 
assess  
Can be 
determined 
Can be 
determined if 
adequate 
contextual 
information 
available 
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 Adverse Event   
Misadventure 
Codes 
Patient 
Safety 
Indicators 
Hospital 
Standardised 
Mortality Ratio 
Incident 
Reporting 
Surveillance Direct 
Observation 
Patient 
Reported 
Harm 
Retrospective 
Case Record 
Review 
Case Control Global Trigger 
Tool  
Mortality & 
Morbidity 
Meetings 
Claims Files 
Content and 
Context 
Lack of completeness and accuracy of coding 
limits adequacy of case mix adjustment. 
No information on context. 
Reports can 
be difficult to 
interpret due 
to staff failure 
to include key 
contextual 
and 
contributory 
factors. 
Triangulation 
across 
sources 
minimises 
risk of 
missing 
information.  
Best source 
for details of 
context as 
staff can be 
consulted. 
Some 
events 
missed, as 
observers 
cannot be in 
place all the 
time. 
Good level 
of detail on 
context. 
Information 
may be 
forgotten if 
there is a 
delay in 
seeking 
patient views. 
Some 
information 
on context. 
Information 
may be 
missing due to 
failure to 
record, 
misfiling, or 
lost sections. 
Records may 
be illegible. 
Some 
information on 
context. 
Information 
may be 
inadequate 
for case/ 
control 
matching and 
identification 
of adverse 
events. 
Information 
may be 
missing from 
case records. 
Missing 
information 
from case 
record may 
hamper 
review. 
Good level of 
detail on 
context. 
Multiple reports 
from different 
individuals’ 
perspective. 
May be missing 
vital 
information. 
Length of time 
to close a case 
may lead to 
missing 
information. 
Validity  Harm codes 
are narrow in 
scope. 
Some 
important 
harms are 
inadequately 
coded, e.g. 
hospital 
acquired 
infection. 
Original data 
source not 
collected for 
this purpose. 
 
Associated 
with longer 
stays and 
increased 
mortality. 
Poor 
coding 
limits 
sensitivity 
and 
specificity. 
Inability to 
identify if 
diagnosis 
present on 
admission 
decreases 
specificity.  
Source 
data not 
collected 
for this 
purpose. 
Correlations 
with other 
measures of 
quality and 
safety show a 
mixed picture 
- with 
positive, 
negative and 
no 
correlations.  
Many factors 
other than 
quality and 
safety impact 
HSMR, 
including 
depth and 
style of 
coding, 
referral and 
discharge 
practices etc.  
Use of 
different 
Incidents 
more likely to 
be reported if 
not 
attributable to 
direct staff 
action (such 
as falls). 
Doctors 
report fewer 
incidents than 
nurses, 
limiting 
capture of the 
full range of 
harm related 
to clinical 
problems.  
Triangulation 
of three 
approaches 
maximises 
identification 
of harm. 
Identification 
of harm in 
real time and 
in its own 
context 
possible. 
Slowly 
evolving and 
rare harms 
such as 
preventable 
deaths may 
be missed. 
 
May miss 
slowly 
evolving and 
rare harms 
or those that 
happen 
when the 
observer is 
absent. 
Difficulty 
detecting 
fleeting or 
simultaneou
s events. 
Resource 
intensivenes
s leads to 
restricted 
focus. 
Proportion of 
reported 
harm due to 
pressure 
ulcers, drug 
error and 
hospital 
acquired 
infection 
harm found to 
be similar to 
RCRR. 
Diagnosis 
and 
monitoring 
harm is less 
visible to 
patients. 
Severity of 
illness, co-
morbidities, 
socioeconomi
c status, 
health 
professionals’ 
Wide range of 
harms can be 
identified, but 
bias towards 
identification 
of clinical/ 
technological 
harms at 
doctor-patient 
interface. Less 
likely to find 
harm related 
to systems 
issues, as well 
as minor harm 
from drug 
errors or falls 
less likely to 
be recorded. 
Prone to 
hindsight bias. 
Wide range of 
harms can be 
identified, but 
bias towards 
identification of 
clinical/ 
technological 
harms at 
doctor-patient 
interface. Less 
likely to find 
harm related to 
systems issues 
as well as 
minor harm 
from drug 
errors or falls 
as less likely to 
be recorded. . 
Prone to 
hindsight and 
selection bias. 
Impact of 
confounding 
factors such as 
Not designed 
to find harm 
related to 
single or 
multiple 
omissions. 
Sensitivity 
and specificity 
of individual 
triggers varies 
widely, and 
lower for less 
specific 
triggers. 
Time limit on 
GTT process 
may lead to 
missed harm. 
Lack of 
involvement 
of multi- 
professional 
team limits 
exploration of 
harm and 
contributory 
factors.  
Fear of blame 
and stigma 
may lead to 
failure to 
explore the 
full details of 
a case.   
Bias towards 
harm caused 
by individuals 
such as 
clinical error. 
Selection 
bias. 
Submission of 
a claim by a 
patient does 
not necessarily 
indicate that 
harm has 
occurred. 
Hindsight bias. 
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 Adverse Event   
Misadventure 
Codes 
Patient 
Safety 
Indicators 
Hospital 
Standardised 
Mortality Ratio 
Incident 
Reporting 
Surveillance Direct 
Observation 
Patient 
Reported 
Harm 
Retrospective 
Case Record 
Review 
Case Control Global Trigger 
Tool  
Mortality & 
Morbidity 
Meetings 
Claims Files 
HSMR 
algorithms 
leads to 
different 
hospital 
rankings. 
Incomplete 
case mix 
adjustment.  
Source data 
not collected 
for this 
purpose. 
attitudes, and 
interview 
setting 
influence 
patient 
reporting. 
Selection bias 
in 
respondents 
possible. 
length of stay. 
Reliability Large and 
stable 
database. 
Poor coding. 
Standardised algorithms 
applied to a stable database. 
Poor coding. 
 
System relies 
on self-
reported 
submissions, 
leading to 
inaccuracies 
in 
classification 
and coding 
especially for 
harm levels.  
Under-
reporting at 
both ends of 
the harm 
spectrum.   
 
Complexity of clinical 
scenarios may lead to poor 
inter-rater reliability around 
judgements of harm and 
preventability. 
Observers may have 
inherently different thresholds 
for judging whether harm has 
occurred. 
Observer and staff behaviour 
may change as the 
investigator builds 
relationships with staff.   
 
Face to face 
interviews, 
using open-
ended 
questions, 
elicit more 
reports. 
Best 
conducted as 
soon as 
possible after 
discharge to 
aid recall.   
 
Complexity of 
clinical 
judgements 
leads to 
generally poor 
inter-rater  
reliability 
around 
judgements of 
harm and 
preventability. 
Harm and 
preventability 
definitions and 
thresholds can 
change the 
proportion 
found. 
 
Complexity of 
clinical 
judgements 
leads to 
generally poor 
inter-rater  
reliability 
around 
judgements of 
harm. 
Using 
predetermined 
criteria to 
assess 
processes of 
care increases 
the reliability of 
judgments 
around quality 
of care, errors 
and harm.  
 
Small number 
of cases 
examined 
Lack of 
standard 
approach to 
information 
gathering 
   
Harm identified 
by physician 
judgement. 
Complexity of 
judgements 
leads to poor 
inter-rater 
reliability 
around 
judgements of 
harm and 
preventability. 
Observers may 
have inherently 
different 
thresholds for 
judging 
whether harm 
has occurred 
Timing Retrospective 
 
Retrospective Prospective Prospective Retrospective/ 
Prospective 
Retrospective Retrospective Retrospective Retrospective Retrospective 
Denominator Usually per 
admission or 
Usually 
those 
Ratio of 
observed to 
No, but 
sometimes a 
Usually per admission or 
hospital bed day. 
Usually per 
patient. May 
Usually per 
admission or 
Depends on 
design. 
No, but 
sometimes a 
No 
denominator  
No 
denominator 
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 Adverse Event   
Misadventure 
Codes 
Patient 
Safety 
Indicators 
Hospital 
Standardised 
Mortality Ratio 
Incident 
Reporting 
Surveillance Direct 
Observation 
Patient 
Reported 
Harm 
Retrospective 
Case Record 
Review 
Case Control Global Trigger 
Tool  
Mortality & 
Morbidity 
Meetings 
Claims Files 
hospital bed 
day. 
patients at 
risk of the 
particular 
PSI. 
expected 
deaths. 
denominator 
is created. 
be restricted 
to population 
at risk. 
hospital bed 
day. 
denominator is 
created. 
Sampling Can be purposive or random. Higher 
specificity if sample from a population at 
highest risk. 
Purposive Usually purposive but can be 
random. 
Can be 
purposive or 
random. 
Can be 
purposive or 
random. 
Matching  
of cases  
and  
controls. 
Can be 
purposive or 
random. 
Opportunity for 
harm differs 
between 
patients. It has 
been advocated 
by some that 
the 
denominator 
should be 
opportunity for 
harm. 
Purposive Can be 
purposive or 
random 
Case Mix 
Adjustment 
Incomplete case mix adjustment. 
 
N/A May be focused on particular 
specialty or sub population of 
patients. 
May be 
focused on 
particular 
specialty or 
sub 
population of 
patients. 
May be 
focused on 
particular 
specialty or 
sub population 
of patients. 
May be 
focused on 
particular 
specialty or 
sub 
population of 
patients. 
May be 
focused on 
particular 
specialty or 
sub population 
of patients. 
May be 
focused on 
particular 
specialty or 
sub 
population of 
patients. 
May be 
focused on 
particular 
specialty or sub 
population of 
patients. 
Comparison 
with RCRR 
No studies 
found 
Two 
validation 
studies 
looked at 
the 
compared 
21 AHRQ 
PSIs to 
RCRR.   
First study 
found PSIs 
correctly 
Four US 
studies look 
at association 
between 
HSMR and 
preventable 
deaths 
determined 
by RCRR.  
The studies 
focused on 
selected 
Findings from 
RCRR of 
1006 records 
from a single 
English 
hospital 
compared 
with incident 
reports. 
RCRR found 
harm in 
10.9% of 
A US study in 
one teaching 
hospital over 
five months 
asked house 
staff to 
submit 
reports of 
harm, as 
soon as 
possible after 
the event. 
Direct 
observation 
studies tend 
to focus on 
specific 
harms. In a 
study of 36 
US hospitals 
and nursing 
homes an 
observer 
accompanie
Weingert et al 
interviewed 
228 US adult 
patients 
during 
admission 
and by 
telephone 10 
days after 
discharge.154 
8% reported 
harm and a 
 Extension of 
RCRR method 
GTT is a tool 
applied to 
case records. 
M & M 
meetings are 
partly based 
on material in 
case records. 
A comparison 
of the number 
of harm events 
found in 
hospital quality 
assurance, risk 
management 
or claims 
records 
compared to 
RCRR was 
undertaken in a 
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 Adverse Event   
Misadventure 
Codes 
Patient 
Safety 
Indicators 
Hospital 
Standardised 
Mortality Ratio 
Incident 
Reporting 
Surveillance Direct 
Observation 
Patient 
Reported 
Harm 
Retrospective 
Case Record 
Review 
Case Control Global Trigger 
Tool  
Mortality & 
Morbidity 
Meetings 
Claims Files 
identified 
harm in 
68.4% of 
surgical 
patients 
and 27.2% 
of medical 
patients.103   
Second 
study found 
that of all 
patients 
screening 
positive for 
at least one 
indicator 
only 11% 
were 
confirmed 
as 
experiencin
g harm on 
RCRR.229  
Sensitivity 
of individual 
indicators 
ranged 
from 4% to 
68%. 
specialties 
(general 
medicine, 
surgery),21-
22diseases 
(pneumonia, 
CVA, MI) 23or 
interventions 
(CABG).24 
Three of the 
studies either 
found no 
correlation or 
a non-
significant 
negative 
correlation. 
Only one 
study found a 
significant 
positive 
association- 
the proportion 
of 
preventable 
deaths for 
pneumonia 
was 
significantly 
higher in high 
HSMR 
hospitals. 
. 
admissions, 
the incident 
reporting 
system 
picked up 
only 10% of 
these.178  
A study 
comparing 
findings from 
RCRR of 228 
case records 
discovered 
that 26 harm 
events were 
found by the 
incident 
reporting 
system.230 
  
Reports were 
verified by 
senior 
resident 
physicians 
via RCRR. 
The 
prospective 
method 
identified 
similar rates 
of harm to 
RCRR  (2.8% 
vs. 2.7%).145 
A French 
study of 778 
patients 
across seven 
hospitals 
used nurse 
investigators 
to check 
notes and 
ask staff 
about harm. 
Similar rates 
of harm to 
RCRR were 
found (15.4% 
versus14.5%)
.146 A third 
study in one 
hospital 
across four 
specialist 
areas also 
included 
d nurses on 
drug rounds 
and found 
71% of the 
35 errors 
thought to 
be clinically 
significant. 
Only 9% of 
these were 
also found 
by chart 
review. 148 
 
quarter of 
these were 
reports of 
serious harm. 
Only half of 
the 20 harm 
events were 
found on 
RCRR and 
none were 
found in the 
incident 
reporting 
system. In a 
similar study 
in UK, 80 
inpatients 
reported an 
average of 
three patient 
safety 
incidents 
each 
including 
clinical and 
non-clinical 
aspects of 
care Patients 
were able to 
identify 83% 
adverse 
events found 
in their 
records.231  
 
large teaching 
hospital.232 
RCRR 
identified 80% 
of the events 
found across 
all three other 
sources. Harm 
not found on 
RCRR tended 
to be 
associated with 
more minor 
and less costly 
malpractice 
claims. 21% of 
harm found on 
RCRR had 
never given 
rise to litigation 
or risk 
management 
reports, despite 
being judged 
as due to 
negligent care. 
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 Adverse Event   
Misadventure 
Codes 
Patient 
Safety 
Indicators 
Hospital 
Standardised 
Mortality Ratio 
Incident 
Reporting 
Surveillance Direct 
Observation 
Patient 
Reported 
Harm 
Retrospective 
Case Record 
Review 
Case Control Global Trigger 
Tool  
Mortality & 
Morbidity 
Meetings 
Claims Files 
direct 
observation 
and found 
more harm 
related to 
diagnosis and 
treatment 
problems 
than 
RCRR.144 
Issues to 
consider 
when 
measuring 
preventable 
death 
Advantages 
Accessible and cheap. 
Could be used to track trends over time. 
Disadvantages 
Limited number of indicators that focus on 
death. 
Coding completeness, accuracy and depth. 
Lack of information on temporal sequence of 
diagnoses. 
Incomplete case mix adjustment. 
No information on preventability. 
Need for follow up with RCRR to confirm 
preventability. 
 
Advantages 
Possible to 
identify rare 
causes of 
potentially 
preventable 
deaths. 
Possibility of 
tracking 
trends over 
time. 
Prompted 
reporting 
might 
increase 
levels of 
serious harm 
detected. 
Disadvantage
s 
Under 
reporting of 
serious 
incidents and 
preventable 
deaths.  
Lack of 
Advantages 
Surveillance identifies more 
diagnostic and therapeutic 
harm events than RCRR, 
which are more common in 
preventable deaths.  
More information on context 
and contributory factors than 
RCRR can improve 
judgements around 
preventability 
Disadvantages 
As preventable death is rare 
the number of patients 
observed or period of 
observation may need to be 
substantial. 
Resource required in terms of 
training and manpower. 
Direct observation has a 
limited focus and surveillance 
may not be possible on more 
than a few wards at a time. 
Easier to identify common 
rather than rarer harm such 
as preventable death.  
Lag time between error and 
Not 
applicable 
 
 
Advantages 
Identifies as 
much harm as 
prospective 
approaches. 
Easily 
assessable 
source of 
information.  
Generally 
enough 
information on 
context to 
make 
judgements on 
preventability. 
Disadvantages 
Missing 
information.  
Time 
consuming. 
Resources 
needed for 
training and 
manpower. 
Hindsight bias. 
Moderate 
Advantages 
Allows 
determination 
of risk factors 
associated 
with harm 
Disadvantages 
Missing 
information  
Time 
consuming 
Resources 
needed for 
training and 
manpower 
Hindsight bias 
Moderate 
Inter-rater 
reliability 
Bias towards 
clinical 
technical harm, 
rather than 
harm due to 
systems 
problems. 
Need to review 
Advantages 
Less resource 
intense than 
RCRR. 
Useful for 
screening the 
case notes 
and 
identifying 
high risk 
populations. 
Disadvantages 
Poor 
recognition of 
harm due to 
omissions, or 
complex 
interacting 
problems 
which are 
common in 
preventable 
deaths. 
Will miss 
harm if 
occurred out 
with the 20 
Advantages 
Natural focus 
on severe 
harm and 
death. 
Able to get 
input on 
context and 
contributory 
factors from 
multidisciplina
ry team 
Disadvantages 
Small number 
of cases 
discussed. 
Selection 
bias. 
Failure of 
healthcare 
professionals 
to disclose full 
details of 
case. 
Advantages 
Files contain 
information on 
severe 
preventable 
harm, 
particularly 
around 
diagnosis. 
Disadvantages 
Long delays in 
closure of 
claims limit 
access. Often 
have missing 
information 
which makes 
judgements 
around 
preventability 
limited. 
Lack of 
verification of 
subjective 
reports.  
Hindsight bias 
Selection bias 
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 Adverse Event   
Misadventure 
Codes 
Patient 
Safety 
Indicators 
Hospital 
Standardised 
Mortality Ratio 
Incident 
Reporting 
Surveillance Direct 
Observation 
Patient 
Reported 
Harm 
Retrospective 
Case Record 
Review 
Case Control Global Trigger 
Tool  
Mortality & 
Morbidity 
Meetings 
Claims Files 
denominator 
data prevents 
establishment 
of rates and 
comparisons. 
Limited 
involvement 
of medical 
staff in 
reporting. 
Relatively 
fewer reports 
of technical 
clinical 
problems.  
 
harm. 
Risks of observer bias. 
 
Inter-rater 
reliability. 
Bias towards 
clinical 
technical 
harm, rather 
than harm due 
to systems 
problems. 
 
cases and 
controls, so is 
more 
expensive 
 
minutes 
allowed for 
case review. 
Does not 
collect 
information on 
preventability 
of harm. 
as claims are 
only made by a 
small 
proportion of all 
patients 
harmed by 
healthcare.  
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2.	6	Comparison	of	Harm	Measures	for	the	Measurement	of	
Preventable	Deaths		
	
Though there are a number of measures that could be used to assess preventable deaths, for 
the majority there are significant limitations to consider. Mortality and Morbidity meetings 
and claims files will only capture small numbers of cases, and are subject to selection bias. 
Explicit reviews such as GTT are limited to detecting those harms that are pre-specified, rely 
on case record review to confirm preventability and have not been designed for use in 
patients that die. Use of incident reporting systems is restricted by under reporting of severe 
harm.  
Poor coding and difficulties establishing the temporal sequence of events complicate the 
gauging of preventable death from routine data. HSMR was heralded as an easily accessible 
measure that could provide an indication of the number of ‘excess deaths’ occurring in a 
hospital, and be used for hospital comparisons. However, a recent study has shown that four 
of the commonly used algorithms for calculating HSMR provide different rankings when 
applied to a single population of acute hospital patients in Massachusetts.233 Lilford et al 
have used modelling to estimate that preventable mortality would have to be 15% or more, 
to enable HSMRs to have a predictive value of even 30%.234 Moreover it has been observed 
that, amongst the few publications that show a decrease in standardised mortality ratios 
linked to interventions targeted at preventable deaths, these changes were in fact more likely 
to be the result of regression to the mean and concurrent changes in coding, than the 
interventions themselves.52 Some measures hold more promise as potential screening 
mechanisms for preventable deaths in the future. With improvements in methods for data 
capture, coding and the sophistication of the algorithms, routine data and GTT might offer 
an efficient approach to screening large numbers of records and identifying high-risk cases 
for review, but this has yet to be demonstrated.  
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Comparative studies have shown that prospective surveillance and RCRR find more severe 
harm than other methods, and are the approaches most suited to capturing preventable 
deaths.145-146  Three studies specifically compared RCRR and prospective methods for 
measuring harm across a broad spectrum of patients. 144-146 The studies were conducted 
within acute hospitals and used similar definitions of harm, and a similar two stage RCRR 
process, to the original HMPS.4 In the first study from the US, 3,141 medical admissions to a 
major teaching hospital were examined over a five month period. For the prospective 
component, house staff were asked to gather information on patient harm soon as possible 
after an event.145 Team leaders reminded junior staff on a daily basis. A senior resident 
physician verified if harm had occurred, through interaction with junior staff and by reading 
their reports. The prospective method identified adverse events in 2.8% of patients, which 
was similar to the percentage identified by RCRR (2.7%). Both prospective recording of 
harm and RCRR methods identified similar types of events with similar distributions across 
levels of severity. In a later French study covering 778 patients (278 medical, 263 surgical 
and 237 obstetric) across seven hospitals over a two month period, nurse investigators 
visited wards each week, and identified adverse events through interaction with ward staff 
and monitoring of case notes.146 Any harm detected was verified by a physician, who also 
visited the wards on a regular basis. Again, levels of detection were similar (15.4% for 
prospective surveillance versus 14.5% for RCRR). The prospective method was more 
effective at identifying events in medical cases than surgical cases. A third study across four 
specialist areas in one hospital, which used direct observation alongside the questioning of 
staff and record review for the prospective approach, found more harm related to diagnosis 
and treatment problems by these methods compared to RCRR.144  
Prospective surveillance and RCRR identify similar numbers of harm events, both omissions 
and commissions. Each method allows collection of contextual information to enable 
judgements around the preventability of deaths to be made. However, by triangulating up to 
three different sources of data (direct observation, interaction with staff, and daily case 
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record review) prospective measures can enable a clearer understanding of this context and 
the contributory factors / intervening variables integral to the origins of harm, making 
judgements of preventability easier than for RCRR where such information may be missing. 
Prospective surveillance also has the advantage of allowing estimation of incidence and is 
timelier than retrospective methods.  
Although the two methods compare favourably on the scope and scale of harm identified, 
prospective surveillance is at a disadvantage when it comes to measuring preventable deaths. 
Being a rare event, either a large number of patients have to be monitored prospectively, or 
the period of surveillance needs to be extensive to ensure adequate numbers of cases are 
captured. In addition, it is more labour intensive than RCRR, particularly if direct 
observation is undertaken. Given these constraints and their impact on cost, RCRR would 
seem the more pragmatic choice allowing a large number of deaths to be examined in a 
relatively short time frame with little disruption to services. A case control design could be 
seen as an enhancement of the RCRR method. It would allow not only the determination of 
the proportion of preventable deaths due to problems in care, but also the determination of 
the risk of problems in care amongst those that died compared to those that were discharged 
alive. However, both the technical challenges of selection bias and dealing with 
confounding, and the added cost of doubling the number of reviews that would need to be 
undertaken, are key disadvantages to adopting this approach. 
 
2.7	Conclusion	
An understanding of how harm is generated has led to the development of a range of 
approaches to its measurement. RCRR was the method developed for the first large scale 
epidemiological studies of healthcare-related harm. These studies have shed light on the 
burden of severe harm and preventable death resulting from healthcare errors. The most 
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commonly used harm measures have been described and compared against a range of 
criteria to determine their relative strengths and weaknesses. RCRR compares favourably 
with other approaches, particularly when used to measure serious harm and preventable 
death, and has the advantage of allowing comparisons with previous studies. The method has 
three main weaknesses; missing information, poor to moderate inter-rater reliability,211 and 
hindsight bias.216 Actions to mitigate the latter two, such as the use of structured data 
collection tools and reviewer training programmes, have been developed in previous studies 
and can be used to improve the reliability and validity of measurements.  
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Chapter	3	Research	Paper	1	
 
3.1	Introduction	to	Research	Paper	1	
This first research paper was published in the Quality and Safety in Healthcare journal, 
which later became BMJ Quality and Safety. It presents a study to identify the range of 
measures available to assess harm in a typical acute NHS hospital in England. The method 
includes semi-structured interviews with staff, direct examination of data sources and policy 
documents, and attendance at clinical governance meetings at one acute hospital.  
The study found that there was a wide range of information on patient harm available, but 
poor quality of coding, delays in collection, narrow scope, time limited data collection, and 
lack of central collation were barriers to using many of these sources. The paper looked in 
particular at seven sources of data that had the potential to provide hospital-wide information 
on harm, namely the five databases held in the Trust’s local risk management system 
(clinical incidents, health and safety incidents, complaints, claims, and inquests), the patient 
administration system (PAS), and case records. These sources were found both to identify 
different kinds of harm, and harm of differing levels of severity with little overlap between 
sources. The study highlighted some of the issues to be considered when using different 
types of harm measurement, such as a lack of temporal sequencing available in PAS data, 
and the subjective nature of information on harm held in claims files. RCRR was found to 
identify the largest number of harm events with the broadest scope.  
This study was important in developing an understanding of harm measurement and, in 
particular, some of the limitations associated with different measures. It was influential in 
guiding the choice of methodology for the main study.
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ABSTRACT
Objective: To assess the utility of data already existing
within hospitals for monitoring patient safety.
Setting: An acute hospital in southern England.
Design: Mapping of data sources proposed by staff as
potentially able to identify patient safety issues followed
by an in-depth analysis of the content of seven key
sources.
Data source analysis: For each data source: scope and
depth of content in relation to patient safety, number and
type of patient safety incidents identified, degree of
overlap with incidents identified by different sources,
levels of patient harm associated with incidents.
Results: A wide range of data sources existing within the
hospital setting have the potential to provide information
about patient safety incidents. Poor quality of coding,
delays in reports reaching databases, the narrow focus of
some data sources, limited data-collection periods and
lack of central collation of findings were some of the
barriers to making the best use of routine data sources for
monitoring patient safety. An in-depth analysis of seven
key data sources (Clinical Incident database, Health and
Safety Incident database, Complaints database, Claims
database and Inquest database, the Patient
Administration System and case notes) indicated that
case notes have the potential to identify the largest
number of incidents and provide the richest source of
information on such incidents. The seven data sources
identified different types of incidents with differing levels
of patient harm. There was little overlap between the
incidents identified by different sources.
Conclusion: Despite issues related to the quality of
coding, depth of information available and accessibility,
triangulating information from more than one source can
identify a broader range of incidents and provide
additional information related to professional groups
involved, types of patients affected and important
contributory factors. Such an approach can provide a
focus for further work and ultimately contributes to the
identification of appropriate interventions that improve
patient safety.
An integrated approach to risk management
requires healthcare organisations to gather infor-
mation on risk and safety from a range of
information sources so that the scale and nature
of key risk areas can be assessed. At a national
level, the National Patient Safety Agency (NPSA)
has established a Patient Safety Observatory to
quantify, characterise and prioritise patient safety
issues by bringing together information held by
different organisations.1 At a local level, despite the
fact that hospitals in the UK collect a wealth of
data on many aspects of patient care, these data
have been seen as an underutilised source of
information on patient safety.2 The majority of
hospitals in England and Wales rely on voluntary
reports of patient safety incidents (defined by the
NPSA as unintended or unexpected incidents that
could have led or did lead to harm for one or more
patients3) to Local Risk Management Systems
(LRMS) to identify trends and areas for further
investigation. The NPSA’s national database (the
National Reporting and Learning System) consists
almost entirely of data derived from this system.
However, this approach has been criticised as
potentially misleading. A few studies have com-
pared the number and types of incidents identified
by LRMS with those identified by other sources
including case notes,4 internal departmental inci-
dent reporting systems5 and computerised hospital
administrative records.6 7 These have shown that
LRMS can fail to pick up serious incidents and are
more likely to identify incidents not attributable to
direct staff action such as falls than those related to
clinical care. Evidence also suggests that nurses
report more incidents than other staff groups, with
significant under reporting by doctors.8
A variety of methods have been used to identify
adverse events affecting hospitalised patients
including retrospective case note review,9–11 in-
person collection of information from staff and
case records on the wards,12 direct observation,13
screening of administrative data14 and staff and
patient surveys.15 Comparisons of incidents
detected by different methods have shown rela-
tively little overlap between sources.4 7 16 These
findings suggest that there may be a value in
bringing together information on patient safety
from a wider range of sources. While most
hospitals do not have the resources to institute
some of the methodologies used in these studies, it
is plausible that they are able to make better use of
the data sources that they currently have. This
study investigated the range of sources information
relevant to patient safety found within a single
acute hospital in England, the scope of information
held by these sources and how it might be used to
examine key areas of patient safety.
METHODS
Design
A mapping exercise, including semistructured
interviews with 33 clinical and non-clinical staff,
direct examination of data sources and attendance
Error management
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at clinical governance meetings, was used to identify potentially
useful hospital data sources in a large district general hospital in
southern England with 850 beds and approximately 40 000
admissions per year.
By judging each source against the criteria of number and
types of incidents that could be identified, mode of data
collection, accessibility and content, seven sources were selected
for more detailed analysis. Retrospective data collection was
undertaken in respect of adult medical and surgical inpatients
admitted between 1 April 2004 and 31 March 2005. Data
sources were assessed to identify the completeness of informa-
tion found in each source, the number and types of incident
detected, patient harm resulting from each incident and the
degree of overlap between incidents identified by different
sources. An incident was registered if the coded event suggested
the potential to cause patient harm, even if harm was not
explicitly recorded, as information on harm was not always
available from some sources. All incidents detected were coded
by category and by level of harm using the standard coding
system employed by the National Reporting and Learning
System (NRLS) (table 1).17 Completeness of information was
assessed by identifying how many of the data items required by
the NRLS incident report form were present.18 Using patient full
name as an identifier, the degree of overlap between records
held on each database was examined.
Data sources
The sources interrogated included:
Five databases which made up the Trust’s Local Risk Management
System
The Clinical Incident database, Health and Safety Incident
database, Complaints database, Claims database and
Inquest database were searched for patient-identifiable entries
linked to adult medical and surgical inpatients within the
index year.
Patient Administration System
The Patient Administration System (PAS) was searched using
the 41 three-digit ICD 10 diagnosis codes for complications and
misadventures.19 Within each record, complication or misad-
venture codes appearing in the first of the six diagnostic code
boxes, which is normally used to designate the reason for
admission, were considered to indicate a preadmission event
and excluded.
Case notes
Two hundred and twenty randomly drawn records with an
adult surgical or medical admission within the index year were
reviewed. Reviews were undertaken using a method adapted
from that described by Woloshynowych et al.20 A 10% sample of
case notes with no incident identified and a 25% sample of
positive case notes were further reviewed by a second expert
reviewer (SO). All positive cases were also discussed with two
expert reviewers (SO and GN). The presence of a patient safety
incident was ascribed only if all three reviewers were in
agreement (75% of cases).
RESULTS
Data-quality issues
Table 2 describes the range of data sources that have the
potential to provide information about patient safety incidents
occurring in medical and surgical inpatients that exist within
the hospital. These sources could be divided into four main
types: Incident Reporting Systems, Surveillance Systems,
Audits and others (including case notes, the Patient
Administration System, minutes from Morbidity and
Mortality meetings, written claims and inquest records). Poor
quality of coding, delays in reports reaching databases, the
narrow focus of some data sources, time-limited data-collection
periods and lack of central collation of findings were some of the
barriers that limited the scope for routine data sources to be
used in monitoring patient safety.
Of the seven data sources selected for more detailed analysis,
case notes contained the most detailed information on
individual incidents including risk factors such as age, ethnicity
or comorbidities, time, place and location, description of the
incident, levels of harm and contributory factors. The Clinical
Incident database also contained many of these data items, but
information on risk factors and contributory factors was usually
not entered. In addition, the category of healthcare professional
who was involved in the incident or who made the report was
often missing. It was difficult to make objective assessments of
patient harm for incidents detected in the Complaints database
or on the PAS system. For the former, information on harm was
principally from the patient or carer’s perspective only, and for
the latter there was inadequate detail. Elucidating the temporal
sequence of events was sometimes challenging with individual
PAS records, occasionally leading to difficulty distinguishing
preadmission diagnoses or comorbidities from in-hospital
incidents.
Box 1 Examples of different categories of incident
detected by different data sources
Clinical incidents: medication error
Patient given five doses of Co-dydramol in 1 day, although
prescribed four times daily—no patient complaints. Drug chart
needed rewriting; previous entries illegible.
Complaints: consent, communication and confidentiality
Patient’s daughter raises concerns regarding doctor’s attitude.
When she spoke to doctor, she was told mother was doing very
well, when in fact the doctor was describing a different patient.
Health and Safety incidents: patient accident
Patient being weighed on sitting scales, mobility poor and brakes
loose, scales moved and patient fell on her side to the floor. Slight
graze to existing haematoma on right elbow and possible injury to
right hip.
Claims: treatment and procedure
Patient had right ankle injected instead of left.
Inquest: clinical assessment
Patient attended A&E three times and sent home with diagnosis
of tonsillitis. Prescribed antibiotics. Finally presented with severe
shock requiring resuscitation and surgery. Delay in diagnosing
haemorrhage due to ruptured spleen. Patient died.
Adverse event from case note review: treatment and
procedure
Cystic artery inadvertently cut during laparotomy cholecystect-
omy. Operation converted to a laparoscopy in order to control
bleeding. Blood loss estimated as 2 litres. Postoperative blood
transfusion given.
Error management
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Numbers of incidents and degree of overlap between sources
Table 3 shows the number patient safety incidents identified by
each of the seven data sources in total and the number identified
exclusively by each source. Case notes potentially identify the
largest number incidents. Seventy-one patient safety incidents
were found across 220 inpatient admissions (32.3%). Of these,
40 (18.1%) fulfilled the definition of an adverse event (an
unintended injury or complication of care leading to prolonged
admission, disability at discharge or death and caused by
healthcare management rather than the disease process), the
term most often used to describe incidents in previous studies.
Sixty-five patient safety incidents were single events. Three
patients experienced two incidents during the index admission.
Based on these findings, it can be estimated that 8781(95% CI
6495 to 12 144) incidents could potentially be identified across
the 27 270 adult medical and surgical admissions between 1.4.04
and 31.3.03. The second largest source of patient safety
incidents was the Clinical Incident database with 484 incidents
identified within the index year. This was followed by PAS (462
incidents), Complaints (221 incidents) and Health and Safety
(176 incidents). Inquest and Claims records identified small
numbers of events, 21 and 10, respectively.
Table 4 demonstrates that the degree of overlap between
incidents picked up by different data sources was small.
Types of incidents identified by different data sources
Different data sources tended to identify different proportions
of incidents in each category (table 5), and 37.5% of incidents
identified via the Clinical Incident database were medication
errors and equipment failures. Complaints provide an insight
into incidents related to communication failures (22% of total).
The PAS system, Inquests database and case notes identified
many incidents linked to surgical interventions and to
investigative procedures. The PAS system was also useful in
identifying incidents related to infection control (see Box 1 and
table 6, for examples of incidents detected by different data
sources).
Levels of patient harm
Incidents were graded by severity; the proportion of incidents
graded as causing death, severe, moderate, low or no harm
varied among the different data sources (table 7). Incidents
found in inquest and claims records tended to be associated
with death or serious harm; case records identified incidents
mainly causing moderate or low levels of harm and LRMS
databases captured a higher proportion of incidents causing low
levels of harm or no harm. Although there was not enough
information available to code the majority of incidents detected
by the PAS, 8.4% of patients with a coded complication or
misadventure in their record died (see Box 2 for examples of
incidents graded for differing levels of patient harm).
DISCUSSION
The aim of this study was to explore the feasibility of using a
range of hospital data sources to identify patient safety
incidents in order to provide a better picture of the scale and
scope of incidents related to key safety issues in an English
hospital. The study focuses on routine data sources that are
available within the hospital setting.
A number of limitations should be considered. The study was
carried out in a single acute hospital, and although data sources
identified by the mapping exercise as containing potentially
useful patient safety information are likely to be present in
other sites, accessibility, quality of coding and completeness
may vary from site to site. The study also focused on data
sources linked to medical and surgical inpatients only. While
these sources also provide information on incidents related to
other specialties and outpatients, there will be additional data
sources that can also be utilised for this purpose, and some
tailoring in relation to the issue being explored is necessary.
Many routine hospital data sources collect data for purposes
other than identifying patient safety incidents. These data are
observational rather than experimental and are prone to biases
Box 2 Examples of incidents graded for differing levels of
patient harm
Clinical incident: no harm impact prevented
Patient’s ‘‘to take home’’ medication mislabelled as 5 mg
Amlodipine when contents in the bag were in fact 10 mg.
Nurse informed pharmacy of error and returned the drugs.
Health and Safety: no harm impact not prevented
Patient found sitting on floor by staff. No obvious injury noted.
Complaints: low
Patient’s son has written regarding her mother was who given a
wrong wrist band in A&E on 2/4/04. He also has other concerns
regarding a cannula which was left in his mother when
discharged.
Claims: moderate
Patient is diabetic with circulatory problems. Allegation made that
insufficient care was taken during his admission to prevent
development of pressure sores, which became infected with
MRSA.
Case note review, adverse event: severe
Patient who was post coronary artery bypass graft gradually
deteriorated over 1 week with symptoms of shortness of breath
and a discharging chest wound. Clinical team failed to investigate
reason for deterioration. After 5 days became acutely unwell and
found to have chest wound breakdown and a passageway
between wound and chest cavity. Transferred to ITU and put on a
ventilator. Recovery took several weeks.
Inquest: death
Patient died following a right hemicolectomy. Cause of death on
post-mortem was (1) haemorrhage due to right hemicolectomy,
(2) Crohn’s disease.
Table 1 National Reporting and Learning System’s harm grading for patient safety incidents
No harm Impact prevented: any patient safety incident that had the potential to cause harm but was prevented, resulting in no harm to people receiving NHS-funded care
Impact not prevented: any patient safety incident that ran to completion but no harm occurred to people receiving NHS-funded care
Low Any patient safety incident that required extra observation or minor treatment
Moderate Any patient safety incident that resulted in a moderate increase in treatment
Severe Any patient safety incident that appears to have resulted in permanent harm
Death Any patient safety incident that directly resulted in death
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introduced by differential reporting levels, the variable quality
of coding and levels of completeness. The most useful
supplementary information sources would be those that collect
timely data on a continuous basis, which are accessible and have
appropriate content. Timely and continuous data collection is
important for analysis of trends over time. These conditions
limit the use of many hospital sources where data collection is
short-lived and non-recurring. Accessibility is also limited by the
long delays in information reaching some sources, the lack of
central collation, poorly coded electronic information and the
amount of time required to review written records. Staff may
also feel uncomfortable sharing some types of sensitive
information, an attitude difficult to change if the hospital’s
culture is not perceived as open and fair. Important content,
such as information related to risk factors including age, gender,
ethnicity or profession of healthcare worker involved, is often
not available. Furthermore, the patchy nature of data collection
across any healthcare organisation and the narrow focus of
much of this data collection will inevitably mean that there will
be gaps in information in certain areas.
Limited information makes it difficult to identify incidents.
In the Complaints and Claims databases, the descriptions of
events are mainly from the patient or carer’s perspective with
limited information from the hospital, diagnoses in PAS records
do not indicate when they occurred, and information on patient
harm, apart from death, is not available. To get the most out of
the data available, a pragmatic approach was taken to
identifying incidents, judging whether the event described had
the potential to cause patient harm, even if that harm was not
explicitly recorded. This may have led to some overestimation
of the numbers of incidents. The relatively small sample of case
notes reviewed, representing 0.8% of all adult medical and
surgical admissions in the index year, also increases the degree of
uncertainty around estimates of the total number of patient
safety incidents that can be identified by this method. These
problems of validity and reliability highlight why such sources
should not be used for comparisons of facilities. However, they
are less important when hospitals are using the data internally
to pinpoint areas of concern as part of internal quality-
improvement processes.
Table 3 Number of incidents identified by each of the seven data
sources for adult medical and surgical patient admissions between
1.4.04 and 31.3.05
Data source
Total no. of incidents
identified
No. of incidents exclusively
identified by source
Case notes* 8781 NA{
Clinical incidents 484 428
PAS 462 399
Health & Safety 221 197
Complaints 176 148
Inquest 21 10
Claims 10 7
Total 10 190
*Estimate based on a sample of 220 inpatient admissions.
{Of the 71 patient safety incidents identified from case notes, 10 were also found by
other sources.
Table 4 Degree of overlap between incidents identified by each data
source, April 2004 to March 2005
Clinical incidents
(484)
Clinical
incidents
Claims (10) 3 Claims
Inquests (21) 9 0 Inquests
Complaints (176) 4 2 2 Complaints
Health & Safety
(221)
7 0 1 10 Heath &
Safety
PAS (462) 35 1 3 12 14 PAS
Case notes (71) 3 0 0 2 1 6
Table 5 Numbers and proportions of incidents in each category detected by different data sources, April 2004 to March 2005
NPSA incident categories Clinical incidents Complaints Health & Safety Claims Inquests PAS Case notes
Access, admission, transfer 67 (13.8%) 15 (8.5%) 8 (11.3%)
Clinical assessment 39 (8.1%) 12 (6.8%) 2 (20%) 5 (23.8%) 13 (18.3%)
Consent, communication &
confidentiality
33 (6.8%) 39 (22.2%)
Disruptive, aggressive behaviour 2 (0.4%) 1 (0.6%) 2 (0.9%)
Documentation 43 (8.9%) 3 (1.7%)
Care & ongoing monitoring and
review
31 (6.4%) 29 (16.5%) 1 (10%) 1 (4.8%) 7 (9.9%)
Infection control 2 (0.4%) 16 (9.1%) 2 (20%) 1 (4.8%) 181 (39.2%) 9 (12.7%)
Infrastructure 34 (7.0%) 29 (16.5%) 1 (4.8%) 2 (2.8%)
Medical equipment 73 (15.1%) 7 (3.2%) 1 (10%) 4 (0.9%) 1 (1.4%)
Medication error 100 (20.7%) 4 (2.3%) 1 (4.8%) 13 (2.8%) 15 (21.1%)
Patient abuse 3 (1.7%)
Patient accident 15 (3.1%) 7 (4.0%) 212 (95.9%) 1 (4.8%)
Self-harming behaviour 1 (0.2%)
Treatment, procedure 44 (9.1%) 18 (10.2%) 4 (40%) 11 (52.4%) 264 (57.1%) 16 (22.5%)
Total 484 176 221 10 21 462 40
Table 6 Patient administration system: infection control incident
Diagnosis 1 Diagnosis 2 Diagnosis 3 Diagnosis 4 Diagnosis 5 Diagnosis 6 Procedure 1
I803 , Phlebitis and
thrombophlebitis of
lower extremities
unspecified
I739 , Peripheral
vascular disease
unspecified
I10X , Essential
(primary)
hypertension
T814 , Infection
following a procedure
not classified elsewhere
B956 , Staph aureus
as cause of dis
classified to other
chapters
N390 , Urinary-
tract infection site
not specified
L592 , Bypass of femoral artery
by anastomosis of femoral artery
to popliteal artery using prosthesis
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Our analyses, which focused on seven data sources,
indicated that the Clinical Incident database, the main database
used by many trusts to monitor patient safety incidents,
identifies relatively few incidents overall. This finding is in
line with previous studies.4 7 21 In addition, each source
picked up its own unique collection of incidents in terms of
type and levels of harm, with minimal overlap between
sources. From the mapping exercise, it is clear that there are
many other data sources found within the hospital setting
which have the potential to provide useful information on
patient safety, particularly if use is tailored to the investigation
of specific problems. Triangulating information from a wider
range of data sources presents an opportunity to gain a greater
understanding of key patient safety issues, including a better
understanding of the common types of incidents, the healthcare
professional groups and types of patients involved, and
important contributory factors. It offers the opportunity to
learn from events that cover the spectrum of patient harm.
Using information from a range of sources can enhance
investigations of key risk areas such as medication errors,
diagnostic testing, infection control or treatments and proce-
dures (see fig 1 for an example). It offers both a mechanism
for ongoing monitoring and an opportunity to better focus
clinical governance activities such as audit or targeted case
note review. The future development of validated patient safety
indicators, similar to those employed by the Agency for
Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ) in the US, will
increase the utility of information derived from administrative
data such as PAS.22 Collaborative working between clinical
staff, clinical risk teams and information technology is essential
to make the most of all the data sources available. Staff
cooperation, in turn, depends on the presence of an open and
fair culture, with an emphasis on learning from incidents rather
than apportioning blame.
Table 7 Proportion of incidents in different harm grades for each data source, April 2004 to March 2005
Clinical incidents Complaints Health & Safety Claims Inquest Case notes
Death 8 (1.7%) 0 0 2 (20%) 21 (100%) 2 (2.8)
Severe 9 (1.9%) 1 (0.6%) 2 (0.9%) 0 0 2 (2.8)
Moderate 28 (5.8%) 18 (10.2%) 3 (1.4%) 2 (20%) 0 18 (25.4%)
Low 114 (23.6%) 38 (21.6%) 86 (38.9%) 6 (60%) 0 35 (49.2%)
No harm impact not prevented 259 (53.5%) 107 (60.8) 127 (57.4%) 0 0 0
No harm impact prevented 66 (13.6%) 0 0 0 0 0
Not possible to code 0 12 (6.8%) 3 (1.4%) 0 0 0
Total 484 176 221 10 21 71
Figure 1 An approach to exploring incidents related to clinical assessment.
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Information plays a vital role in identifying, monitoring and
investigating levels of risk, promoting safer healthcare within
organisations and enabling delivery of the continuous quality
improvement that underpins the clinical governance agenda in
the UK. Chief executives and directors of Trusts are now
accountable for organisation-wide assessment of patient safety
risks. This study highlights the advantages of triangulating
information from a range of sources when making such
assessments. Leadership from senior managers is vital to
promote a culture that promotes the sharing of information
derived from these sources among different departments. The
directors are also in a position, based on the findings from local
investigations or intelligence received from external sources, to
identify key risk areas requiring further investigation anywhere
in the hospital and to provide the resources needed to ensure
that the methodology and findings from such investigations
are disseminated and further in depth work such as audit is
commissioned if necessary. Such a targeted approach to
improving patient safety would allow for the most efficient
use of scarce resources. Clinical governance teams could provide
technical support to departmental staff, helping them to
identify and exploit information sources that are relevant for
a particular investigation, along with advice on search strate-
gies, collation and analysis of these data. Work to overcome the
limitations of some data sources, such as improvement of the
quality and consistency of electronically coded information or
institution of new data collection systems to address key
knowledge gaps could be part of this support. Such an approach
need not be restricted to acute hospitals although the challenges
relating to sharing information across the primary-secondary
care interface are likely to be more significant.
The NPSA’s National Reporting and Learning System draws
the majority of the incident reports it uses for monitoring
national trends from LRMS. The agency acknowledges that
incident reporting systems alone can never be relied upon to
provide a comprehensive picture of patient safety.1 At a national
level, the NPSA draws more widely on intelligence from a range
of sources both within and external to the NHS via its Patient
Safety Observatory to better characterise patient safety issues.
At the local level, data from a broader range of local sources
would also seem to offer valuable supplementary information to
the NPSA. Such findings could reach the agency via its network
of Patient Safety Managers who currently work closely with
individual Trusts.
In conclusion, gaining intelligence on patient safety incidents
from a broader range of information sources has the potential to
provide healthcare organisations with a better picture of key
patient safety risks thus facilitating targeting of scare resources
on appropriate interventions with the potential to improve
patient safety.
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Chapter	4	Method	
 
4.1	Introduction	
This Chapter describes the development of a methodology for the determination of an 
estimate of the scale of preventable deaths in English acute hospitals, and exploration of the 
nature of that harm.  Based on the findings from Chapter 2 and Chapter 3, RCRR was 
selected as the most appropriate method for the study. Given that there had been relatively 
few published RCRRs with a focus on deaths in the past,17 174 I undertook a pilot study to test 
the feasibility of the approach and identify if there were adaptations needed. In this chapter I 
describe the findings of the pilot and its contribution to improving the reliability and validity 
of measurement, before describing the methods for the main study.   
	
4.2	The	Pilot	Study	
The aim of the pilot study was to establish what modifications might need to be made to the 
traditional RCRR method in order to ascertain a valid and reliable estimate of hospital 
preventable deaths. Forty-seven randomly selected deaths from two large London acute NHS 
hospital Trusts (20 from a teaching hospital and 27 from a large acute general hospital) were 
reviewed by myself (27 cases) and another expert reviewer (20 cases) in March and April 
2007. A 10% sample of records from each reviewer was double reviewed by a third 
reviewer. Information was collected using a structured medical review form developed for 
the first English RCRR study that had been conducted in London in 1999.235 Most of the 
patients in the sample were over 80 years old and had multiple co-morbidities. The study 
found 4 preventable deaths (8.5%), the majority of which occurred during general ward care 
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and were related to either a failure in clinical monitoring, hospital acquired infection, or a 
problem related to drugs or fluids.  
The pilot study found that the case records were straightforward to access and were in hard 
copy (rather than microfiche), when deaths occurred within two years of the review. In 
addition, tracers in medical record databases enabled records missing from the Medical 
Records department to be located and retrieved for reviewing. However, specific instruction 
needed to be given to ensure that medical records staff made every attempt to retrieve these 
missing records. The average review time was one hour, with a review rate of six to seven 
case records per day. Most records (96%) were found to contain enough content to allow an 
assessment of the presence of harm and its preventability.   
As a result of the pilot study, the following decisions were made about the design of the 
proposed main study: 
1. New definition for harm events 
The pilot study confirmed that the term ‘adverse event’ tended to draw attention to 
acts of commission rather than omission, and to harms related to actions of 
individuals rather than those that were system-based. In consultation with Professor 
Charles Vincent and Dr Graham Neale, who had conducted the first English RCRR 
in London, and Professor Richard Thomson, the Head of Research for NPSA, a new 
definition of harm, termed ‘problems in care’, was developed and defined as: 
‘Patient harm resulting from acts of omission (inactions), such as failure to diagnose 
and treat, or from acts of commission (affirmative actions), such as incorrect 
treatment or management, or harm as a result of unintended complications of 
healthcare’.  
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This definition was designed to be inclusive of the widest range of harms, including 
those that resulted from multiple, small sub-optimal failures in care, especially if 
these occurred over the period of the admission.  
2. Questions to determine preventable death 
In traditional RCRR studies, reviewers make a series of judgements related to 
whether the patient experiences harm, whether that harm was caused by healthcare 
and, if so, if it was preventable.  At each point a decision is usually made using a six 
point Likert scale, reflecting the probabilistic nature of the decision. Again, based on 
the pilot study and in consultation with experts this series of questions was 
simplified. In the newly designed form the reviewer was asked to answer ‘yes’ or 
‘no’ to a question enquiring whether problem(s) in care had contributed to the 
patient’s death. An affirmative answer led to a further set of questions on the nature 
of the problem in care that culminated in a question on the preventability of the 
death, which reviewers were asked to rate on the six point Likert scale. The study 
design envisaged using a value of four or more on the Likert scale - deaths were 
judged preventable if reviewers felt that there was more than a 50% chance that the 
death was preventable.  
3. Life expectancy 
Descriptions of the burden of harm in healthcare have evoked images of a plane 
crash, or busloads of people dying every day, giving an impression that preventable 
deaths have as much impact on the young as on the old.8 This assumption is 
unlikely, given that approximately 60% of deaths in England occur in hospital, and 
the majority of those are in elderly patients. To address this issue, an estimation of 
life expectancy was added to the review. A range of options for capturing this 
information was explored. The Charlson index is commonly used in elderly 
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populations, and captures life expectancy based on the number and severity of co-
morbidities, but is not designed for use in gathering data on critically ill patients.236 
In contrast, the Acute Physiology and Chronic Health Evaluation (APACHE), and 
other associated tools, were designed to estimate life expectancy in critically ill 
patients, but completion requires access to a range of physiology results that might 
not be available in the patient record. Furthermore, both the Charlson Index and the 
APACHE score were created for case mix adjustment in population studies, and not 
for making estimates for individuals.237 Disease specific tools also generally perform 
poorly if used for prognostication in elderly people with six months or less to live.238 
The same applies to performance status measures.239  
Given the complexities of using a tool for life expectancy estimation in a cohort of 
elderly patients with multiple co-morbidities and towards the end of their lives, I 
adopted the approach taken by Hayward and Hofer in their small study of 
preventable deaths,17 and the Dutch Adverse Event study,16 both of which used 
physicians’ judgements of life expectancy. Reviewers were asked to consider three 
factors when making this decision: the degree of urgency on admission (critical, 
urgent, semi-urgent, routine), the patient’s functional state on admission using a 
seven point scale from ‘normal’ to ‘requires special care’ adapted from the 
Karnofsky Index,240  and the patient’s acute and chronic condition. 
4. Measuring Quality of Care 
To explore the relationship between overall quality of care, and problems in care and 
preventable death, a ‘quality of care’ rating scale designed by the RAND 
Corporation was included in the Review form.215 The scale asked reviewers to rate 
the quality of each phase of care (from admission through to ward care), before 
giving an overall rating. 
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4.3	The	Preventable	Incidents	Survival	and	Mortality	Study:	
Main	Methods	
The final study design drew heavily on the approach used by Professor Charles Vincent and 
Dr Graham Neale for their RCRR of 1014 admissions, which took place in two London 
hospitals during the late 1990s.15 Their design had, in turn, been based on the HMPS. 
Professor Vincent and Dr Neale were advisors to this study, and provided invaluable 
guidance.  
4.3.1	Determining	Sample	Size	
I based sample size estimation on the proportion of preventable deaths found in the US study 
of 111 deaths conducted by Hayward and Hofer (6%), as this was a more conservative 
estimate than that found in the pilot study.17 For a simple random sample, a sample size of 
347 deceased patients was required (alpha=0.05) to estimate a confidence interval of 2.5% to 
both sides. In an effort to make the study’s results more generalisable, I decided that sub-
samples of deceased patients should be selected from ten English acute hospital Trusts of 
contrasting size and location. The number of hospitals was a pragmatic choice based on 
study resources. With a sample size of ten hospitals, taking inter-hospital clustering into 
account, and using the intra-cluster correlation coefficient derived from the well powered 
Dutch Adverse Event Study16 (0.037), the sample size needed to be increased at least three 
fold to 1000, in order to account for the two stage sampling strategy, and to maintain the 
same 95% confidence interval. The ten acute hospitals were randomly selected from a list of 
all English acute hospitals, which was then stratified by size, geographical location and 
HSMR quartile. An index year of 2009 was chosen for the sample, being the last complete 
calendar year before reviewing was scheduled to start, and recent enough to ensure that 
hardcopy records were likely to be available for review. 
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4.3.2	Sample	Exclusions	and	Inclusions	
The majority of previous RCRRs excluded psychiatric patients,6 169 with some also excluding 
obstetric patients,174 and others children under 18.15 Given that obstetric, psychiatric and 
paediatric patients accounted for less than 5% of all hospital deaths in England and Wales,64 
and would require recruitment of specialist reviewers in those areas to undertake the case 
record review, I decided to exclude these patients from the sample. Additionally, patients 
that were admitted explicitly for palliative care were excluded.  Deaths were included if they 
occurred within the first 24 hours after admission, as long as the notes indicated that the 
patient had been formally admitted to hospital and was not just an A&E attendance. 
4.3.3	Hospital	Recruitment	
I sent a letter to each hospital Chief Executive outlining the aims of the study, the approach 
and how findings would be fed back. All hospitals were asked to nominate a lead (a senior 
member of the clinical governance team in most cases) who would be the main point of 
contact during the study. A protocol was developed covering patient sampling, and the 
location, tracing and retrieval of medical records at each site. Information Departments were 
asked to draw up a list of adult medical and surgical patients from 2009 that had died during 
their admission, using the Patient Administration System. The Microsoft Office Excel 2010 
random numbers generator was used to select a random sample from the list. Oversampling 
was undertaken to ensure replacement records were available if those from the original list 
could not be traced, or had inadequate content. I gave instructions to medical records staff 
about the importance of tracing any missing records to ensure the sample was as complete as 
possible. It was stressed that this was particularly important if these records were located in 
the legal department. Each hospital maintained a list of all records that could not be traced, 
including details of age, sex, specialty, whether subject to a coroner’s inquiry or claim, and 
last location, as well as the reason for their loss.   
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In previous RCRRs, reviews have usually been completed on the hospital site. This has the 
advantage of allowing access to the complete record, enabling the reviewer to track a 
problem backwards from the index admission if its origin falls outside this hospitalisation. In 
addition, missing elements such as drug charts or laboratory results can be searched for 
within the record itself, or accessed via the hospital’s computer system. One RCRR study in 
Birmingham did obtain photocopies of the index admission, previously anonymised by 
hospital staff, and this allowed reviewing to take place remotely.241 However, the resource 
implications of this approach were beyond the means of this study. 
4.3.4	Reviewer	Recruitment	and	Training	
I considered whether each hospital’s own doctors could undertake the reviews. Previous 
studies indicated that this was feasible and would have the advantage of leaving a legacy of 
trained staff.200 242 However, given the nature of the study’s aims to produce the first rigorous 
estimate of preventable death in England, it seemed more appropriate to use external 
reviewers to ensure the independence of the findings. I felt that the workload for NHS 
consultants could restrict their ability to take part in this study, and chose instead to recruit 
reviewers who were recently retired NHS hospital consultants. A limit of five years post 
retirement was set, to ensure that these doctors remained relatively up to date with current 
NHS practice. 
Recruitment was undertaken through the Royal College of Physicians and Royal College of 
Surgeons, via adverts in College newsletters. I vetted CVs for relevant experience, and 
conducted informal interviews over the phone. The pilot study had indicated that most 
problems in care would be of a generalist nature and would not need a reviewer to have 
particular specialist knowledge. Only two surgeons were eventually recruited, the rest being 
physicians with a generalist background. I felt that the surgical resource could be most 
usefully employed by providing advice to the physicians on problems in care directly related 
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to surgery. Across the reviewer base, many different specialties were represented, which 
opened up the possibility of dealing with specialist-type queries generated by the reviewers 
within the group. 
I designed a one day training programme in collaboration with Dr Graham Neale. After an 
initial introduction to the study, the protocol, definitions and review form, there was 
opportunity for the participants to practise making judgements on short and long cases. 
Clinical discussions based on the cases led by Dr Neale covered areas including avoidance of 
hindsight bias, and clarified the procedure in order to develop a consistency of approach 
amongst the reviewers. Dr Neale and I provided ongoing support, once the reviewers were 
out in the field, by email and telephone. In addition, a secure email list was set up to allow 
discussion of difficult cases, and a monthly newsletter sent round with a list of Frequently 
Asked Questions.  
4.3.5	The	Structured	Medical	Review	Form	
As part of the London RCRR study, Professor Vincent and Dr Neale had modified the 
original HMPS review form, to ensure better alignment with the typical phases of care within 
an NHS hospital admission.235 The categories for harm events were also changed to reflect 
differences in nomenclature between the UK and the US. The London form drew on 
Professor Vincent’s approach to incident investigations, by incorporating additional 
checklists for organisational and environmental contributory factors to those already in place 
(patient, individual, and team factors) having been identified as important underlying 
contributors to harm events.243 The London form had undergone piloting across eight 
international clinical teams experienced in RCRR before implementation. Subsequently, two 
further UK-based RCRR studies and the Dutch Adverse Event study have used this form.230 
242  
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Following changes made to the London form after the pilot, it was tested by Dr Neale, a third 
experienced reviewer, and myself, each of us taking ten records. It was also used by two 
trainee surgeons undertaking their own record review studies, both of whom provided 
valuable feedback. Finally, the reviewers themselves were invited to give feedback on the 
form during the training session. The form was structured to allow reviewers to progress 
through the review in a structured way. General demographic information and information 
on the patient’s condition at admission were gathered in the first stage.  If a problem in 
healthcare was found to have contributed to a patient’s death, the form then led the reviewer 
through a series of questions documenting its type and timing, causative and contributory 
factors, and the preventability of the death. Information was also gathered on quality of care, 
the completeness of the records, the nature of missing information, and whether this impeded 
the review process. 
4.3.6	The	Review	Process	
Reviews were conducted on site, either in Medical Records or Clinical Governance 
Departments. Two reviewers were allocated to each site, and reviewed 50 case records each. 
The hospital lead was responsible for introducing the reviewers to the hospital site, ensuring 
that they were familiar with its organisational structure and had access to laboratory results 
and imaging if these were stored electronically. 
Reviewers were required to complete a log, tracking which medical records had been 
reviewed and dates of transfer back to Medical Records Department (Access log). They also 
completed a key code that linked the patient’s hospital number with a unique study number 
taken from a prepared list. Before commencing a review, reviewers added the patient’s 
unique study number to the review form, along with their own reviewer ID code. No patient 
identifiable data were transferred onto the form. The key code document and completed 
forms were stored in separate locked cupboards in the review room.   
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Traditional RCRR is normally a two stage process. In the first stage it is usual for a nurse to 
screen the case record, using a defined list of sentinel events that indicate an adverse event 
may have occurred. Screen-positive records are forwarded to a physician for implicit review. 
As death is one of the screening criteria, I did not employ this initial screening step. All 1000 
records underwent a complete implicit review. 
Before the review commenced, reviewers were asked to check that the record was complete, 
that the death occurred during the index year (2009), and that the patient was not admitted 
for obstetric, psychiatric or paediatric care. If a post mortem report was found in the medical 
records, this was not to be read until the end of the review. The review focused on the 
admission in which the patient’s death occurred. Reviewers could track back to previous 
admissions to uncover the origin of any harm discovered in the index admission, if this was 
not clear from that admission. Reviewers were asked to approach each review in a similar 
way: 
1. Review the initial presentation with special attention to the general practitioner’s 
referral letter, recent outpatient care, the need for admission, timeliness of initial 
assessment, diagnostic evaluation and management plan. 
2. Review the rest of the doctor’s record to determine if appropriate and timely care 
was given, and to evaluate the reasons for continued hospitalisation, testing and 
treatment. This step included review of the laboratory and radiology records to 
determine if important abnormalities were reported and acted on, and whether 
appropriate / inappropriate testing was performed. 
3. Review the nursing notes and monitoring charts to determine if the management 
plan was adhered to and that new patient signs and symptoms were dealt with 
appropriately. 
4. Review the medication record to determine if appropriate / inappropriate medicines 
were given. 
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Instructions were given to mark any causes for concern found in the initial read through with 
a sticky label to indicate the need to return to that point for a more detailed assessment later. 
It was recommended that the form be completed at the end of the review. 
The reviewers were asked to imagine ‘walking through’ the case with the patient’s clinical 
team and to ask themselves the question, ‘Would this issue still be a problem if the patient 
had not died?’ in an effort to prevent second guessing and hindsight bias.  Each reviewer was 
provided with a manual to help guide the review process. 
The record reviews were initially conducted independently. If, after full review, a reviewer 
was uncertain as to whether a death was caused by a problem in care, then a conversation 
with their reviewing partner could take place and a consensus reached. If judgement was 
hampered by a specialty specific question, it could be discussed with another reviewer in the 
group who was a specialist in this area. If there were no specialists in a particular area, then 
an opinion from a specialist outside the group was sought by me. Reviewers were asked to 
note down on the form if such advice had been sought. 
On completion of all reviews at each site, reviewers discussed each case found to be a 
preventable death with Dr Neale to ensure any residual questions were dealt with and all the 
required information had been gathered from the case record. 
4.3.7	Approaches	to	Reduction	of	Bias	
A number of design features were built into the study that have previously been shown to 
improve the reliability of judgements made by reviewers. The study employed experienced 
physicians, reviewer training, written guidance, ongoing reviewer support and the use of a 
structured data collection form.12 16 184 244   In anticipation that some reviewers might be 
harsher judges of the acceptability of healthcare processes than others even after training, 
two reviewers were sent to each site. 25% of each reviewer’s case records were randomly 
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selected for double review, and the Kappa Coefficient calculated to provide an indicator of 
inter-rater reliability of judgements around life expectancy, the presence of a problem in 
care, and of the preventability of deaths. 
4.3.8	Ethical	Issues	
The study was granted ethics approval by The Royal National Hospital for Neurological 
Diseases, and the Institute of Neurology Research Ethics Committee. One of the acute 
hospitals was nominated as the lead for research governance purposes and liaised with 
Research Governance Departments in the other nine sites to ensure all necessary permissions 
were sought and that ‘letters of access’ for the reviewers were issued. 
Research based on medical records has a proven track record in providing health gains for 
the population, but any potential for such research to benefit society does have to be 
balanced against ethical concerns related to consent and confidentiality at an individual 
patient level.  This imperative applies to the medical records of patients who have died, but 
for whom there may be particular challenges related to obtaining consent for record review 
from next of kin. For this study, tracing the next of kin of the 1000 patients in the sample 
who died at least one year before the study commenced was deemed impractical. Moreover, 
previous research led me to believe that approaching relatives for consent, following what 
may have been a disturbing and painful experience, would cause further and unnecessary 
distress.74 245 For these reasons, I sought and was granted exemption from seeking consent 
from next of kin under Section 251 of the NHS Act 2006. 
Measures were put in place to ensure patient and hospital confidentiality. The study 
complied with guidance set out in the NHS Code of Confidentiality, the London School of 
Hygiene and Tropical Medicine’s Information Security Management Policy, and the Code of 
Practice for Higher and Further Education Sectors on the Data Protection Act 1998. During 
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reviewer training, issues of confidentiality were discussed, and the ‘letter of access’ issued to 
each reviewer contained a confidentiality clause outlining the consequences of any breach in 
confidentiality. 
Each case study number was linked to the patient’s hospital number in a key code document 
completed by the reviewer and kept on the hospital site. If reviewers were aware of a serious 
breach in standards of care and felt that this should be reported to the hospital, then it was 
possible for clinical governance staff to use the key code to obtain the patient’s hospital 
number and retrieve the records for further examination. The mechanism for reporting such 
occurrences was agreed with each hospital before the study started, and a key contact in 
clinical governance or patient safety nominated. Hospitals were then able to arrange for an 
investigation in accordance with their normal procedures for such events.  
4.3.9	Data	Entry	
Quantitative data from the review forms was entered into an Epidata Version 3 database 
before export to Stata Version 12 for analysis. Built in validation occurred on data entry. 
Qualitative data were entered into a Microsoft Access 2011 database. I clarified medical 
jargon, when necessary, for data entry personnel. The dataset included information on patient 
demographics and characteristics (age, sex, co-morbidity, functional status, life expectancy), 
admission characteristics (degree of urgency, length of admission, specialist team, ward 
placements, diagnosis), quality of care, and adequacy and completeness of the record. For 
patients experiencing problems in care, further information gathered included time and place 
of occurrence, categorisation (diagnosis and assessment, clinical monitoring, drugs and 
fluids, infections, procedures, resuscitation and other), sub-categorisation, contributory 
factors, and preventability ratings via the six point Likert scale. Narrative descriptions of the 
admission history and any problem(s) in care contributing to death were also collected. For 
each preventable death reviewers were asked to explain why the judgement had been made, 
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and to make recommendations for prevention under the categories of human, technical or 
organisational actions. 
4.3.10	Analysis	of	Quantitative	Data	
The proportion of preventable deaths (deaths scoring 4 or above on the Likert scale) was 
calculated along with a sensitivity analysis, taking different thresholds of 3 (preventability 
not likely, less than 50:50 but close call) and 5 (strong evidence for preventability). 
Comparisons were made for age, sex, co-morbidities, functional ability, life expectancy and 
quality of care in patients with a) no problems in care, b) problems in care, and c) problems 
in care and preventable deaths. Comparisons of the types of problems in care associated with 
different phases of care, and in patients who did and did not experience a preventable death, 
were made.  The median numbers of years of life lost as a result of a preventable death was 
calculated. Comparisons were made of the proportions of preventable deaths across 
hospitals. Descriptive statistics were used to derive means and percentages. Tests for the 
comparison of proportions in two independent groups corrected for binomial distribution 
were used, with two-sided estimation of significance and the significance level set at 0.05. 
The degree of correlation between preventable death rates across the ten hospitals, and eight 
publicly available safety measures associated with the structure of healthcare (% staff 
indicating patient safety incidents were not reported as a proxy for safety culture, staff 
sickness absence), process (patient safety incidents, % patients reporting the hospital as not 
very clean, % patients reporting nurses not washing hands), and outcomes (HSMR, MRSA 
bacteraemia rates, emergency readmissions) were tested using Spearman’s Rank Correlation 
Coefficient. Spearman’s test is based on the correlation of the rank of values rather than the 
values themselves, and, unlike the Pearson Product Moment test, it avoids making 
assumptions about the distribution of the indicators or the linearity of the association 
between them.246 It is generally regarded as more conservative than the Pearson test. 
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4.3.11	Content	Analysis	of	Narrative	Accounts	
As a tool for understanding the epidemiology of patient harm, RCRR has generally been 
oriented to the quantitative analysis of the proportion of patient harm and underlying causes. 
However, it has been recognised for some time that the evolution of harm is often a 
consequence of a build up of multiple small problems, mainly omissions. These can combine 
across an admission to cause harm, especially in the frail and sick whose defences against 
such small insults are not as robust as they would be in a younger, fitter patient.182 
Approaches that can expose these threats to patient safety as efficiently as possible are 
needed to complement the traditional quantitative approach. 
Case note review methodology has benefitted from the introduction of methods of incident 
analysis which derive from James Reason’s organisational accident model, and which 
highlight both the chains of small harm events and the wider organisational and other factors 
which contribute to such events.59 247-248 Such approaches, based on in-depth analysis of 
problems with the aim of discovering the root causes underlying their occurrence, have been 
most commonly employed in safety dependent industries.249 Tools used for this purpose, 
particularly those developed for analysing problems and their contributory factors, might be 
usefully applied to narrative sections of mortality reviews to increase the utility of this 
information in the systematic analysis of patient harm.   
In collaboration with Dr Frances Healey, Associate Director of Patient Safety at NHS 
Commissioning Board Authority, I developed a novel approach to content analysis, drawing 
on the methodology of root cause analysis,247 and applied it to the case narratives of 
preventable deaths in order to explore the problems in care and contributory factors 
underlying such deaths. A number of different root cause analysis tools exist; some, such as 
nominal group technique or brainstorming, are designed to help uncover the underlying 
causes of harm within groups and others including ‘fishbone analysis’ and ‘five whys’ can 
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be used on case records, but may require the availability of more information than is 
available in the narratives.250 Having noted the overall length and depth of the accounts 
(generally one to two paragraphs), a small number of tools were chosen which seemed 
feasible to use in this context.  
Change analysis was used to specify problems in care by prompting consideration of what 
‘problem free’ care might look like for a particular patient and using constant comparisons 
between this fictional ‘problem free’ care and what actually happened, as described in the 
narrative.250 The problems identified in this way were categorised by type into clinical 
monitoring, diagnosis and assessment, drugs and fluids, technological, infection and ‘other’ 
based on definitions used by Woloshynowych et al.235 The Contributory Factor 
Classification Framework,243 developed by Professor Charles Vincent as part of the approach 
to patient incident analysis, was then used to assess the role of  nine separate categories of 
contributory factors including patient, staff, task, communication, equipment, work 
environment, organisational, education and training, and team factors, and a series of sub-
factors underlying each main heading. 
Dr Healey and I applied the analysis to an initial five cases to test feasibility. We then met to 
discuss any discrepancies in our findings and make adjustments to the process. I went on to 
apply the method to the rest of the preventable deaths (n=47) and Dr Healey double reviewed 
a third of these. Levels of agreement in identifying problems in care and contributory factors 
were calculated using the Kappa Coefficient.  
 
4.4	Conclusion	
This chapter began by outlining the pilot study which confirmed the feasibility of the 
PRISM, and went on to describe the study methods in detail and actions taken to ensure both 
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the generalisability of findings and the reduction of known biases. The results from the study 
are presented in Chapters 5, 6, and 7. 
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This paper was published in BMJ Quality and Safety and represents the main findings from 
the research included in this PhD thesis. It describes the study method and the headline 
findings, including, for the first time in England, an estimation of the proportion of hospital 
preventable deaths. 
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Preventable deaths due to problems in
care in English acute hospitals:
a retrospective case record review
study
Helen Hogan,1 Frances Healey,2 Graham Neale,3 Richard Thomson,4
Charles Vincent,3 Nick Black1
ABSTRACT
Introduction: Monitoring hospital mortality rates is
widely recommended. However, the number of
preventable deaths remains uncertain with estimates in
England ranging from 840 to 40 000 per year, these
being derived from studies that identified adverse
events but not whether events contributed to death or
shortened life expectancy of those affected.
Methods: Retrospective case record reviews of 1000
adults who died in 2009 in 10 acute hospitals in
England were undertaken. Trained physician reviewers
estimated life expectancy on admission, to identified
problems in care contributing to death and judged if
deaths were preventable taking into account patients’
overall condition at that time.
Results: Reviewers judged 5.2% (95% CI 3.8% to
6.6%) of deaths as having a 50% or greater chance of
being preventable. The principal problems associated
with preventable deaths were poor clinical monitoring
(31.3%; 95% CI 23.9 to 39.7), diagnostic errors
(29.7%; 95% CI 22.5% to 38.1%), and inadequate
drug or fluid management (21.1%; 95% CI 14.9 to
29.0). Extrapolating from these figures suggests there
would have been 11 859 (95% CI 8712 to 14 983) adult
preventable deaths in hospitals in England. Most
preventable deaths (60%) occurred in elderly, frail
patients with multiple comorbidities judged to have
had less than 1 year of life left to live.
Conclusions: The incidence of preventable hospital
deaths is much lower than previous estimates. The
burden of harm from preventable problems in care is
still substantial. A focus on deaths may not be the
most efficient approach to identify opportunities for
improvement given the low proportion of deaths due to
problems with healthcare.
BACKGROUND
Following the US Institute of Medicine’s
report To err is human,1 the Chief Medical
Officer for England estimated that 60 000 to
255 000 NHS patients each year suffer serious
disability or death as a result of healthcare
interventions.2 This estimate was derived
from retrospective case record review
(RCRR) studies conducted in USA in the
1980s and 90s.3 4 These and other national
studies using comparable methods were not
designed to establish the proportion of
deaths that were preventable.5e8
Two smaller studies have specifically
assessed the degree to which problems in
care contributed to death. In one study of
111 deaths in US hospitals, reviewers judged
6% as either probably or definitely prevent-
able.9 A study from New Zealand concluded
that 3.4% of 118 deaths were related to
preventable errors in healthcare.10 More
recently, a large RCRR study in the
Netherlands reported a figure of 4.1%,11
which would be consistent with a more
modest estimate of 9000 such deaths annu-
ally in England. These findings suggest that
existing estimates in England based on
extrapolations from studies with small
numbers of deaths have overestimated
preventable deaths.10e12
Given the considerable attention paid to
hospital mortality as an indicator of quality of
care,13 14 we aimed to estimate more accu-
rately the number of preventable deaths
among hospitalised patients in England, to
describe the problems in care that are
responsible (type, phase of care) and to
estimate the life expectancy of those affected.
METHODS
Design
RCRR is a method based on experts’ retro-
spective reviews of healthcare records,
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assessing the quality and safety of care provided during
an index admission. It is the most sensitive approach in
determining the proportion of hospital deaths that are
preventable.15e17 Our study design was adapted from
previous RCRRs in the UK and the Netherlands,7 11
which in turn, were based on the Harvard Medical
Practice Study.3 It also drew on a study of deaths by
Hayward and Hofer.9
Sampling strategy
Deceased patients were identified at 10 randomly
selected English acute hospital Trusts. To increase
generalisability, we stratified our sampling on the basis of
region (London, South, Midlands and North); teaching
status; and bed size (<500, 500e700, >700) before
random selection of the 10 sites from across these strata.
We estimated that 6% of deaths would be judged
preventable.9 A simple random sample would require
347 deaths to yield a 95% CI with a width of 2.5% on
each side. Taking into account the two-stage sampling
strategy and clustering effects at the hospital level
increased the required sample size to 1000 cases. (This
estimation used an intracluster correlation of 0.037
derived from the Dutch Adverse Event Study11).
One hundred case records of patients who had died in
hospital during 2009 were randomly selected using the
hospital administration system in each Trust. As in
previous studies, obstetric, psychiatric and paediatric
patients (who in total accounted for less than 5% of all
hospital deaths in England and Wales in 200918) were
excluded. Of the 1000 randomly selected patients, 13
patients were admitted explicitly for planned palliative
care and, therefore, were excluded and replaced.
Judgements of preventable deaths
The judgement of preventable deaths was undertaken in
two stages. First reviewers were asked to judge whether
there had been any problem in care that had contributed
to the patient’s death. Problems in care were defined as
patient harm resulting from acts of omission (inactions),
such as failure to diagnose and treat, or from acts of
commission (affirmative actions) such as incorrect treat-
ment or management, or harm as a result of unintended
complications of healthcare. This definition was seen as
more helpful than adverse event, patient safety incident,
or error (box 1) because it extends beyond single
discrete incidents to take a wider view of the overall
quality of care provided and its contribution to a patient’s
death. The definition was also more likely to ensure that
deaths related to failure to act (omissions) were recog-
nised, particularly if these occurred over days or weeks.
Then, for each case where a problem in care that had
contributed to death had been identified, reviewers
judged the preventability of death. This two-stage
approach was adopted because some problems in care
contributing to death are not the result of poor practice
(eg, a patient experiencing an intracerebral bleed after
appropriate administration of a thrombolytic drug
following myocardial infarction). Neither the problem
nor the death would be regarded as preventable. In
other cases where a problem in care had contributed to
death, the problem may have been preventable but the
patient’s concurrent illness was so complex or severe
that, the death itself was not judged preventable during
that admission. Reviews focused on the admissions
during which death occurred, but reviewers identified
problems that occurred prior to that admission if these
appeared to have contributed to a patient’s death.
In line with previous RCRRs, reviewers assessed
preventability on a 6-point Likert scale (box 2) which
reflects the probabilistic nature of reviewers’ decision
making more closely than requiring a simple ‘yes’ or ‘no’
response.4 The validity of this approach was demon-
strated in the Harvard Medical Practice Study. Deaths
were judged preventable if reviewers felt that there was
more than a 50% chance the death was preventable
(4e6 on the scale). This included all deaths in which
reviewers judged the death was ‘definitely preventable’,
‘strong evidence it was preventable’ and ‘probably
preventable’. It excluded those deemed ‘definitely not
preventable’, ‘slight evidence of preventability’ and
‘possibly preventable but not very likely’.
The review process
The reliability of the reviews was maximised by: the use
of experienced medical reviewers; providing reviewer
training and written guidance; ongoing support from
Box 1 Definitions previously used to describe harm due to
care
Adverse event
An injury related to medical management, in contrast to
complications of disease. Medical management includes all
aspects of care, including diagnosis and treatment, failure to
diagnose or treat, and the systems and equipment used to
deliver care. Adverse events may be preventable or non-
preventable.19
Patient safety incident
Any unintended or unexpected incident that could have or
did lead to harm for one or more persons receiving
healthcare.20
Error
The failure of a planned action to be completed as intended
(ie, error of execution) or the use of a wrong plan to achieve
an aim (ie, error of planning). Errors may be errors of
commission or omission, and usually reflect deficiencies in
the systems of care.19
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the research team with the opportunity to raise and
discuss questions within the reviewer group; and the use
of a structured data collection form.4 11 21 22
Given that previous studies have found that many
problems in care are related to general clinical care
processes (including omissions of care) rather than
specialist technical processes and that our sample would
include many patients with multiple pathologies, we
required reviewers with a generalist orientation. To
achieve this, 17 recently retired doctors all of whom had
extensive experience as generalists (15 internal medi-
cine and 2 general surgeons) were recruited through the
Royal College of Physicians and other contacts. When
necessary, specialist medical advice was available either
from other reviewers within the group or from outside.
This was most often used to obtain a surgical opinion.
Reviewers underwent one day of training in the review
technique and could contact the principal investigator
(HH) with any queries during the reviewing period. In
addition, each case that was considered to be a prevent-
able death was discussed with the principal investigator
and an expert reviewer (GN). Two reviewers were allo-
cated to each site and each reviewed 50 records to make
a total of 100 for that site. Reviewers had previously had
no connection with their allocated site. As reviews took
place on site, they were able to request additional
materials such as laboratory reports stored on computer,
if these were missing from the clinical record. To
determine inter-rater reliability, 25% of the records were
re-reviewed by another reviewer.
Medical review form
Reviewers were asked to consider all aspects of patient
care and review the entire record for the index admis-
sion, including nurses’ and allied health professionals’
notes, drug charts and diagnostic test results. Informa-
tion was recorded by hand on a structured Medical
Review Form. Demographic and clinical information on
each patient included age, sex, admitting specialty
(medical; surgical), type of admission (elective; emer-
gency), comorbidity (number of conditions), and func-
tional impairment based on the Karnofsky Performance
Status Scale (none; mild; moderate; severe).23 In all
cases where a problem in care was judged to have
contributed to death, reviewers reported on the type of
problem, its timing and any associated causative or
contributory factors before making a judgement as to
whether the death was preventable.
Reviewers estimated life expectancy on admission
taking into account admitting diagnosis, functional state
and degree of urgency of the admission. The use of
a prognostic epidemiological tool based on survival
analysis was rejected as it requires information that may
not be present in case records. A similar approach to the
one we adopted was used both in empirical studies of
adverse events,9 11 and in the development of tools to
assess quality of care.24
Reviewers also rated overall quality of care by first
rating each phase of care (initial assessment, treatment
plan, ongoing monitoring and preparation for
discharge) and then the overall quality of care on a scale
from very poor to excellent, using a validated method.25
Analyses
Anonymised data were entered onto EpiData 3.1 and
Microsoft Access databases and analysed using STATA
(version 11.2) software. Demographic and health service
utilisation data for the 10 hospital Trusts and for
England were obtained from Hospital Episode Statistics.
Summary statistics included proportions, means and
medians. For all comparisons of rates, descriptive statis-
tics and frequency tables were used, and tests for
comparison of proportions in two independent groups
corrected for binomial distribution.
RESULTS
Study sample characteristics
The study sample was representative of patients who die
in hospital in England as regards age, admitting specialty
and type of admission (table 1). Reviewers made the
‘determination of a problem in care’ (k 0.54; 95% CI
0.37 to 0.71) and ‘preventable death’ (k 0.49; 95% CI 0.2
to 0.8) with moderate inter-rater reliability. The wider
CIs for preventable deaths reflect the fact that there were
17 preventable deaths among the 250 charts randomly
selected for double review. There was substantial intra-
rater agreement in assessing ‘life expectancy’ (weighted
k 0.66; 95% CI 0.53 to 0.79).
Patients experiencing a problem in care
In the first stage of review 131 (13.1%; 95% CI 10.9 to
15.1) patients were identified as having a problem in
care that contributed to their death. There were no
statistically significant differences (at p<0.05) in the
characteristics of patients who experienced a problem in
care and those that did not (n¼869) as regards age, sex
or comorbidity (table 2). However, on admission,
patients who experienced a problem in care were more
Box 2 Scale used to judge preventability of death
1. Definitely not preventable.
2. Slight evidence for preventability.
3. Possibly preventable but not very likely, less than 50e50
but close call.
4. Probably preventable, more than 50-50 but close call.
5. Strong evidence for preventability.
6. Definitely preventable.
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likely to be admitted under surgical specialties (23.6% vs
12.7%, p<0.005), as an elective admission (9.4% vs 4.5%,
p<0.05) and be less severely impaired (46.3% vs 71.7%,
p<0.001) than those in whom no problem was identi-
fied. Fifty-five (45.5%) of the former group were judged
to have a life expectancy of more than 1-year compared
with 86 (10.7%) of the latter (p<0.001).
Reviewers rated the overall quality of care received by
patients to be excellent or good for 726 (73.8%, 95% CI
70.9 to 76.4) patients. Inevitably, the proportion was
lower for the 131 patients deemed to have experienced
a problem in care, 47 (37.0%; 95% CI 29.1 to 45.7;
p<0.001) (table 3).
Preventable hospital deaths
Fifty-two deaths (5.2%; 95% CI 3.8 to 6.6) were judged to
be preventable (ie, received a rating of 4e6), that is 39.7%
of the 131 cases found to have a problem in care
contributing to death. There were no significant differ-
ences between the proportions of preventable deaths
found at each hospital. Only four (8%; 95% CI 3.1 to 18.8)
of these patients were judged to have received excellent or
good quality care overall and in these cases the problem in
care occurred before the final hospital admission. In 33
(66.0%; 95% CI 52.2 to 77.6) patients suffering
a preventable hospital death the overall quality of care was
rated poor or very poor compared to 25 (2.9%; 95% CI
1.78 to 4.0) (p<0.001) in those with no problem in care.
Patients with preventable deaths were more likely to be
admitted under surgical specialities (30.8% vs 13.3%,
p¼0.0004). While problems occurred in all phases of
care (table 4), 37 (44.0%; 95% CI 33.9 to 54.7) of the
problems that contributed to a preventable death
occurred during ward care. Of the rest, 13 (15.5%; 95%
CI 9.3 to 24.7) patients experienced problems in care
before admission (of whom five experienced no further
problems in care after admission).
A wide range of types of problems were identified
in patients whose death was judged to be preventable
(table 5). In 73.1% (95% CI 59.7% to 83.2%) of
preventable deaths more than one problem in care was
identified. The most frequent problems related to clin-
ical monitoring (31.3%; 95% CI 23.9 to 39.7), diagnosis
(29.7%; 95% CI 22.5 to 38.1) and drugs or fluid
management (21.1%; 95% CI 14.9 to 29.0). Clinical
monitoring problems included failure to act upon
results of tests or clinical findings, to set up monitoring
systems, to respond to such systems or to increase the
intensity of care when required. Problems with diagnosis
occurred at all steps in the diagnostic process
from physical examination to seeking specialist help if
necessary. Examples of cases are provided in box 3.
Impact of preventable hospital deaths
If 5.2% of deaths in hospital are preventable, there would
be 11 859 (95% CI 8712 to 14 983) adult preventable
hospital deaths in English National Health Service
(NHS) acute hospitals each year (based on 228 065 adult
deaths in acute hospitals in England in 2009).26 If a more
demanding definition of preventable is employed (scores
of 5 and 6 only on the Likert scales) our estimate of
preventable deaths falls from 5.2% to 2.3% (5245
deaths), though this excludes deaths that reviewers
thought were ‘probably preventable’. Using a more
relaxed definition (scores of 3 to 6 on the Likert scale,
thus including ‘possibly preventable but not very likely)
the proportion rises from 5.2% to 8.5% (19 385 deaths).
The median estimated life expectancy of those
suffering a preventable death in hospital was 6 months
(IQR 4 months to 2 years) with 60% of cases having a life
expectancy of <1 year.
DISCUSSION
Main findings
Among 1000 adult patients dying in acute hospitals in
England, death was considered preventable in 5.2% of
cases (95% CI 3.8% to 6.6%). Preventable deaths were
more common among surgical admissions. The prob-
lems associated with preventable deaths occurred in all
phases of hospital care but were most likely in wards
(44%) and involved poor clinical monitoring (31%),
diagnostic errors (30%), or inadequate drug or fluid
management (21%).
Table 1 Comparison of study sample and all National
Health Service hospital deaths in England (2009)
Characteristic
NHS
population*
Study
sample
n[1000 p Value
Age at death %
40e59 7.4 7.0 0.63
60e79 35.8 34.9 0.55
80e89 40.1 43.2 0.16
90e99 14.9 14.2 0.54
>100 0.5 0.4 0.15
Males % 48.7 46.3 0.13
Admitting specialty %
Medical specialties 85.0 85.8 0.48
Surgical specialties 15 14.2 0.48
Type of admission %
Elective 4.6 5.6 0.13
Emergency 95.4 94.4 0.13
Admission duration in days
Median 7.5 9 0.009
*Source: Aggregated Hospital Episode Statistics Data, 2011,
derived by Clinical Effectiveness Unit, The Royal College of
Surgeons of England. Copyright (c) 2011. Data used with the
permission of The Health and Social Care Information Centre. All
rights reserved.
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Our best estimate of preventable deaths is based on
a midpoint threshold on the Likert scale (categories
4e6), which may over or underestimate the actual
proportion. Adopting a stricter definition in which deaths
that reviewers judged to be ‘probably preventabled
more than 50e50 but close call’ were excluded
resulted in 2.3% defined as preventable but this would
have excluded some preventable deaths. In contrast,
Table 2 Comparison of the characteristics of patients who died having experienced a problem in care that contributed to their
death with those that did not
Characteristic
Patients with problem/s in
care contributing to death n[131
Patients with no problems in
care contributing to death n[869 p Value
Age
Mean (SD) 76.7 (13.4) 78.8 (12.4) 0.07
Median (IQR) 80 (50.5e83.0) 82 (73.0e87.0) 0.16
Male (%) 54 (41.2) 409 (47.0) 0.21
Admitting specialty (%)
Medical specialties 97 (76.4)) 715 (87.3) 0.01
Surgical specialties 30 (23.6) 104 (12.7) 0.01
Not known 4 50
Comorbid conditions
Mean (SD) 4.2 (2.4) 3.8 (2.5) 0.09
Type of admission (%)
Elective 12 (9.4) 42 (4.5) 0.02
Emergency 116 (90.6) 795 (95.5) 0.02
Not known 3 32
Functional impairment on admission (%)
None* 6 (4.9) 8 (1.1) 0.02
Mild impairmenty 35 (28.5) 77 (10.9) <0.0001
Moderate impairmentz 25 (20.3) 116 (16.4) 0.28
Severe impairmentx 57 (46.3) 508 (71.7) <0.0001
Not known 8 160
Estimated life expectancy on admission (%)
<24 h 4 (3.3) 49 (6.1) 0.22
1e7 days 6 (5.0) 257 (32.0) <0.0001
1e4 weeks 9 (7.4) 185 (22.9) 0.001
1e5 months 20 (16.5) 138 (17.2) 0.85
6e12 months 27 (22.3) 89 (11.1) <0.0001
1e4 years 35 (28.9) 75 (9.3) <0.0001
5e9 years 14 (11.6) 8 (1.0) <0.0001
10e19 years 4 (3.3) 3 (0.4) 0.0007
>20 years 2 (1.6) 0 (0) 0.0003
Missing 10 65
Estimated life expectancy in years on admission
Mean (SD) 2.1 (4.3) 0.35 (1.0) <0.0001
Median (IQR) 0.5 (0.25e2.0) 0.05 (0.01e0.25) <0.0001
*Normal, no complaints or evidence of disease.
yAble to perform normal activity; minor signs and symptoms of disease/able to perform normal activity with effort; some signs and symptoms of
disease.
zCares for self, unable to perform normal activity or to do active work/requires occasional assistance but is able to care for most of own needs.
xRequires considerable assistance and frequent medical care/requires special care and assistance; disabled.
Table 3 Reviewers rating of the overall quality of care received by patients
Overall quality of care (%)
Patients with problem in care
contributing to death n[131
Patients with no problems in
care contributing to death n[869
Excellent 16 (12.6) 211 (24.6)
Good 31 (24.4) 468 (54.6)
Adequate 35 (27.5) 153 (17.9)
Poor 41 (32.3) 19 (2.2)
Very poor 4 (3.1) 6 (0.7)
Not known 4 12
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a more relaxed definition which includes ‘possibly
preventable, but not very likely’ resulted in 8.5%
preventable though this would include deaths which are
unlikely to be preventable.
These findings suggest there would have been 11 859
preventable deaths among adults in acute hospitals in
England in 2009. Many of these deaths occured in
elderly, frail patients with multiple comorbidities, with
60% judged to have had less than 1-year of life left to live.
Strengths and limitations of the study
Our study has a number of strengths: the large, repre-
sentative sample drawn from Trusts in different regions
and of different size and teaching status; our use of
‘problem in care’ rather than the commonly used
‘adverse event’ to minimise the risk of overlooking errors
of omission; and the various measures to standardise
data collection and ensure high quality record review.
Nonetheless, several limitations need to be consid-
ered. First, medical records may not document all
problems in care, though this limitation applies to all
RCRR studies, including ones that have generated
previous estimates of preventable hospital deaths.
Second, the estimates of life expectancy were dependent
on reviewers’ judgement, a notoriously difficult task.
Third, RCRR studies are often criticised because of the
poor reliability of the reviewers’ judgements. We used
a number of approaches to improve reliability and
obtained a moderately strong inter-rater agreement that
compared favourably with previous studies. Some
researchers have advocated using two reviewers for each
case but this has not been shown to significantly improve
reliability compared to employing a single reviewer.27
Moreover, had we required agreement between two
reviewers to count a case as a preventable death our
estimate would have fallen to 2.8%. Thus, any problem
with reliability is likely to have led to overestimating
preventable deaths, not underestimating them. Another
problem in RCRRs is hindsight bias, in which knowing
the outcome and its severity influence the judgement of
causation and preventability.28 However, this problem
would also be expected to overestimate preventable
deaths, not underestimate them.
We chose to use experienced generalist reviewers
rather than specialist reviewers, the majority of whom
were physicians rather than surgeons. We thus ran the
risk of biasing the judgement of the technical aspects of
surgical care. This might have led to an underestimation
of the number of preventable deaths if errors in these
processes were not spotted. In fact, we found a higher
proportion of both problems in care and preventable
deaths among surgical patients than medical patients,
Table 4 Phases of care during which problem in care that contributed to death occurred. (More than one option may apply for
each patient)
Phase of care (%) Preventable deaths n[52 Non-preventable deaths n[79
Before admission* 13 (15.5) 20 (19.2)
Early in admissiony 19 (22.6) 14 (13.5)
Care during a procedure 8 (9.5) 21 (20.2)
Postoperative/ procedure carez 7 (8.3) 8 (7.7)
General ward care 37 (44.0) 41 (39.4)
*General practitioner, outpatient clinic, previous admission.
yIncludes assessment in the emergency department, emergency care before full assessment, admission ward, and preoperative assessment.
zIncludes high dependency or intensive care unit care.
Table 5 Types of problems in care that contribute to patient death (More than one option may apply for each patient).
Type of problem in care (%) Preventable deaths n[52 Non-preventable deaths n[79
Clinical Monitoring* 40 (31.3) 25 (18.0)
Diagnosisy 38 (29.7) 30 (21.6)
Drug or fluid relatedz 27 (21.1) 30 (21.6)
Technical problemx 8 (6.3) 26 (18.7)
Infection related 9 (7.0) 22 (15.8)
Resuscitation 0 (0) 3 (2.2)
Other 6 (4.7) 3 (2.2)
*Failure to act upon results of tests or clinical findings, set up monitoring systems or respond to such systems or increase intensity of care when
required.
yMissed, delayed or inappropriate diagnosis as a result of failure to perform an adequate assessment of patient’s overall condition including
appropriate tests or lack of focused assessment when required.
zSide effects, inappropriate use, failure to give prophylactic care, anaphylaxis, etc.
xRelated to an operation or procedure whether on ward, in a diagnostic suite or in theatre and including inappropriate or unnecessary
procedures.
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the majority of these being related to ward care rather
than technical care. Our findings do resonate with
previous reports that highlight that surgical patients do
not always receive optimal management of their medical
conditions.29e31 However, it is possible that the greater
risk for preventable deaths among surgical patients in
our study reflects the impact of prognosis on reviewers’
judgements. Reviewers typically did not judge deaths as
preventable in the setting of imminent death or short
life expectancy due to comorbid conditions. Patients
with very short life expectancies due to underlying
conditions are probably less likely to be admitted to
surgical services. Consequently, surgical services have
a greater proportion of patients for whom reviewers
might judge problems in care judged as directly
contributing to death.
Comparison with existing evidence
Our estimate of 11 859 preventable hospital deaths is
similar to an estimate from the Netherlands which was
based on 3983 patients dying in 25 Dutch hospitals in
2005.11 However, our estimate is much lower than that
suggested in 2000 by the Chief Medical Officer (60 000
to 255 000 serious disability or death),2 derived from
studies in USA which not only included relatively small
numbers of deaths but did not examine the relationship
between problems in care and death.3 4 Our estimate is
also inconsistent with suggestions of 25 000 deaths in
England from venous thromboembolism,32 if most of
those are considered preventable. The difference from
previous estimates is all the more surprising for two
reasons: our more inclusive definition would have iden-
tified more ‘problems in care’ and, therefore, more
preventable deaths; and the methodological limitations
of this study outlined above suggest we probably over-
estimated the number of preventable deaths. The
difference from earlier estimates appears to have arisen
because these estimates were based on unjustified
extrapolations.
The observation that patients were more likely to
experience a problem in care if they were less func-
tionally impaired, were elective admissions and had
a longer life expectancy on admission was inconsistent
with studies in other countries and might reflect a bias
among reviewers towards discounting problems in the
most frail, sick patients. We tried to avoid this bias by
requiring reviewers to examine the entire record to the
same depth and in the same structured way for all
patients. Instead, we feel this finding may reflect
a greater willingness in England than in some other
countries to limit the extent of interventions in frail
patients which would put them at less risk of experi-
encing a problem in care. This is inevitably speculative
and would be worthy of further investigation in an
international comparative study.
Implications for practice, policy and research
Although the quality of care that three-quarters of
patients received was judged to be good or excellent,
there is clearly plenty of scope for improvement in
clinical practice. The principal area of concern is clinical
monitoring on the ward. This finding is consistent with
Box 3 Examples to illustrate nature of deaths judged to be
preventable
A female patient in her early 80s presenting with watery
diarrhoea where the diagnosis of inflammatory bowel
disease took 18 days despite a past history of the disease.
The patient had deteriorated significantly before appropriate
treatment was commenced and failed to respond.
A middle aged male patient who developed infection at the
site of a pharyngeal pouch excision. Antibiotic treatment
was continued despite a failure to improve and subsequent
open drainage proved too late.
A male patient in his 60s with previous history of ischaemic
heart disease and treated carcinoma of the bladder (with no
evidence of progression/ recurrence) underwent an
unnecessary therapeutic ascitic tap when misdiagnosed as
recurrent cancer when the actual diagnosis was congestive
cardiac failure. He suffered a myocardial infarction after the
procedure and went into multi-organ failure.
An obese woman in her 40s who presented with malaise,
vomiting, anorexia, weight loss, early saity and night
sweats. The diagnosis of ovarian malignancy took 21 days
to confirm. On day 19 the patient’s breathlessness and
tachycardia were treated as a chest infection. Two days
later she collapsed and subsequently died from pulmonary
embolism. No risk assessment undertaken or thrombopro-
phylaxis prescribed during stay.
A 30 year old man with a history of drug and alcohol use
admitted with worsening shortness of breath and green
sputum. Initially condition treated as a community acquired
pneumonia until CT scan showed possible lung abscess or
empyema. Patient developed clostridium difficile diarrhoea
which delayed chest drainage and then went on to have
a cardiac arrest when an attempt at drain insertion was
subsequently made on the ward. Following transfer to the
intensive care unit and drain insertion he continued to
deteriorate and died.
A female patient in her 80s on warfarin for atrial fibrillation
and admitted with an infected finger which had been treated
with a combination of antibiotics by her general practitioner.
Despite daily warfarin at a dose of 1mg being continued, the
international normalised ratio (INR) was not checked until
day 3, 1-day after blood was first noted in her stools. When
the INR was found to be well above therapeutic levels at 10,
vitamin K and fresh frozen plasma were administered with
the clinical team commenting that a preferred treatment was
not available at the time. Despite ongoing resuscitation she
continued to deteriorate and died.
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previously voiced concerns and has already prompted
various quality improvement initiatives. These include
Early Warning Score Systems to avoid delay in identifying
deteriorating patients,33 explicit handover procedures to
ensure vital clinical information is passed between
clinicians,34 and critical care outreach services.35
There are also implications for policy. While the
spectre of preventable hospital deaths may prove helpful
in raising interest in patient safety and a commitment to
improvement, overestimating the size of the problem
and the risk to patients may induce unjustified levels of
anxiety and fear among the public. In addition, confir-
mation of the relatively small proportion of deaths that
appear to be preventable provides further evidence that
overall hospital mortality rates are a poor indicator of
quality of care.14
This does not mean that preventable deaths should be
ignored and no attempt made to improve our under-
standing of their causes. Indeed, this is one of the key
areas for further research and we shall report on more
detailed analyses of the type, place and timing of prob-
lems in care. Analyses will focus on clinical monitoring
problems to ascertain if areas such as the early identifi-
cation of deteriorating patients continue to threaten
patient safety. If so, this will raise questions as to why the
impact of existing initiatives has not been greater.
Mortality reviews have been adopted as a tool to
identify serious harm arising from healthcare. Further-
more, given that many patients who die in hospital have
been subjected to a complex series of medical inter-
ventions, studying deaths is likely to help identify a wide
range of problems in care. However, it would be unwise
to limit safety and quality monitoring to this relatively
small proportion of patients, when the majority of
problems in care may result in morbidity and disability
rather than death. Further research needs to adopt
a wider perspective of outcomes. There is also a need to
consider other areas of secondary care, in particular
preadmission care in ambulances and accident
and emergency departments, and primary care where
little is known about problems in care leading to
serious morbidity and preventable deaths. And finally,
research is required into the ways in which feedback of
information on hospital mortality can be used effectively
to reduce the occurrence of problems in care.
Acknowledgements The authors thank the 10 English acute hospital Trusts
for agreeing to take part in this study, allowing us access to their medical
records and providing support for the record reviewers while on site. The
authors thank all the medical record reviewers for their time and the Royal
College of Physicians for help with reviewer recruitment. The authors also
thank Amanda Cale and Jenny Neuburger for advice, Martin Gulliford,
Cameron Willis, Richard Lilford and Michael Rigby for insightful comments
on earlier drafts of this manuscript, and the National Institute of Health
Research, Research for Patient Benefit Programme for funding (PB-PG-
1207-15215).
Contributors RT was responsible for the original study idea. All authors
contributed to the design of the study and the review forms. HH and GN were
responsible for recruiting and training reviewers. HH was responsible for data
collection and analysis and, with GN, provided additional support to reviewers.
All authors contributed to data interpretation. HH and NB drafted the
manuscript and all authors contributed to its revision. HH is guarantor.
Funding The funders of the study, the National Institute of Health Research,
Research for Patient Benefit Programme had no role in study design, data
collection, data analysis, data interpretation, or composition of the report. The
corresponding author had full access to all data in the study and had final
responsibility for the decision to submit for publication. The views expressed
in this publication are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the
NHS, the NIHR or the Department of Health.
Competing interests All authors have completed the unified competing
interest form at http://www.icmje.org/coi_disclosure.pdf (available on request
from the corresponding author) and declare that neither authors nor their
family relations have a financial or non-financial interest that might be relevant
to the submitted work.
Patient consent Patients in the study were deceased. Section 251 of the
National Health Service Act 2006 for the use of patient identifiable information
without consent was gained.
Ethics approval Ethics approval was received from the National Hospital for
Neurology and Neurosurgery and the Institute of Neurology joint multi-centre
research ethics committee and research governance approval was granted by
each participating Trust.
Provenance and peer review Not commissioned; internally peer reviewed.
REFERENCES
1. Institute of Medicine. To Err Is Human: Building A Safer Health Care
System. Washington DC: Institute of Medicine and National Academy
Press, 1999.
2. Department of Health. An Organisation with a Memory: Report of an
Expert Group on Learning from Adverse Events in the NHS. Chaired
by the Chief Medical Officer. London: Department of Health, 2000.
3. Leape LL, Brennan TA, Laird N, et al. The nature of adverse events in
hospitalized patients. Results of the Harvard Medical Practice Study I.
N Engl J Med 1991;324:377e84.
4. Thomas EJ, Studdert DM, Burstin HR, et al. Incidence and types of
adverse events and negligent care in Utah and Colorado. Med Care
2000;38:261e71.
5. Wilson R, Runciman W, Gibberd R, et al. Quality in Australian Health
Care Study. Med J Aust 1995;163:472e5.
6. Davis P, Lay-Yee R, Briant R, et al. Adverse events in New Zealand
public hospitals I: occurance and impact. N Z Med J 2002;115:U268.
7. Vincent C, Neale G, Woloshynowych M. Adverse events in British
hospitals: preliminary retrospective record review. BMJ
2001;322:517e19.
8. Baker G, Norton P, Flintoft V, et al. The Canadian Adverse Events
Study: the incidence of adverse events among hospital patients in
Canada. CMAJ 2004;170:1678e86.
9. Hayward R, Hofer T. Estimating hospital deaths due to medical
errordpreventability is in the eye of the reviewer. JAMA
2001;286:415e20.
10. Briant R, Buchanan J, Lay-Yee R, et al. Representative case series
from New Zealand public hospital admissions in 1998eIII: adverse
events and death. N Z Med J 2006;119:U1909.
11. Zegers M, de Bruijne MC, Wagner C, et al. Adverse events and
potentially preventable deaths in Dutch hospitals: results of
a retrospective patient record review study. Qual Saf Health Care
2009;18:297e302.
12. McDonald CJ, Weiner M, Hui SL. Deaths due to medical errors are
exaggerated in Institute of Medicine report. JAMA 2000;284:93e5.
13. Canadian Institute for Health Information. Hospital Standardised
Mortality: a New Approach For Measuring Hospital Mortality Trends in
Canada. Ottawa: Canadian Institute for Health Information, 2007.
14. Lilford R, Pronovost P. Using hospital mortality rates to judge hospital
performance: a bad idea that just won’t go away. BMJ 2010;340:
c2016.
15. Baba-Akbari Sari A, Sheldon T, Cracknell A, et al. Sensitivity of
routine system for reporting patient safety incidents in an NHS
hospital: retrospective case note review. BMJ 2007;334:79.
16. Michel P, Quenon J, de Saraqueta A, et al. Comparison of three
methods for estimating rates of preventable adverse events in acute
care hospitals. BMJ 2004;328:199.
8e9 Hogan H, Healey F, Neale G, et al. BMJ Qual Saf (2012). doi:10.1136/bmjqs-2012-001159
Original research
 group.bmj.com on December 19, 2012 - Published by qualitysafety.bmj.comDownloaded from 
17. Brennan TA, Localio AR, Leape LL, et al. Identification of adverse
events occurring during hospitalization. A cross-sectional study of
litigation, quality assurance, and medical records at two teaching
hospitals. Ann Intern Med 1990;112:221e6.
18. Office of National Statistics. Mortality Statistics. Review of the
Registrar General on Deaths by Cause, Sex and Age in England and
Wales 2005. London: HMSO, 2006.
19. World Alliance For Patient Safety. WHO Draft Guidelines for Adverse
Event Reporting and Learning Systems. From Information to Action.
Geneva: World Health Organization, 2005.
20. National Patient Safety Agency. Seven Steps to Patient to Patient
Safety. London: National Patient Safety Agency, 2004.
21. Brennan TA, Localio AR, Laird N. Reliability and validity of
judgements concerning adverse events suffered by hospitalized
patients. Med Care 1989;27:1148e58.
22. Davis P, Lay-Yee R, Schug S, et al. Adverse events regional
feasibility study: methodological results. N Z Med J 2001;114:200e2.
23. Mor V, Laliberte L, Morris JN, et al. The Karnofsky Performance
Status Scale. An examination of its reliability and validity in a research
setting. Cancer 1984;53:2002e7.
24. Rubenstein L, Kahn K, Harris E, et al. Structured Implicit Review of
the Medical Record: A Method for Measuring the Quality of In-hospital
Medical Care and a Summary of Quality Changes Following
Implementation of the Medicare Prospective Payments System.
Prepared for the Health Care Financing Administration, US
Department of Health and Human Services. Santa Monica: RAND
Corporation, 1991.
25. Rubenstein L, Kahn K, Harris E, et al. Structured Implicit Review of
the Medical Record: A Method for Measuring the Quality of In-hospital
Medical Care and a Summary of Quality Changes Following
Implemetation of the Medicare Prospective Payments System. Santa
Monica: RAND Corporation, 1991.
26. Neuberger J, Copley L. Aggregated Hospital Episode Statistics
data. Clinical Effectiveness Unit, the Royal College of Surgeons
of England. Copyright (c) 2011. Re used with the permission of
The Health and Social Care Information Centre. All rights reserved.
2011.
27. Zegers M, de Bruijne MC, Wagner C, et al. The inter-rater agreement
of retrospective assessments of adverse events does not improve
with two reviewers per patient record. J Clin Epidemiol
2010;63:94e102.
28. Lilford R, Edwards A, Girling A, et al. Inter-rater reliability of case-note
audit: a systematic review. J Health Serv Res Policy
2007;12:173e80.
29. The Royal College of Surgeons of England/Department of Health.
The Higher Risk General Surgical Patient: Towards Improved Care
for a Forgotten Group. London: RCSENG - Professional Standards
and Regulation, 2011.
30. National Confidential Enquiry into Patient Outcome and Death.
Deaths in Acute Hospitals: Caring to the End? London: National
Confidential Enquiry into Patient Outcome and Death, 2009.
31. National Confidential Enquiry into Patient Outcome and Death. An
Age Old Problem. A Review of the Care Received by Elderly Patients
Undergoing Surgery. London: National Confidential Enquiry into
Patient Outcome and Death, 2011.
32. House of Commons Health Committee. The Prevention of Venous
Thromboembolism in Hospitalsied Patients. Second Report of
Session 2004-2005. London: The Stationary Office, 2005.
33. Robb G, Seddon M. A multi-faceted approach to the physiologically
unstable patient. Qual Saf Health Care 2010;19:e47.
34. Raduma-Tomas MA, Flin R, Yule S, et al. Doctors’ handovers in
hospitals: a literature review. BMJ Qual Saf 2011;20:128e33.
35. Godhill D, McNarry A. Intensive care outreach services. Curr Anaesth
Crit Care 2002;13:346e61.
PAGE fraction trail=8.5
Hogan H, Healey F, Neale G, et al. BMJ Qual Saf (2012). doi:10.1136/bmjqs-2012-001159 9e9
Original research
 group.bmj.com on December 19, 2012 - Published by qualitysafety.bmj.comDownloaded from 
124 
 
Chapter	6	Research	paper	3	
	
6.1	Introduction	to	Paper	3	
This paper presents details of the problems in care, and contributory factors underlying 
preventable death. The paper has been submitted for publication in the Journal of the Royal 
Society of Medicine. Together with Dr Frances Healey, I developed a novel content analysis 
approach, which was applied to the case narratives of preventable deaths found in the 
Medical Review Forms. The paper highlights the role of both multiple problems in care, 
particularly omissions, in the generation of harm. It reveals the persistence of particular 
problems in care related to poor assessment, missed diagnosis, poor monitoring of warfarin 
and fluids, and failures to give venous thromboprophylaxis despite interventions aimed at 
reducing their occurrence introduced over the last decade
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Abstract 
Objectives 
To explore problems in care and contributory factors in 52 patients whose death has been 
judged to be preventable using a new content analysis approach based on root cause 
analysis. 
Design 
A retrospective case record review of 1000 adults who died as in-patients in 2009 in ten 
acute hospitals in England provided  52 cases of preventable death. Change analysis, 
problem categorisation and the Contributory Factor Classification Framework were applied 
to narrative accounts of case histories written as part of the review process. 
Results 
An average of 3.0 (SD 1.5) problems in care and 5.2 (SD 2.5) contributory factors were 
identified. Almost three quarters of problems in care in both medical (71.4%) and surgical 
patients (72.1%) were due to omissions. Poor monitoring of laboratory tests and drugs and 
fluids, inadequate patient assessment, failures of the diagnostic process and drug omissions 
were the most common problems in care. Task and education and training factors together 
accounted for nearly half of the contributory factors underlying these problems. 
Conclusions 
Exploration of narrative accounts written as part of mortality reviews was used to 
systematically capture a multiplicity of problems in care and their contributory factors.  
Given that problems in care span initial assessment through to complex treatment, 
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improvements made as a result of such reviews are likely to provide safer environments for 
the majority of inpatients.  
Key words: preventable death, mortality review, problems in care, narrative accounts, 
content analysis 
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Introduction 
Over the last decade, there has been a movement towards developing a more systematic 
understanding of causes of hospital mortality as part of a range of approaches that can be 
used to identify preventable harm, and so focus improvement efforts.
1
 The importance of a 
focus on mortality been cemented in the minds of clinicians, the public and politicians 
following the well-publicised investigations at Bristol Royal Infirmary and Mid 
Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust, both prompted by standardised hospital death rates 
found to be outside the expected range.
2-3
 The Modernisation Agency
4
 and  the NHS 
Institute for Innovation and Improvement,
5
 drawing upon the work of the US Institute for 
Healthcare Improvement,
6
 have advocated  the use of retrospective case record review 
(RCRR) for this purpose. The approach is also recommended by NHS national safety 
campaigns in both England and Wales.
7-8
   
RCRR can be explicit whereby healthcare professionals assess the quality of processes of 
care using a set of pre-determined criteria or implicit, allowing clinicians to make 
judgements using their knowledge and experience. Enhancements to implicit review, such as 
the use of a structured review form and formal training, have been introduced over time in 
an effort to increase its reliability. Within the research sphere RCRR, both implicit and 
explicit, has usually been orientated towards quantitative analyses of either the prevalence of 
patient harm and underlying causes or of the percentage of patients in which a particular 
process was undertaken. However, it has been recognised for some time that preventable 
deaths are often a consequence of the build-up of multiple small problems, mainly 
omissions, which can combine to cause major harm especially in the frail and sick whose 
defences against such small insults are not as robust as those of a younger, fitter patient.
9
 
Approaches that can expose these threats to patient safety as efficiently as possible can 
complement the traditional quantitative approach. 
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Case note review methodology has benefitted from the introduction of methods of incident 
analysis which derive from James Reason‟s organisational accident model and are able to 
highlight both the chains of small events at the clinician/ patient interface and wider 
organisational factors which contribute to adverse events.
10-12
  These approaches involve in-
depth analysis of patient harm and aim to discover the root causes underlying its occurrence. 
We recognised that these tools, particularly those used for understanding problems in care 
and their contributory factors, might be usefully applied to narrative reports made by 
reviewers of hospital deaths to increase the utility of this information in the systematic 
analysis of patient harm.   
A large scale retrospective case record review of 1000 acute hospital deaths has recently 
been conducted to provide a robust estimate of the proportion of preventable deaths in 
England. This provided the opportunity to develop and use a novel approach to analysis of 
case narratives of the 52 preventable deaths identified during the case record review, in order 
to determine the problems in care and contributory factors behind these deaths.  
Method 
Details of a retrospective case record review of 1000 hospital deaths in 2009 in ten randomly 
selected acute hospitals have been described elsewhere.
13
 The method was based on previous 
similar studies.
14-18
   The reviews were undertaken by 17 recently retired physicians, all of 
whom had extensive experience as generalists, supported by training and expert reviewer 
advice. For each case, reviewers were asked to provide a brief narrative account (up to one 
A4 page) of the circumstances.  
The narrative accounts from the 52 deaths judged to be preventable were transcribed from 
the Review Form. A range of root cause analysis tools are available for qualitative analysis 
of causes and contributory factors underlying harm. We excluded techniques such as 
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multidisciplinary review meetings or nominal group technique that could not be applied. 
Two tools seemed suitable for use with written case histories. The first, change analysis asks 
a reviewer to specify problems in care by prompting consideration of what „problem free‟ 
care might look like for a particular patient and then using constant comparisons between 
this fictional „problem free‟ care and what actually happened during the admission. Any 
problems identified by change analysis were categorised by type (clinical monitoring, 
diagnosis and assessment, drugs and fluids, technological, infection and „other‟) based on 
definitions used  by Woloshynowych et al,
19
 and into care delivery problems (problems that 
arise in the process of care at clinician/ patient level) or service delivery problems (problems 
related to decisions, procedures and systems at organisational level) based on National 
Patient Safety Agency (NPSA) definitions.
20
 Charles Vincent and colleagues developed the 
Contributory Factor Classification Framework as a guide to determining the nature of 
underlying factors that enable problems in care to occur.
12
 This second tool was used to 
categorise and subcategorise contributory factors into nine major groups, namely patient, 
staff, task, communication, equipment, work environment, organisational, education and 
training and team. 
The method was applied to the first five cases to test feasibility. Two independent reviewers 
(HH and FH) met to discuss any discrepancies in their findings and make adjustments to the 
process. A third of all preventable death cases were then double reviewed by the same two 
investigators to test inter-rater reliability. The frequency of problems, contributory factors 
and their categories was calculated and descriptive statistics used to derive means and 
percentages. Tests for the comparison of proportions in two independent groups corrected 
for binomial distribution were used. 
Results 
Across the 52 preventable deaths, a mean of 3.0 (SD 1.5) problems in care and 5.2 (SD 2.5) 
contributory factors were identified. Reviewer agreement on problems in care was found in 
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71% of cases (Kappa coefficient = 0.64 indicating substantial agreement) and for 
contributory factors in 64% (Kappa coefficient= 0.56% indicating moderate agreement).   
Problems in care causing patient deaths   
71.4% of problems in care in medical patients and 72.1% in surgical patients were due to 
omissions such as inadequate assessment or failure to give an indicated drug. Care delivery 
problems (88.5%) were more frequently identified from the narratives than service delivery 
problems (11.5%), 61% of the latter being due to delays in tests or procedures.  
Clinical monitoring problems (45) were the most frequent problems (Table 6.1). Just over a 
third were due to poor monitoring of laboratory tests. Poor monitoring of warfarin with 
subsequent bleeding was the most common monitoring problem originating prior to 
admission (7). Two thirds of these patients had ongoing anticoagulation problems after 
admission which contributed to their deaths. Inadequate monitoring of fluid balance 
accounted for almost a quarter of problems in this category, fluid overload in nine patients, 
and dehydration in two, contributing to deaths. These problems were more common in 
surgical patients (35.7% of all surgical monitoring problems). A combination of failure to 
monitor pre-operative clinical observations and pre-operative fluids led to a third of 
preventable surgical deaths. Figure 6.1 illustrates the distribution of problems in care across 
medical and surgical patients. 
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Table 6.1 Comparison of problem types amongst medical and surgical patients 
 
Characteristic Medical n=36 Surgical n=16 P values 
 
Type of problems in care  
  
Clinical Monitoring
a
 31 (29.0) 14 (27.5) 0.8 
Assessment and Diagnosis
b
 30(26.7) 12 (23.5) 0.3 
Drugs and fluids
c
 20(21.9) 7 (13.7) 0.1 
Technical
d
 11(10.5) 8 (15.7) 0.2 
Infection
e
 6(5.7) 7(13.7) 0.04 
Resuscitation
f
 0(0) 0 (0) 0 
Other
g
 9(8.4) 3 (5.9) 0.6 
 107 (100) 51(100)  
 
a
Clinical monitoring: failure to set up monitoring systems,  act upon changes in observations, results of tests or 
clinical findings or provide increased intensity of monitoring when required 
b
Assessment and Diagnosis: missed, delayed or inappropriate diagnosis due to premature closure of decision 
making or failure to base diagnosis on available or necessary information, failure or delay to perform an adequate 
assessment of the patient‟s overall condition including history, physical examination, appropriate tests or seeking 
specialist advice 
c
Drugs and fluids: omissions, inappropriate use, failure to give prophylactic care, drug interactions 
d
Technical: related to an operation or procedure whether on the ward, in a diagnostic suite or in theatre and 
including delayed, inappropriate or unnecessary procedures 
e
Infection: any form of hospital acquired infection 
f
Resuscitation: A problem occurring at any stage of the resuscitation process 
g
Other: problems in care not captured by any of the above definition 
 
Assessment and diagnosis were the other frequent category (42) with 38.9% occurring early 
in admission. Inadequate assessment leading to missed diagnoses, failures to secure 
appropriate specialist opinions or to appreciate the risks of chosen treatments, most often 
underpinned these problems. In wrong diagnoses, the case history or clinical examination 
often pointed to alternative diagnoses. A cancer diagnosis led to an increased risk of 
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misdiagnosis. Two wrong diagnoses and two premature closures of investigation 
contributing to avoidable deaths in this patient subgroup. Failure or delay in diagnosing 
sepsis or in recognition of its extent was the predominant underlying problem in 7 of 
preventable deaths. 
Drugs and fluids accounted for 27 problems overall with failure to prescribe an indicated 
drug making up 40.7%. Venous thromboembolism (VTE) prophylaxis in patients at high 
risk of thrombosis was the most commonly omitted drug and occurred predominantly in the 
early phase of admissions. Five patients subsequently died of a pulmonary embolus 
Amongst the 19 problems associated with technical procedures (11 surgical procedures and 
6 non-surgical ward-based procedures), organ damage as a result a poorly performed 
procedure occurred in 7  patients and procedure delays led to poor outcomes in 5. Thirteen  
problems were related to hospital acquired infection of which 6 were post-surgical or after a 
ward procedure. Surgical patients had significantly more infections than medical patients 
(13.7% vs 5.7%, p=0.04). Of the four cases of MRSA infection uncovered, two were as a 
result of a previous hospital procedure (hip prosthesis and biliary stent) and two arose from 
infected pressure ulcers during the final admission. Three of these four patients went on to 
die from their infection.  
Serious falls were the most prevalent problems in the “other” category. Of the 6 patients 
who fell, two sustained a fractured neck of femur and two, significant brain injuries, 
contributing to their deaths. Other problems in this category were related to inappropriate 
admissions or ward placements compromising clinical care.  
The most common problem types to cluster together were clinical monitoring, diagnosis and 
assessment and drugs and fluid problems (Box 6.1).
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Figure 6.1 Pie Charts showing the distribution of problem in care subtypes across medical and 
surgical preventable deaths
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Figure 6.1 (continued) Pie Charts showing the distribution of problem in care subtypes 
across medical and  
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Box 6.1 Examples of how different problems in care cluster together 
An 87 year old female with a past history of stroke was admitted with a chest 
infection. An early CT scan showed a dilated oesophagus with food residue. She 
was kept nil by mouth for 5 days waiting for a swallowing assessment (problem 
1/diagnosis and assessment). Fluid balance during that period was poorly charted 
(problem 2/clinical monitoring) but laboratory tests indicated developing 
dehydration.  No changes in fluid regime were made in response (problem 3/drugs 
and fluids). On day 5, a trip over the drip stand (problem 4/other) led to a 
fractured femur. The patient died from post -operative renal failure, to which her 
poor preoperative state had contributed.   
An 82 year old female on regular warfarin developed an infected finger and was 
prescribed two antibiotics (flucloxacillin and sodium fusidate) (problem 1/drugs 
and fluids) by her GP, leading to an increase in the coagulant effect of warfarin. 
On admission the patient was commenced on intravenous antibiotic treatment for 
osteomyelitis. Two days passed without an assessment of clotting status (problem 
2/clinical monitoring) whist warfarin was continued at her standard dose. On day 
3, the patient developed gastrointestinal bleeding and her level of anticoagulation 
was found to be well above the therapeutic range. The preferred treatment to 
reverse the effect of warfarin was not available on the ward overnight (problem 
3/drugs & fluids) and the patient was given a second line alternative. Despite 
treatment, including transfusion of blood, she continued to bleed and died. 
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Contributory factors 
Task factors, in particular task design, were the most frequent contributory factors identified 
in clinical monitoring problems (Figure 6.2). A typical task design factor would be the use of 
monitoring systems that allowed staff to enter information indicating gross fluid imbalance 
without automatically triggering action. Education and training factors contributed to 22.5% 
of monitoring problems, mainly a lack of knowledge, which often manifest as a lack of 
action in response to changes in a patient‟s condition.  
Contributory factors in assessment and diagnostic problems were spread more evenly across 
five main factors: communication (19), staff (16), education and training (15), team (13), 
and task (12). Almost half (47.4%)  of communication factors were ineffective flows of 
information impeding transfer of important clinical information within and between teams 
which, in turn, caused delays in arranging investigations or receiving results. Staff 
confirmatory/ expectation bias resulted in premature closure of the search for alternative 
diagnoses and failures to base the diagnosis on all the available evidence.  Education and 
training factors particularly featured amongst surgical problems, a lack of knowledge 
underlying unsuccessful assessment of the severity of a patient‟s condition or a lack of an 
appropriate investigative approach. Team factors arose when two or more specialist teams 
were involved in the process of diagnosis and assessment and there was a lack of clarity 
around roles and responsibilities and task factors included decision making based on 
incomplete information.  
For drug and fluid problems, education and training factors (21) were dominant. Lack of 
individual knowledge was associated with the prescription of contraindicated drugs, drugs 
given at the wrong dose and a lack of awareness of the impact of potential drug interactions.  
Task factors accounted for 26.0% of the contributory factors, with 61.5% of these being 
related to staff failing to follow evidence-based guidelines. 
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Education and Training factors (8), team factors (7) and task factors (7) were the main 
contributory factors associated with technical procedural problems. Lack of skills was most 
often associated with procedures that failed or caused organ damage when undertaken by 
junior staff. Almost 60% of team factors reflected issues of shared understanding and lack of 
leadership between different specialist teams resulting in procedure delays. Poor task design 
reflected cases where procedures were carried out in environments without adequate 
monitoring facilities or without the use of equipment which might aid better visualisation. 
Task factors were also the dominant contributory factor for infection. 
Communication factors made the largest contribution to the “other” problem category (7). 
These factors featured in breakdowns of communication with external agencies such as 
social services leading to unnecessary admissions, to failures in coordination of cancer 
investigations as an outpatient or to ensuring that patients were admitted to wards best able 
to meet their nursing needs.  
Seven patients who experienced a preventable death were known to have dementia on 
admission. In two of these patients, the assessment and management of their underlying 
conditions was not adequate, in another two, an indicated procedure were delayed. The final 
three patients experienced a fractured neck of femur from a fall, a pulmonary embolus after 
inappropriate sedation and an MRSA infection of a pressure ulcer. Three other patients who 
developed acute confusion during admission experienced delays in diagnosis and in 
receiving indicated drugs. Box 6.2 provides case examples of contributory problems. 
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  Box 6.2   Examples of contributory factors 
 
Monitoring: poor task design  
A fluid balance chart had separate sheets for each day‟s fluid balance which made 
the accumulated overload less immediately obvious  
Diagnosis and assessment: written communication 
 A note of a previous significant diagnosis was not clearly visible from the case 
records. The fact that it was missed led to a delayed diagnosis 
Drugs and Fluids: competence- lack of knowledge 
Lack of knowledge of the consequences of administration of high flow oxygen to a 
patient with chronic obstructive pulmonary disease resulted in the patient developing 
respiratory failure. 
Technical: competence- lack of skills 
A junior doctor made several unsuccessful attempts at aspiration of a pleural 
effusion. The patient developed a pneumothorax, followed by a chest infection, after 
a chest drain was later inserted. 
Infection: task 
Poor management of fluid balance led to three separate insertions of a urinary 
catheter for output monitoring in a patient who went on to develop a urinary tract 
infection. 
Other: communication management 
A lack of communication with social services led to an unnecessary admission for a 
man with dementia and no indication of any other significant underlying condition. 
He went on to develop a pulmonary embolus after 2 weeks sedation and bed rest  
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Figure 6.2 Pie charts showing the distribution of contributory factors across 
different categories of problems in care 
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Discussion 
We developed a new approach for systematically analysing case narratives based on root cause 
analysis methods. The approach was designed to identify multiple problems care across a single 
admission and found an average of 3 problems and 5 contributory factors per patient, with just under 
three-quarters related to omissions.  
Main Findings 
Problems generated when processes of care go wrong were found to accumulate across the admission. 
Notably, problems related to anticoagulant management were the most common preadmission 
problems and continued to be associated with ongoing difficulties during admission. Diagnostic errors 
made early in admission were compounded by later failures to monitor the side effects of 
inappropriate medication and delays in identifying poor responses to treatment. Problems related to 
clinical monitoring, assessment and diagnosis and drugs and fluid problems were the major causes of 
preventable deaths, with half of these problems occurring during ward care. Specifically, poor 
monitoring of laboratory results, fluids or clinical observations, inadequate or delayed assessments 
and missed diagnoses were core to the genesis of almost half of all serious harm.  Amongst the third 
largest category, drug and fluid problems, drug omissions, principally, the failure to prescribe and 
administer venous thromboembolism prophylaxis were the most important contributors to harm. We 
also found that patients with a previous diagnosis of dementia or cancer were particularly vulnerable 
and that failure to diagnose infection continued to put patients at risk of serious harm.  
Contributory factors shed light on the issues underlying the problems in care found in preventable 
deaths and varied in distribution across the different problem categories. Task factors accounted for a 
quarter of all factors and were found most commonly amongst monitoring problems. Education and 
Training factors also accounted for around a quarter of all the contributory factors with a lack of 
knowledge being the most frequent factor for assessment and diagnosis and drug and fluid problems. 
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Lack of skill was the dominant factor amongst technical and procedural problems, contributing to 
organ damage caused by junior doctor operators. A combination of team, staff, communication, task 
and work environment factors underpinned assessment and diagnosis problems. Our findings capture 
the fact that clinical errors are generated within a system where there are poor methods for 
communication amongst and across clinical teams, inadequate levels of supervision and inadequate 
preparation of staff to deal with the complexity of clinical problems  
Relationship to previous research and policy 
Our findings confirm those from previous large RCRR studies, both in the predominance of omissions 
as a major factor in serious harm and the nature of the problems in care underpinning preventable 
deaths.
15 18 21
  The problems we found are all well-known and particularly persistent. It is now two 
decades since the publication of a National Confidential Enquiry into Perioperative Deaths report 
highlighted fluid imbalance as a leading cause of serious postoperative morbidity and mortality and 
called for fluids to be given the same status as the prescription of other drugs.
22
 As a result of the 
continuing poor quality of fluid management, the National Institute for Health and Care Excellence is 
preparing a national guideline for publication in late 2013.
23
 Previous studies have also confirmed that 
warfarin is one of the most common causes of drug-related admissions.
24
 Our observations correlate 
with these findings, and those from the NPSA, which found warfarin to be the third most commonly 
reported cause of drug-related severe harm or death. 
25
  On the other hand, the NPSA has also found 
that drug omissions form the largest category of drug-related patient safety incidents.
26
 Omissions of 
indicated drugs such as  venous thromboembolism prophylaxis continue to lead to devastating 
consequences despite repeated national guidance since 2007.
27
   
Systematic assessment is the cornerstone of reaching the correct diagnosis, identifying if and why a 
patient has not responded to treatment, assessing the risk from a treatment or procedure and 
identifying deterioration early.   There have been multiple reports implicating poor assessment in the 
generation of patient harm, both the lack of timely assessment and ineffectual assessments that do not 
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lead to appropriate responses.
28-30
 Oliver recognised the problem of older patients being managed 
without proper assessment and diagnosis, resulting in treatable conditions going untreated, and 
labelled the term “therapeutic nihilism”.31  Failure to recognise sepsis is already a well-known cause 
for concern because of its links with serious harm and preventable death.
32
 The nature of diagnostic 
problems are complex, our findings concur with the work of Graber et al who highlight the 
contribution of both clinical cognitive error and system-wide factors.
33
  
Across all contributory factors we found that 33.6% were related to individuals‟ clinical technical 
performance (lack of knowledge or skills, staff cognitive processes) and 34.3% to non-technical issues 
(communication or teamwork) confirming the findings of previous research which emphasised the 
continued significant threats to patient safety from failures of these non-technical aspects of care.
34
 
Strengths and Limitations  
Examining the narratives of deaths judged to be preventable allowed a deeper understanding of the 
nature of problems in care underlying such deaths and was particularly good at identifying multiple 
omissions across the care pathway. However, these case stories were limited in length, ranging from 
one paragraph to single sheet of A4. Missing detail is likely to have lead to a failure to identify some 
problems and their contributory factors. Even with the availability of the full admission record it is 
unlikely that retrospective review can find the full spectrum of hospital-related patient harm. 
Clinicians are more likely to record clinical details than factors related to organisational policies and 
processes, therefore reviews of records will be biased to the identification of problems with clinical-
technical aspects of care, especially those related to human error, rather than system-wide issues.
35-36
 
Only 11.5% of the problems we identified were classified as service delivery problems. For the same 
reasons, contributory factors are often not explicitly recorded and factors such as a lack of knowledge 
have to be inferred from the nature of the problem itself. Another valid criticism would be that the 
reviewers already knew they were reviewing narratives of patients who had experienced a preventable 
death and with this hindsight bias, may have identified problems, even if the evidence for these was 
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scant. However, we attempted to decrease this bias by comparing reviewer performance early on to 
increase consistency and undertaking double review in a third of all cases.  
Implications for practice 
As the vast majority of patients who die in acute hospitals today are elderly and frail with multiple co-
morbidities, hospital death reviews provide a window on how well healthcare is delivered to those 
with complex conditions. Such care tests the reliability of hospital systems, with fragmented and 
poorly co-ordinated care increasing the opportunity for omissions and ensuing harm, especially in 
those with fragile health states.
3
 Mortality reviews can highlight key areas of risk as patients move 
through the care process thus allowing more focused targeting of resources to reduce these risks. We 
found over 70% of problems in care to be due to omissions which would suggest that one focus for 
improvement should be improving the reliability of delivery of care processes. Although initiatives 
such as national audits have stimulated improvements in this domain, within certain specified areas, a 
move beyond a patchwork approach to a “whole system” approach would be more likely to have a 
bigger impact. Human failure remains an important contributor to monitoring, assessment and 
diagnosis, drug and technical procedure-related problems. Urgent consideration is needed of how 
adequate senior supervision and support for junior staff can be provided, in increasingly cost 
constrained environments, to reduce such harm. 
 
Conclusion 
Mortality reviews highlight the continued harm generated by failures of early assessment and 
diagnosis, poor clinical monitoring of warfarin and intravenous fluids and failures to give indicated 
drugs. Such reviews offer the opportunity to identify high risk areas and target appropriate 
interventions. Given that problems in care span initial assessment through to complex treatment, 
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improvements made as a result of mortality reviews are likely to provide safer environments for all 
patients.  
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Chapter	7	Research	Paper	4	
 
7.1	Introduction	to	Paper	4	
This paper explores the association between preventable deaths identified by RCRR and a 
range of publicly available safety indicators. It has been submitted for publication in the 
International Journal of Quality in Health Care. My conceptual framework identifies 
different measures of patient safety according to Donebedian’s distinction between structure 
(inputs), process or outcomes.32 This study was undertaken to illuminate the degree of 
correlation between a range of measures of safety, and the proportion of preventable hospital 
deaths. The hypothesis was that there should be an association. A lack of association would 
reflect that these measures assess distinctly different aspects of hospital safety, and indicates 
that caution should be applied when using a single primary measure to reflect the whole 
patient safety domain. This study was only exploratory, given a sample size of only ten 
hospitals. 
 
Using Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient to test these associations, only MRSA 
bacteraemia rate was significantly associated with the proportion of preventable hospital 
deaths (r=0.73, p=0.02), emphasising the prominent role played by infection in the causation 
of serious harm. There was a suggestion that the strength of association declined from 
outcomes (MRSA) to process (hand hygiene 0.51) to structure (patient safety culture 0.26). 
These findings require confirmation in a larger study. No significant correlation was found 
with HSMR, which is consistent with other studies.  
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Abstract 
Objectives 
To explore associations between the proportion of hospital deaths that are 
preventable and other measures of safety.  Our hypothesis was that the association 
would be strongest with other measures of outcome, but progressively less strong 
with process and structure measures. 
Design 
A retrospective case record review of 1000 adults who died as in-patients in 2009 in 
ten acute hospitals in England provided  estimates of preventable death proportions. 
The relationship with eight other measures of patient safety was explored by 
estimating simple monotonic correlations using Spearman‟s rank correlation 
coefficient. 
Results 
The proportion of preventable deaths varied between hospitals (3% - 8%) but was 
not statistically significant (p=0.94). Only one of the eight measures of safety 
(MRSA bacteraemia rate) was clinically and statistically significantly associated 
with preventable death proportion (r=0.73; p<0.02). There were no significant 
associations with the other measures including hospital standardised mortality ratios 
(r = -0.01). Despite this, there was a suggestion that preventable deaths may be more 
strongly associated with some other measures of outcome than with process or with 
structure measures 
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Conclusions 
The exploratory nature of this study inevitably limited its power to provide definitive 
results. The observed relationships between safety measures suggest a larger more 
powerful study is needed to establish the inter-relationship of different measures of 
safety (structure, process, outcome), in particular the widely used standardised 
mortality ratios 
 
Key words: preventable death, patient safety measures, HSMRs 
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Introduction 
A wide variety of measures are used to assess the safety of hospitals.
1
  They can be grouped 
into three broad categories reflecting Donabedian's typology of outcomes, processes and 
structures (sometimes referred to as inputs).
2
 Outcomes include preventable mortality, 
hospital acquired infections and emergency readmissions. Processes include events that 
might result in an adverse outcome such as patient safety incidents (e.g. falls and medication 
errors) and structure, aspects such as the safety culture of a hospital and the attitudes of staff 
towards safety. It is unclear whether or not these different dimensions of poor safety are 
associated with one another, an association that would suggest common cause. This is of 
considerable policy importance as if there is little or no association then the choice of a 
primary or leading measure of safety of a hospital will influence judgments about its 
performance. 
Over the past decade, the most commonly used primary measure in many countries has been 
the standardised mortality ratio (SMR) for the entire hospital. In England the most 
commonly used versions have been the Hospital Standardised Mortality Ratio (HSMR) and, 
more recently, the Standardised Hospital-Level Mortality Indicator (SHMI). Their use has 
had and continues to have an enormous influence on health care policy, despite the lack of 
any evidence of their validity either as accurate indicators of safety or as a screening tool to 
raise suspicions of poor safety. 
3-5
 
Arguably, from the point of view of patients, the public, politicians and staff, the most 
important and credible indicator of hospital safety is preventable mortality, when 
preventability is determined by trained reviewers undertaking retrospective case record 
review. It has two important attributes:   clinical credibility by taking account of the 
complexity of patients' conditions and care, and it can indicate whether or not poor care was 
responsible for any death. In addition clinicians identify the nature of any poor care and this 
starts to instil improvements in clinical practice.  
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Only four studies, all in North America, have looked at the association of preventable death 
proportions with other frequently used measures of safety. All four studies focused on the 
relationship with SMRs either for selected specialties,
6-7
 specific diseases,
8
 or a specific 
intervention,
9
 rather than for hospital-wide deaths. The studies were limited to considering 
aggregated data from groups of high and of low SMR hospitals due to the small samples 
from individual hospitals (less than 50). Three of the studies either found no correlation,
6-7
  
or a non-significant negative correlation.
9  
The fourth study, which reviewed patients with 
one of three medical conditions also found no association for two conditions (stroke and 
myocardial infarction) but did find a positive association in patients with pneumonia. 
8
 
To date, comparing the proportion of preventable deaths with other measures of safety in 
England has been limited by the lack of an accurate estimate for the proportion of deaths in 
hospitals that were preventable. An opportunity to carry out an initial exploration of this key 
issue has arisen with the availability of data collected in a recent large retrospective case 
record review.
10
 The rigour with which the measurements were made suggests that they 
provide a valid and credible indication of safety.  
Our aim was to carry out an exploratory study of the associations between the proportion of 
deaths in a hospital that are deemed preventable and other measures of safety.  Our 
hypothesis was that the association would be strongest with other measures of outcome 
(HSMR, hospital acquired infections, emergency readmissions), less strong with measures of 
process (patient safety incidents; hospital cleanliness; staff hand hygiene) and weakest with 
structure measures (safety culture, staff sickness absence). 
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Method 
Preventable deaths in hospital 
Details of the retrospective case record review of 1000 hospital deaths in 2009 carried out in 
ten randomly selected acute hospitals have been described elsewhere.
10
 The method was 
based on previous similar studies.
11-14
 Record reviews were undertaken by 17 recently retired 
doctors, all of whom had extensive experience as generalists and received training for the 
task. 
 The judgement of preventable deaths was undertaken in two stages. First, reviewers were 
asked to determine whether there had been any 'problems in care' that had contributed to the 
patient‟s death. Problems in care were defined as patient harm resulting either from acts of 
omission (inactions), such as failure to diagnose and treat, or from acts of commission 
(affirmative actions) such as incorrect treatment or management. Then, for each case in 
which a problem in care that had contributed to death was identified, reviewers judged the 
preventability of death. Preventability was assessed on a six point Likert scale.
15
 Deaths were 
deemed preventable if it was judged that there was more than a 50% chance that the death 
was preventable (scored from 4 to 6 on a 1 to 6 Likert scale). For deaths judged to be 
preventable, reviewers reported the type of problem, its timing and any associated causative 
or contributory factors. 
Other patient safety measures 
A priori, we selected measures of safety that were publicly available and reflected safety 
across entire hospitals rather than restricted to specific departments.  The measures were: 
 Outcomes: HSMR, obtained from Dr Foster Intelligence; MRSA bacteraemia 
reports, from the Health Protection Agency;  emergency readmissions within 28 
days of discharge, from  Hospital Episode Statistics 
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 Processes: patient safety incidents, reported to the National Reporting and Learning 
System; patients‟ views of hospital cleanliness and of nurses‟ hand cleaning, 
obtained from the NHS Inpatient Survey 
 Structure:  staff views of safety culture, obtained from the NHS Staff  Survey; staff 
sickness absence rates, from the NHS Staff Sickness Reports 
 Details of these data sources and the validity of the measures are shown in Table 7.1 and 
how they varied across the hospitals in Table 7.2. It is important to recognise that all eight 
measures are inevitably subject to chance variation in addition to the specific limitations 
mentioned in the table.  All of these data were publicly available at hospital-level on the 
internet. 
Analyses 
Median and inter-quartile ranges for each patient safety measure were calculated to show the 
distribution of values across the hospitals. Simple monotonic correlations between 
preventable death proportions and each of the other safety measures for the ten hospitals 
were examined using Spearman‟s rank correlation coefficient. The level of what would be 
deemed a clinically significant association was set as a correlation coefficient of at least 0.3. 
Tests for significance were two-sided and the significance level set at 0.02, given the 
multiple comparisons being tested. 
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    Table 7.1: Sources and description of eight safety measures 
 
 Source Description of measure Collection Threats to Validity 
Outcomes     
Hospital 
Standardised 
Mortality 
Ratio 
(HSMR) 
Dr Foster 2009/10 
(http://www.drfosterhealth.co.
uk/docs/hospital-guide-
2010.pdf) 
HMSRs are calculated using 
Hospital Episode Statistics 
(for 56 conditions known to be 
related to 80% of hospital 
mortality) by calculating the 
ratio of observed deaths to 
expected deaths with 
adjustment for case mix. 
Hospital Episode Statistics are derived 
from Patient Administration Systems. 
Expected death rates are calculated 
using national data. Adjustments are 
made for age, co-morbidity, number of 
previous admissions and 
sociodemographic factors 
Low sensitivity for measuring quality 
of care (most quality problems do not 
occur in patients who die) 
Low specificity for measuring quality 
of care (most deaths don‟t reflect poor 
quality) 
Artifactual variation for a range of 
reasons including coding depth and 
patient exclusions 
Structural factors e.g. local services 
available, admission thresholds and 
technology/ treatments available cause 
variation  
Methicillin 
Resistant 
Staph 
Aureus  
(MRSA) 
bacteraemia 
rates 
Health Protection Agency: 
MRSA surveillance 
programme 2009/10 
(http://www.hpa.org.uk/web/H
PAweb&HPAwebStandard/H
PAweb_C/1233906818165) 
Hospital apportioned MRSA 
bacteraemia reports per 
100,000 admissions. A 
positive blood culture on or 
after the third day of 
admission is classified as 
hospital apportioned. 
Mandatory surveillance of MRSA 
bacteraemia conducted by Health 
Protection Agency based on hospital 
submitted reports of positive blood 
cultures and accompanying 
demographic and clinical data. Data 
submitted via web-based system. 
Some MRSA infections  occurring 
prior to admission or recurrent 
infections may be included 
Rates are not adjusted for hospital 
demographics or case mix 
 
Emergency 
readmissions  
The NHS Information Centre 
2009/10 
(https://mqi.ic.nhs.uk/Perform
anceIndicatorChapter.aspx?nu
mber=1.01) 
Percentage of emergency 
admissions to hospital in 
England for adults that occur 
within 28 days of the previous 
discharge (indirectly 
standardised ) 
Hospital Episode Statistics derived 
from Patient Administration Systems. 
Some readmissions result from of lack 
of primary/ community services 
Quality of coding 
Admission decision dependent on 
variation in clinical judgment of the 
admitting doctor 
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 Source Description of measure Collection Threats to Validity 
 
Processes 
    
Patient 
safety 
incident 
reports 
National Reporting and 
Learning System 2009/10 
(www.nrls.npsa.nhs.uk) 
Overall reporting rate per 100 
admissions.  
Voluntary self reports are received by 
the NRLS via downloads from local 
risk management systems or web-based 
e- forms (including open access e-
forms).  
Individual reports are not investigated 
or verified by NPSA 
Quality/ volume of data variable 
depending on reporting system used 
and reporter 
Counts based on incidents reported: 
known under reporting 
Variability in reporting rates may not 
reflect safety but organisational culture 
Some reports are not PSIs e.g. 
misreporting of harm to staff or lost 
patient property 
Rates are not adjusted for hospital 
demographics or case mix 
Patients' 
views of 
hospital 
cleanliness 
Acute Hospitals Adult 
Inpatient Survey 2009, 
Economic and Social Data 
Service, 
http://www.esds.ac.uk/finding
Data/snDescription.asp?sn=70
34&key=Acute+Trusts:+Adult
+Inpatients+Survey,+2010 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Proportion of patients at each 
hospital giving negative 
responses to question related 
to general cleanliness of the 
hospital  
Annual Survey of patient experience 
commissioned by the Care Quality 
Commission. Each hospital identifies a 
random sample of 850 adult and 
psychiatry patients who at least one 
night.  
Response rate around 50%. 
Patient exclusions include maternity  
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 Source Description of measure Collection Threats to Validity 
Patients' 
views of  
staff hand 
hygiene 
Acute Hospitals Adult 
Inpatient Survey 2009, 
Economic and Social Data 
Service, 
http://www.esds.ac.uk/finding
Data/snDescription.asp?sn=70
34&key=Acute+Trusts:+Adult
+Inpatients+Survey,+2010 
Proportion of patients at each 
hospital giving negative 
responses to question related 
to whether nurses washed 
their hands between patients 
Annual Survey of patient experience 
commissioned by the Care Quality 
Commission. Each hospital identifies a 
random sample of 850 adult and 
psychiatry patients who at least one 
night.  
Response rate around 50%. 
Patient exclusions include maternity  
 
Structures 
   
Staff view of  
reporting of 
patient 
safety 
incidents  
The Staff Survey Coordination 
Centre, Picker Institute 
Europe: NHS Staff Survey 
2009 
(http://www.NHSStaffSurveys
.com) 
Proportion of staff at each 
hospital giving a negative 
response to question: “The last 
time that you saw an error, 
near miss or incident that 
could have hurt patients / 
service users, did you or a 
colleague report it?” 
Annual survey of staff views. Random 
sample of staff based on the size of the 
institution. Analysed by Staff Survey 
Coordination Centre. Hospital 
management do not see individuals‟ 
completed surveys but are sent 
amalgamated results for their hospital 
following analysis. 
Wording of some questions is 
ambiguous 
Response rates range from 40%-65% 
Staff 
sickness 
absence 
The NHS Information Centre: 
NHS Electronic Staff Records 
2009/10)(http://www.ic.nhs.uk
/statistics-and-data-
collections/workforce/sickness
-absence) 
Annual staff sickness absence 
rate  
Data collected monthly from the 
Electronic Staff Record System which 
links to the payroll and human resource 
systems within hospitals and contains 
records for the majority of NHS staff. 
The rates are calculated using Full 
Time Equivalent (FTE) days lost to 
sickness divided by the FTE days 
available  
Gives overall measure of sickness 
absence amongst NHS staff but does 
not indicate which staff and in which 
roles 
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Table 7.2: Hospital characteristics and patient safety indicator values, 2009 
 
PRISM Trusts A B C D E F G H I J 
 Bed Numbers 871 393 1449 998 1108 693 999 628 483 417 
 Annual Admissions  100,828 37,345 171,954 111,003 141,166 94,961 117,727 76,873 55,238 51,756 
 No. Adult Coronary Care Unit  beds 32 7 62 67 58 10 24 12 10 7 
 
Hospital type 
Large  
acute 
Small 
acute 
Acute 
teaching 
Acute 
teaching 
Large  
acute 
Large 
acute 
Large 
acute 
Medium 
acute 
Small 
acute 
Small 
acute 
 Preventable deaths (%) 0.04 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.03 0.08 0.04 0.06 0.05 
 
Hospital Standardised Mortality Ratio 
107.6 97.8 79.6 96.8 96.0 102.1 107.4 89.4 90.3 112.0 
 MRSA bacteraemia rates per 100,000 
admissions 
1.0 4.2 3.4 6.2 2.9 0.9 3.3 1.6 4.2 0.7 
 Emergency readmissions within 28 days 
of discharge (%) 
12.4 11.5 13.2 12.0 13.0 10.1 9.5 10.2 12.7 9.6 
 Patient safety incidents per 100,000 
admissions 
6298.8 4236.2 4869.3 6316.9 3536.3 5255.8 5971.4 3903.8 4764.8 4134.8 
 Patients reporting hospital 'not very 
clean'/ 'not clean at all' (%) 
4.1 4.2 5.2 2.4 4.6 2.9 2.9 1.7 2.5 5.3 
 
Patients reporting hospital not cleaning 
their hands between patients (%) 
2.2 2.6 4.9 4.2 2.1 2.6 2.8 1.5 3.6 2.8 
 Staff indicating that patient safety 
incidents were not reported (%) 
33 34 34 40 36 34 35 36 34 35 
 Staff sickness absence rate (%) 3.2 4.4 2.8 3.5 4.7 4.5 4 3.1 3.7 4.1 
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Results 
Among 1000 adult patients dying in acute hospitals in England, death was considered 
preventable in 5.2% of cases (95% CI 3.8% - 6.6%). The proportion varied between 
hospitals from 3% to 8% but these differences were not statistically significant (p= 0.94) 
(Figure 7.1). Table 7.3 shows the distribution of the safety measures across the ten hospitals. 
 
Figure 7.1: Proportion of preventable deaths across ten English acute hospitals   
 
 
The relationships between preventable deaths and the other measures of safety are shown in 
Table 7.4. Only one association was clinically and statistically significant: there was a 
positive correlation between preventable death proportion and MRSA bacteraemia rate (r = 
0.73; p = 0.02). (Figure 7.2)  Although a positive association was also observed with one 
other measure (nurses not cleaning their hands between patients r = 0.51) and a weak 
positive relationship with two other measures (staff indicating that adverse events were not 
reported r = 0.26; patient safety incidents r = 0.23) none were statistically significant.  As 
regards the other four measures (HSMR, emergency readmission, hospital cleanliness, staff 
sickness absence), there was no evidence of an association with preventable deaths. Given 
that previous studies have compared groups of hospitals with high SMRs with those with 
low SMRs, we did the same by aggregating data from the hospitals with the three highest 
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and the three lowest SMRs. There was no significant difference: 5.6% v 5.0% respectively 
(p=0.74). 
As regards our hypothesis based on Donabedian‟s categories of outcome, process and 
structure, there was a suggestion that the strength of association declined from 0.73 with 
another outcome (MRSA bacteraemia), to 0.51 with a process measure (staff hand hygiene), 
to 0.26 with a structure measure (poor safety culture) but the lack of statistical significance 
of the latter two correlations means such an observation must be treated cautiously. 
Table 7.3: Distribution of patient safety measure values across ten acute hospitals 
Safety measure Median Inter quartile 
      Range 
Preventable deaths (%)     5.00        4.00-6.00 
 
Outcomes 
Hospital standardised mortality ratio  
 
97.30 
 
91.73-106.10 
 
MRSA bacteraemia rates per 100,000 admissions 
 
3.10 
 
1.15-4.0 
 
Emergency readmissions within 28 days of discharge (%) 
 
11.74 
 
10.15-12.59 
 
Processes 
 
Patient safety incidents per 100,000 admissions 4317 4160-5793 
 
Patients reporting hospital „not very clean‟ or „not at all 
clean‟ (%) 3.53 2.58-4.50 
 
Patients reporting nurses did not clean their hands between 
patients (%) 2.67 2.30-3.37 
 
Structures   
 
Staff indicating that patient safety incidents were not 
reported (%) 
 
34.68 
 
33.84-35.85 
 
Staff sickness absence rate (%) 3.85 3.28-4.33 
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Table 7.4: Correlations between preventable deaths and other patient safety measures 
Safety measure Spearman 
correlation 
coefficient 
Lower 
confidence 
limit 
Upper 
confidence 
limit 
P value 
Outcomes     
Hospital standardised mortality ratio  -0.012 -0.64 0.62 0.97 
MRSA bacteraemia rates per 100,000 
admissions 
0.73 0.19 0.93 0.02 
Emergency readmissions within 28 
days of discharge (%) 
-0.06 -0.66 0.59 0.86 
 
Processes 
    
Patient safety incidents per 100,000 
admissions 
0.23 -0.47 0.75 0.52 
Patients reporting hospital „not very 
clean‟/„not at all clean‟ (%) 
-0.08 -0.68 0.58 0.80 
Patients reporting nurses not cleaning 
hands between patients (%) 
0.51 -0.17 0.86 0.12 
     
Structures     
Staff indicating patient safety 
incidents were not reported (%) 
0.26 -0.44                  0.76 0.47 
Staff sickness absence rate 0.06 -0.59 0.66 0.86 
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Figure 7.2: Scatter plot of hospital apportioned MRSA bacteraemia rates and hospital 
preventable death proportion 
 
Discussion 
Main findings 
This exploratory study has found that only one of the eight measures of safety (MRSA 
bacteraemia rate) was significantly associated with the proportion of preventable deaths. In 
contrast, for four of the other measures, there appeared to be no association with preventable 
deaths (HSMR, emergency readmissions, hospital cleanliness, staff sickness absence).  
Comparison with other studies 
Due to the lack of previous studies on most of the measures of safety we considered, we can 
only compare our results for the association between preventable deaths and standardised 
mortality ratios. Our results are consistent with all the published evidence (except for 
pneumonia deaths in one study
8
)
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 which also found no significant positive correlation. 
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One study from England of 173 acute hospitals considered associations between several 
patient safety measures but did not include preventable death proportion.
16
 It found that a 
process measure (patient safety incident rates) had no association with several outcome 
measures (MRSA bacteraemia rates, SMRs, incidence of decubitus ulcers, post-operative 
sepsis rates). There were, however, positive associations with some structure measures (staff 
views of the safety culture in their hospital, risk management ratings). 
Interpretation of findings 
Our overall finding of no or only a weak association between preventable deaths and most 
other measures of safety suggests that each measure has different underlying causes.  The 
one exception was a moderately strong correlation with a hospital acquired infection 
(MRSA) which gives credence to  the importance given to the latter in many countries, 
including England.
17
 In the study from which our data were drawn, 7% of preventable deaths 
were associated with hospital acquired infection and 3.8% with MRSA septicaemia.
18
 
Our findings do provide support to policies in UK, USA and France aimed at reducing 
MRSA bacteraemia rates in order to reduce preventable deaths.
19
 Although our study was 
insufficiently powered to detect a statistically significant association with one of the 
cornerstones of infection control, hand washing by healthcare staff,
20
  the findings do suggest 
a link with hospital acquired infection-related deaths. Measuring this activity may be an 
effective way to assess and drive improvements in safety.
21 
The lack of correlation of preventable deaths with rates of patient safety incidents may 
reflect a true lack of association or incomplete reporting to the NPSA. In addition, there is 
some uncertainty as to whether a high rate of reported incidents reflects poor safety or the 
opposite, acting as an indication of a greater propensity to address safety issues. Staff 
171 
 
concerns about unfair blame or fear of litigation, particularly in organisations with a poor 
safety culture, generally discourage reporting.
22-23
 
The lack of correlation with HSMR is consistent with  findings from other studies.
24
 After 
taking into account artefactual and structural factors, it remains unclear how much of the 
residual variation in HSMRs represents differences in safety between organisations.
4-5
 Given 
that this study (and others) suggests that only 5% of deaths are preventable, the signal to 
noise ratio of preventability would preclude the ability of HSMRs to be valid measures of 
safe care. 
Strengths and limitations 
The principal strengths of this study are the methodological rigour of determining 
preventable deaths and the first time the relationships with a wide-range of other safety 
measures at the level of individual hospitals has been undertaken outside the USA. 
However, with only ten hospitals, the principal limitation is its power to detect associations 
between safety measures.  The small sample size may have led to the undue influence of 
outliers on the value of the correlation coefficients, though this was addressed by using the 
more conservative Spearman Rank Correlation test.  
Whilst retrospective case record review provides a comprehensive picture of patient care, it 
is inevitably limited to what is written in the record and is vulnerable to the risk of hindsight 
bias.
25
 Our method maximised the validity and reliability of the judgment of preventability 
and was fit for the purposes to which the data have been put in this analysis. 
Our choice of safety measures was guided by the desire to look at safety from multiple 
perspectives and to focus on entire hospitals. Use of other, not yet publicly available 
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measures, such as in-hospital cardiac arrest rates currently being collected as part of a 
national clinical audit in England, would have strengthened the study.
26
 Despite the selection 
of safety measures being limited to those with reasonable coverage and measurement 
properties, several of these are of uncertain accuracy (such as patient incident reports, 
patients' views, staff views). 
Although our study of preventable deaths was conducted during calendar year 2009, the 
majority of safety measures used in the correlation analyses were from the financial year 
2009/10. We have no reason to believe that this minor lack of concordance of data collection 
periods would have introduced any significant bias. 
Implications  
Given the lack of association between preventable death proportion and some widely used 
measures of safety (HSMRs, emergency readmissions), a larger study is needed to establish 
whether this reflects the limited power of this study or real relationships. In autumn 2013 
there are plans to study an additional 24 hospitals in England which will enable this to be 
resolved.
27
 
This study also underlines the need for governments and others responsible for health care 
systems to consider a portfolio of measures of safety when assessing a hospital, given the 
limited inter-relationships between the various options. This, in turn, reflects the diverse 
aspects of safety that each measure detects.    
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Chapter	8	Discussion	
8.1	Introduction	
The aim of this research was to identify a method most suited to the identification of 
preventable hospital deaths, and to apply it to determine the proportion of preventable deaths 
in acute NHS hospitals in England and their underlying causes and contributory factors. The 
extent of correlation between the proportion of preventable deaths across hospitals and other 
safety indicators was explored. This chapter places my research findings within the body of 
current knowledge and highlights my contribution to its expansion. I also reflect on the 
implications of this research for clinical practice, NHS policy and future research. 
 
8.2	Key	Findings	
8.2.1	Objective	1	and	2:	To	describe	the	strengths	and	weaknesses	of	current	
measures	of	patient	safety	for	identifying	harm	in	hospitals	and	compare	
the	scale	and	scope	of	hospital	harm	identified	by	different	measures	of	
patient	safety	
 
A number of methods for measuring harm exist. Some are more frequently used in the 
service setting (Routine Data, Incident Reporting, Global Trigger Tool, Morbidity and 
Mortality Meetings, Confidential Enquiries), others in research settings (Direct Observation, 
Case Control, Patient Reported Harm) and some in either setting (Claims / Inquest Records, 
RCRR, Prospective Surveillance). By undertaking a narrative literature review of harm 
measurement, and exploring the range of measures and their performance in a single acute 
hospital, I was able to determine that common measures differ in the scope and scale of 
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harm they identify, with relatively little overlap between sources. Each measure is subject to 
a number of biases that threaten validity and reliability when measuring severe harm 
including preventable death. Compared to other harm measures, both RCRR and prospective 
surveillance identify the broadest spectrum of harm including that at the severe end of the 
spectrum and due to multiple small omissions. Both methods also capture adequate 
contextual information to allow an assessment of the preventability of harm to be made. 
RCRR also enables the examination of deaths for preventability on a larger scale with fewer 
resources, and makes comparisons with previous epidemiological harm studies that 
traditionally use this approach, possible. 
 
8.2.2	Objective	3:	To	determine	the	proportion	of	preventable	deaths,	
causes,	contributory	factors,	subpopulations	affected,	and	years	of	life	lost	
in	acute	hospitals	in	England	
The main study in this thesis, PRISM, has provided for the first time in England, a robust 
estimate of the proportion of preventable hospital deaths. This estimate of 5.2% (95% CI 
3.8% - 6.6%) equates to approximately 11,859 such deaths annually across the NHS in 
England. I found that preventable deaths were more common amongst surgical than medical 
patients, with problems in care for both groups occurring most frequently during ward care 
(44%). The majority of problems in care were related to clinical monitoring (31%), 
diagnostic errors (30%), or inadequate drug or fluid management (21%).  Most preventable 
deaths occurred in elderly and frail patients with multiple co-morbidities; 60% were judged 
to have less than one year of life left to live on admission.  
Content analysis of the case narratives of the preventable deaths using a novel approach 
based on root cause analysis sought to understand in more depth the nature of these deaths. 
On average, three healthcare problems and five contributory factors were found per patient, 
with around three quarters related to omissions. Problems were found to accumulate across 
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the patient’s hospital stay, as demonstrated by five out of seven patients admitted with 
warfarin-induced bleeding who went on to have further management problems related to 
anticoagulation during hospitalisation. Failures of early assessment and diagnosis (39% of 
all assessment and diagnosis problems), poor clinical monitoring of intravenous fluids (24% 
of all monitoring problems) and warfarin (20% of all monitoring problems), and failures to 
give indicated drugs (particularly venous thromboembolism prophylaxis) (41% of all drug 
and fluid problems) were the most frequent problem subtypes. Factors related to clinical 
tasks, e.g. design or guidance, and education and training made up 50% of contributory 
factors. Across all contributory factors, 34% were related to individuals’ clinical technical 
performance (lack of knowledge or skills, staff cognitive processes) and 34% to non-
technical issues (communication or teamwork), continuing to emphasise the interplay 
between clinical and system factors in the generation of harm. 
8.2.3	Objective	4:	To	determine	whether	the	proportion	of	preventable	death	
across	hospitals	correlates	with	other	patient	safety	indicators	
Correlation of the proportion of preventable deaths with eight other patient safety indicators, 
chosen as measures linked to the structure, process and outcomes of healthcare, found that 
only one, the MRSA bacteraemia rate, had a statistically significant correlation (r=0.73, 
p=0.02). This study was necessarily exploratory due to the limited number of data points 
(ten hospitals), but there was an indication that the strength of association decreased across 
some measures from outcome (MRSA bacteraemia 0.73), through to process (staff hand 
hygiene 0.51) and to structure (poor safety culture 0.26) where such an association would 
seem feasible. This observation would require testing a in a larger study. There was no 
significant correlation between preventable deaths and five other measures of safety: HSMR, 
emergency readmissions, hospital cleanliness, and staff sickness absence. 
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8.3	Setting	Thesis	Findings	in	Context	
There are only two previous studies with a significant focus on measuring preventable death 
by RCRR. Hayward and Hofer found 6% of deaths to be preventable, in a review of 111 
deaths from across seven Veterans Affairs hospitals in the US.17 More recently, a review of 
3,983 deaths in 25 Dutch hospitals in 2005 found that a preventable adverse event 
contributed to death in 4.1% of cases.174 My finding of 5.2% preventable deaths is 
compatible with this previous work. The Dutch study also estimated that around half of 
dying patients, having experienced a preventable adverse event, had a potential life 
expectancy of less than one year.174  
My estimate is much lower than the 60,000 to 255,000 episodes of healthcare-related serious 
disability or death in England suggested in 2000 by the Chief Medical Officer, these figures 
being derived from extrapolations of the findings of the HMPS, and the Utah and Colorado 
studies in the US.9 The robustness of extrapolations from these studies is limited by their 
small sample sizes for deaths, and the fact that reviewers were not required to explicitly 
examine the relationship between an adverse event occurrence and the preventability of the 
death.   
Despite some issues with methodological differences when making direct comparisons 
between my findings and the large RCRRs of the past, it is reassuring that these studies also 
found similar causes of serious harm, namely clinical monitoring, assessment and diagnosis, 
and drugs and fluids problems, with over half of this harm occurring during ward care.170 173-
174 Additionally, my finding that a relatively small number of preventable deaths are 
associated with technical problems (6.3%), compared to diagnosis and monitoring problems, 
is consistent with the findings from these previous RCRR studies. The HMPS found that the 
balance in frequency between the usually more common technical and less common 
diagnostic problems altered in patients suffering severe harm or death. These patients were 
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more likely to have experienced diagnostic mishaps than problems related to surgery or 
procedures.170 This finding was mirrored in the QAHCS where surgical adverse events 
occurred in only 3% of patients who died having experienced an adverse event, and 
diagnostic, system and therapeutic errors accounted for 64% of harm in this group.173 More 
recently, the Dutch RCRR reviewing 3,983 deaths found that twice as many adverse events 
were related to the diagnostic process in this group than in patients who were discharged 
alive (14.8% vs. 6.3%).174  
My finding that omissions in care, such as the failure to monitor or give an indicated drug, 
are twice as common as problems related to acts of commission (giving the wrong drug or 
an error during a procedure), is consistent with findings from previous studies. In the 
QAHCS, omissions were found to be twice as common as errors of commission and the 
HMPS found that, not only were omissions more common, but they were more likely to be 
preventable.170 173 Hutchinson and colleagues also identified the greater impact on harm 
generation of multiple omissions along the care pathway rather than single acts of 
commission.171 
Comparison of the findings from the correlation study are limited by its exploratory nature 
and the lack of similar such studies. My finding that there is no significant association 
between the proportion of preventable deaths identified by case record review and HSMR, is 
consistent with three out of the four published studies in this area.21-22 24 This lack of 
correlation with HSMR is not surprising, and it agrees with findings from other studies that 
report a weak and inconsistent relationship between HSMR and other measures of the safety 
of hospital care.251 After taking into account artifactual and structural factors, it remains 
unclear how much of the residual variation in HSMR represents differences in safety 
between organisations.53 252 Modelling studies suggest that the proportion of preventable 
death would need to be significantly higher than 5.2% to show any clear association between 
these measures.234 One caveat must be that although I can rule out any medium to strong 
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association with HSMR, smaller associations will be masked by the low power of the study, 
due to the relatively small number of hospitals in the sample. The strongly positive 
correlation with MRSA is consistent with the challenges related to MRSA infections and 
associated deaths that the NHS was facing around 2009.253 Only one other study from 
England has looked at associations between a range of patient safety indicators, but did not 
include preventable deaths identified through RCRR.254 Hutchinson et al found no 
association between reported patient safety incident rates to the NPSA from 173 acute 
hospitals, and MRSA bacteraemia rates, HSMRs, incidence of decubitus ulcers or post-
operative sepsis rates. There were, however, positive associations with structure measures 
(staff views of the safety culture in their hospital, risk management ratings). 
 
8.4	Strengths	and	Limitations	of	the	Research	
8.4.1	Strengths	
Several methodological approaches were considered before choosing RCRR. A prospective 
cohort study would have allowed determination of incidence and associated risk factors, but 
given that preventable death is a rare outcome, such a cohort would have needed to be 
unfeasibly large 17 255 A case control study would have doubled the cost and time for data 
collection and given that the focus of the study was not on identifying risk factors for 
preventable deaths, but rather on estimating the proportion of preventable deaths by close 
examination of the appropriateness of  processes of care, the extra investment was not 
justifiable. RCRR compares favourably to other harm methods in the identification of harm 
at the severe end of the spectrum.256-257  
The research design included a number of measures to enhance validity and reliability. The 
external validity was strengthened by the large random sample size, which was drawn from 
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acute hospitals in different regions and of different sizes and teaching status. It was the 
largest sample of deaths to be reviewed in England and second only to the Netherlands, 
internationally.174 I was also able to confirm that the study sample was representative of the 
population of patients who die in English hospitals each year. Efforts were made to ensure 
that the participating hospitals undertook correct sampling procedures and worked hard to 
trace any missing records, particularly if these records were part of a medicolegal case. For 
those records that could not be traced, additional information on the age, sex, specialty and 
reason for loss were sought, in order to check for selection bias. In addition, reviewers were 
asked to rate the completeness of the case records and identify any where the amount of 
missing information prevented a review. Only 0.8% of records were rejected on this basis.  
Using retired consultant physicians as reviewers was another study strength.  They had the 
experience to make sense of complex clinical scenarios, and to take the necessary global 
overview required when making judgements of the preventability of deaths. An additional 
advantage of using retired doctors was that many had practised medicine at a time when 
there was less specialisation and were comfortable assessing the care of patients spanning a 
range of specialties. The study design could be criticised for not using specialist reviewers. 
However, findings from previous RCRR had highlighted that much of the harm we might 
find in PRISM was likely to be of a general nature related to diagnosis, assessment or 
monitoring, and would not require specialist reviewers. 15 37 169-170 214 Reviewers did have 
access to specialty expertise either from other members of the review group and via external 
sources if necessary.  
The study used of a new definition of harm, ‘problem(s) in care’, rather than the more 
commonly used ‘adverse event’. This change was designed to ensure omissions and multiple 
problems in care would be captured. Reviewers were asked not only to identify problems in 
care that had contributed to a death but also to answer a separate question on the 
preventability of the death using a six point Likert scale. This judgement step had previously 
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only been included in only one other RCRR study,17 but was essential in enabling reviewers 
to take into account not only the appropriateness of care the patient received but also the 
impact of the patient’s condition on admission, including co-morbidities, on the likelihood 
of death.  
A key measure to improve reliability was training. The design of training programme was 
based on that used for three previous RCRR studies (HMPS, QAHCS, London).  Reviewers 
were able to practise using the structured Medical Review form on real cases during the 
training, giving them the opportunity to ask questions and compare their performance with 
peers. A source of bias that is hard to eradicate from retrospective studies is hindsight bias. 
Reviewers were instructed on approaches to the review that helped to minimise this bias. 
Each reviewer was also given an instruction manual to remind them of key issues to look out 
for when completing the structured review form.  Once reviews commenced, expert 
reviewers were available to answer reviewers’ questions, and a group email facility allowed 
further discussions.  
The qualitative analysis developed a novel content analysis approach based on root cause 
analysis tools in current use. The method enabled extraction of richer material on problems 
in care, and measurement of inter-rater reliability indicated a good level of agreement for 
problems in care, and moderate agreement for contributory factors.  
8.4.2	Limitations	
RCRR has been shown to more often identify harm related to the clinical aspects of care at 
the clinician-patient interface, especially if related to human error, than harm that results 
from underlying system problems.37 120 218   In my study, I found only 11.5% of the problems 
identified could be considered mainly healthcare system problems. This may be partly 
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because it is not always possible to discern contributory factors such as teamwork, 
leadership or communication issues because of lack of detail in the case record. 
 Important information may be missing due to illegibility, poor recording practices or 
misfiling. In the QAHCS, over a quarter of the records did not have enough content to allow 
a judgement of whether harm had occurred.169 However, despite 12% of records in this study 
having missing components, only 0.8% were rejected by the reviewers on the grounds of 
inadequate content.258 The problem of missing content may lead to information bias. It is 
possible in hospitals with more rigorous record keeping standards and well maintained 
records, that more harm will be identified than in those with poor standards where crucial 
details may be missing. I guarded against this by the inclusion of an item in the review form 
that rated the quality of the records for each case, and was able to ensure that there were no 
serious outliers for quality of record keeping.  
RCRR studies are often criticised because of the poor reliability of the reviewers’ 
judgments. Most studies rarely achieve more than moderate reliability for judgements of 
harm and preventability.211 The nature and complexity of judgements, given that the 
majority of patients under review are elderly and frail with multiple co-morbidities, limits 
the degree of reliability that can be achieved. Some researchers have advocated using more 
than one reviewer for each case, but it has been shown that improvement in reliability only 
occurs when five or more clinicians undertake the review.207-208  That number of reviewers is 
beyond the means of most large scale studies. Hayward and Hofer, who have done much of 
the empirical research on inter-rater reliability in the judgement of harm, have concluded 
that having one or two reviewers per case record is permissible for studies comparing 
hospitals where there is a large number of cases being reviewed but would not be 
satisfactory for individual patient level decisions.209 As the Dutch had recently found no 
worthwhile improvement in reliability using two reviewers,210 I settled for one reviewer per 
case record, but with two reviewers visiting each site and a quarter of all reviewed records 
185 
 
undergoing double review. In addition, to account for error around judgements of 
preventability using the Likert scale, a sensitivity analysis was incorporated into the final 
analysis using different Likert scale thresholds (3 and 5) to give an indication of the potential 
range for the proportion of preventable deaths. 
A further limitation is hindsight bias, in which knowing the outcome and its severity 
influences judgements of harm causation and preventability.211 216 I did consider the 
feasibility of using copies of the admission record with masked outcomes in addition to 
reviewer training on the issue, but the resources required were beyond the means of this 
research. There was also a risk that altering the records in this way would compromise the 
ability of reviewers to make judgements. 
Experienced generalist reviewers rather than specialist reviewers were used, the majority of 
whom were physicians rather than surgeons. I thus ran the risk of missing harm related to 
technical aspects of surgical care. This could have led to an under-estimation of the number 
of surgical preventable deaths. However, I did have the support of two general surgeons who 
were on hand to deal with any questions related to surgery raised by the reviewers. In the 
end, the study found a higher proportion of problems in care and preventable deaths amongst 
surgical patients than medical patients, but the majority of these were related to ward care 
rather than the surgical intervention itself.  
Study findings that patients were more likely to experience harm if they were less 
functionally impaired, were elective admissions and had a longer life expectancy on 
admission were inconsistent with previous studies and could have reflected a bias amongst 
reviewers towards discounting problems in the most frail, sick patients. To reduce this 
tendency, reviewers were required to examine the entire record to the same depth and in the 
same structured way for all patients, regardless of their condition on admission. An 
alternative explanation might reflect the greater willingness in England, compared to the US, 
186 
 
to limit the extent of medical intervention in frail patients. This, in turn, would result in less 
exposure to potential high risk procedures or treatments, and reduce the opportunity for 
harm.  
The estimates of life expectancy were dependent on reviewers’ judgements, a notoriously 
difficult task especially when many patients were very elderly and frail. However, no 
alternative approach proved satisfactory given the nature of the patients in the sample. 
The robustness of the correlation between the proportion of preventable death and other 
safety indicators was limited in its power to detect associations, because of the small number 
of hospitals in this study.  This analysis should be regarded as exploratory and will benefit 
from testing in a larger study. However, while the lack of statistically significant correlations 
with some measures cannot rule out the existence of weak associations with preventable 
mortality, this study was still able to confirm the absence of strong associations.  It cannot be 
ruled out that the lack of correlation with some measures may have been a reflection of the 
poor quality of the data. 
The small sample size may have led to the undue influence of outliers on the value of the 
correlation coefficients, but this was addressed by using the more conservative Spearman 
Rank Correlation test. The choice of safety measures was guided by the desire to look at 
safety from multiple perspectives and to focus on entire hospitals. Use of other, not yet 
publicly available measures, such as in-hospital cardiac arrest rates being collected as part of 
a national clinical audit, would have strengthened this element of the study.259 Furthermore, 
the proportion study was conducted during the calendar year 2009, and the majority of safety 
measures used in the correlation analyses were from the financial year 2009/10. It is unlikely 
that this lack of concordance of data collection periods would have introduced significant 
bias. 
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The content analysis was also weakened by the fact that it depended on the level of detail 
recorded by reviewers in the case narrative section of the review form, which varied in 
length from a single paragraph to several sides of A4. This was a more noticeable handicap 
for identifying contributory factors.  
 
8.5	Implications	for	the	NHS	
8.5.1	Implications	for	Clinical	Safety	in	the	NHS	
The revelation of the scale of the poor healthcare at the Mid Staffordshire NHS Foundation 
Trust has ensured that hospital-related harm has moved up the political agenda with reports 
of such harm rarely out of the media.27 Today, reduction of harm, particularly serious harm, 
is a key focus for improvement in the NHS. My research highlights that whilst three-quarters 
of patients receive good quality of care, there is scope for improvement in the safety of 
healthcare provision. The findings show that well known and long standing causes of serious 
patient harm, such as inadequate assessment, poor fluid balance, failure to monitor warfarin 
or give thromboembolism prophylaxis, persist in the NHS.123 260-263  
My analysis of contributory factors implicates both individuals’ clinical technical 
performance (lack of knowledge or skills, staff cognitive processes) and non-technical 
factors (communication or teamwork). Case narratives capture the fact that individual 
human error at the patient-clinician interface occurs within a system in which poor 
communication, poor teamwork and inadequate levels of supervision are common and 
inexperienced clinicians continue to be exposed to complex clinical situations without the 
adequate knowledge and skills to deal with them. This situation very much reflects James 
Reason’s ‘Swiss Cheese’ model of failed defences, demonstrating how risks to patient 
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safety, inherent in most healthcare systems, will reach the patient when all the holes in the 
cheese line up.59 
Figure 8.1 James Reason’s Swiss cheese model of harm generation  
 
Reproduced from Health Information Technology and Error Detection and Reporting.  Learning From 
Mistakes: Error Reporting and Analysis and Health Information Technology Part 1. Health Information 
Technology Database.  http://www.philblock.info/hitkb/h/HIT_and_error_detection_and_reporting.html. 
Downloaded 8th August 2013.  After Reason JT. Human Error. New York, NY: Cambridge University 
Press; 1990 
In the last decade a wide range of interventions have been introduced in the NHS to address 
the known underlying risks that lead to serious harm, including Early Warning Score 
Systems to avoid delay in identifying deteriorating patients,264 explicit handover procedures 
to ensure vital clinical information is passed between clinicians,265 and critical care outreach 
services to rescue deteriorating patients.266 However, my findings that over 70% of problems 
in care are due to omissions would suggest that one focus for improvement should be on 
improving the reliability of the delivery of care overall. Although initiatives such as national 
audits have led to improvements in standardisation of care delivery within certain specified 
areas, a move beyond a patchwork approach to a ‘whole system’ approach would have a 
greater impact. Approaches aimed at achieving total system reliability, such as those based 
on Six Sigma principles (a process improvement strategy to identify and remedy defects and 
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variability) are gradually being introduced across some NHS wards, and evidence is 
emerging that there are improving outcomes.267-268   Further research is needed to understand 
the key components of these programmes linked to success.269 Improved reliability will not 
eradicate all human error. Training and supervision remain key defences to human failures. 
The link between preventable death and inadequate senior supervision and support for junior 
staff is becoming increasingly recognised, both through studies that show poor outcomes 
from out of hours care and via recent investigations of failing hospitals.270-271 
 With an aging population, nearly a quarter of all NHS hospital admissions are aged over 75 
years.272 By 2025 it is estimated that the over 65s will account for 60% of acute hospital 
admissions.273 Older people who come into contact with increasingly complex and 
technological healthcare provision are vulnerable to higher rates of harm due to frailty and 
multiple co-morbidities, and are likely to suffer more serious consequences.168 Their longer 
lengths of stay in hospital compared to younger patients’, increase the opportunity for 
injury.274 My findings suggest hospital provision still appears ill equipped to keep this 
vulnerable population safe. Several recent reports have highlighted failings in the standards 
of care for older people within hospitals, due to poorly co-ordinated care.27 275   Within a 
system where care is fragmented, the opportunity for harm as a result of omissions is high. A 
recent King’s Fund report corroborated my findings when highlighting how the breakdown 
of team structure as a consequence of shift work, the lack of opportunity for regular multi-
professional team meetings to plan care, larger numbers of specialists involved across the 
care journey, and inadequate senior clinical supervision of junior staff are all contributing to 
fragmentation of care delivery.273    
A consensus is beginning to emerge as to how acute care can be provided in hospitals to 
ensure both a better experience for patients, and protection from healthcare-related harm. 
Recent publications by the Royal Colleges of Physicians276-277 have put forward a number of 
recommendations to this end, including: 
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• Early comprehensive multi-disciplinary assessment 
• Early establishment of treatment goals 
• Consistent consultant cover and early consultant review 
• Integrated services, with access to care of the elderly expertise 
• Assessment, documentation and treatment of acute illness standardised across 
the NHS 
• Standard handover procedures 
• Education and training in order to better address the specific needs of an 
aging population 
• Avoidance of unnecessary transfers 
• Prompt consultant review after transfer 
 
In addition, the widespread adoption of approaches shown to improve outcomes in the 
elderly, such as regular multidisciplinary team meetings,278 need to be combined with 
general improvements to the quality of healthcare provision through strengthened ward 
leadership, regular senior review of patient progress, electronic prescribing systems and 
clear pathways for communication to ensure appropriate care is delivered as intended and 
any negative impacts identified and dealt with rapidly. Effective approaches aimed at 
improving non-technical aspects of care, such as teamwork and communication, exist and 
are currently being tested in healthcare settings. A recent study showed team-based training 
programmes previously used to train airline cockpit staff, can lead to a reduction in error 
rates in surgical settings.279 
8.5.2	Implications	for	Patient	Safety	Measurement	
Recent media stories linking raised HSMR / SHMI to thousands of preventable deaths across 
NHS acute hospitals have caused alarm amongst the public and politicians alike.280 While 
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the spectre of preventable hospital deaths may prove helpful in raising interest in patient 
safety and a commitment to improvement, over-estimating the size of the problem and the 
risk to patients may induce unjustified levels of anxiety and fear among the public, as well as 
dismay and despondency amongst the staff that care for them in resource stretched 
environments. Preventable deaths form a relatively small proportion of all deaths, and with 
their low signal to noise ratio, it is very unlikely that variation in HSMR and SHMI between 
hospitals can ever reflect variation in actual preventable deaths. The findings from the 
exploratory correlation study support the fact that any association is not likely to be strong.  
With serious concerns being voiced as to the validity of using HSMR and SHMI to identify 
excess mortality in acute hospitals, my study presents a feasible alternative measure.51 281  
The two public enquiries undertaken by Robert Francis QC,27 282 on the failings in standards 
of care at the Mid Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust revealed a raft of failings at the Trust 
resulting from the lack of commitment to quality and safety at Board level, a culture that 
tolerated low standards of care compounded by understaffing and fears among some staff of 
raising awareness of these problems. He saw the situation compounded by the emphasis 
placed on the importance of financial balance by central supervisory NHS bodies and the 
failure of the regulator, the Care Quality Commission, to undertake sufficient scrutiny. 
Frances’ recommendations called for the development and enforcement of fundamental 
standards which place the patient at their heart combined with a duty to be open and 
transparent when things go wrong, an emphasis on improving the culture amongst nursing 
staff, in particular, the quality of communication with patients and improvements in the 
measurement and dissemination of performance related information. 
In the government’s response,283-284 Trusts would now be required to publish data on 
complaints and ward-based staffing and there was a proposal for new legislation related to 
candour and the criminalisation of patient neglect. The government set up a number of 
reviews to look at areas ranging from patient safety to the burden of NHS information 
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collection and monitoring on Trusts. One of these reviews undertaken in 2013 was led by Sir 
Bruce Keogh, the Medical Director of the NHS, and investigated 14 NHS acute Trusts that 
had persistently high mortality rates.271 Although the review found evidence of differing 
issues impacting on quality and safety at each Trust, common themes to emerge were the 
failure of management to engage and support frontline staff, professional isolation and the 
limited capacity within Trusts to utilise measurement for quality improvement. Sir Bruce 
also noted that the different measures of hospital-wide mortality used to identify the 14 
hospitals had generated two completely different lists of outliers, concluding that reliance on 
these measures to identify failing hospitals was likely to lead to misleading results. He called 
for an examination of the relationship between the measures and preventable deaths 
identified via case record review. My colleagues and I have been commissioned to undertake 
this study and will do so by extending the PRISM study to 24 more sites, providing a 
statistically robust sample size to enable correlation with HSMR/SHMI measures. The 
review became the blueprint for a new approach to hospital inspection for the Care Quality 
Commission which takes account of a far wider range of intelligence, with the views of 
patients and staff at all levels being seen as key. 
During the period that the post-Francis reviews have been taking place, the Department of 
Health and NHS England have been developing a new national indicator, ‘hospital deaths 
attributable to problems in care’, based on my case record review methodology. This 
indicator will be incorporated into the NHS Outcomes Framework and will be used to both 
track the national proportion of preventable deaths over time, and encourage a systematic 
approach to mortality review across NHS hospitals.285 It is planned that hospitals will use a 
national standard form to review random sample of records of deaths each year, with a 
proportion of these records selected for external review. The extension of the PRISM study 
to a further 24 hospitals will provide an opportunity to pilot the new form and establish a 
baseline proportion of preventable deaths for 2012/13. Whether, NHS England, will want to 
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replace HSMR/SHMI measures with a mortality measure derived from case record review 
for benchmarking hospitals remains to be seen 
Extension of my method beyond its research origins will raise a number of important issues 
for consideration by policy makers. These include: 
1. Scope of harm indicator 
As death occurs relatively rarely in hospital (in approximately 2% of inpatients64) 
and preventable death is even rarer, it should be acknowledged that the greater 
burden of harm, even at the severe end, falls on those who are discharged from 
hospital alive. The profile of this harm may well be different from that found in 
patients who die. Moreover, some specialties such as ophthalmology will have 
relatively few deaths, which limits the utility of mortality review to improve safety 
in these areas. No single measure of harm is likely to capture the full picture, and a 
combination of approaches would seem the optimum way of finding the broadest 
range of harm. 
Many aspects of the poor care found at Mid Staffordshire and at other NHS acute 
Trusts since then are clearly related to organisational culture. These problems are 
likely to be compounded by the tough financial constraints that most NHS 
organisations are facing today. The NHS budget has been frozen in real terms since 
2010/11 leading to staff reductions and pay restraints placed on many others.286-287  
The ability of case record review to be able to reveal links between these underlying 
factors and failures in the processes of care at the clinician/patient interface is 
limited by the fact that information on contributory factors is often poorly recorded. 
The first Francis investigation included a case record review of 60 deaths at Mid 
Staffordshire and revealed only one death thought to be avoidable.27 Clearly this 
approach would not be an adequate safeguard of quality and safety on its own. 
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2. Training for internal and external reviewers to increase reliability of judgements 
Training is key to improving the reliability of the measurement of preventable 
deaths by case record review. Providing timely training to staff across English 
hospitals will be challenging, and consideration of the use of technologies such as 
such as elearning will be necessary to ensure the widest audience reach. 
 
3. Resource intensiveness  
The average review time for my study was one hour. Death reviews will place a 
considerable resource burden on acute hospitals. Consideration of how to avoid 
over-burdening reviewers with unnecessary review questions, whilst at the same 
time not losing essential information will be important. The possibility of 
developing a screening tool, similar to GTT, which can be used to target reviews on 
high risk cases should be explored. Senior consultant time is an expensive resource 
within the NHS, and consideration might need to be given to substitution with 
middle grade doctors. In addition, nurses can bring a different perspective to case 
record review and they should be included in the process. To maximise the 
relevance of the reviews to local learning, they should be conducted as soon after the 
patient’s death as possible. This will require administrative support to ensure the 
records for review are rapidly identified and forwarded to the reviewers. 
 
4. Local Learning 
A key outcome for local review will be the learning that arises as a result of the 
findings. The new national indicator should include a way of tracking local 
improvements that are implemented following reviews. In addition, the national 
programme should be flexible enough to enable hospitals to collect additional 
information on key quality and safety areas of interest to them, such as the quality of 
end of life care. 
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5.  Hospital Comparisons 
There will always be a need to use measurement for national comparisons of 
hospital performance. However, two main barriers will limit the validity of using 
mortality reviews for this purpose. Firstly, sample sizes at each organisation would 
need to be large enough to rule out the impact of chance variation, given that only 
around 1 in 20 deaths are likely to be preventable. Secondly, the moderate reliability 
of the measure, whilst acceptable when used for internal monitoring purposes or 
when large numbers of cases are reviewed to establish the national indicator, would 
limit use for hospital-level comparisons. 
 
Although measurement of preventable deaths and their underlying causes will provide a rich 
source of information that can lead to safety improvement, my conceptual framework 
indicates that other harm measures will shed light on different aspects of harm. In addition, 
there are a wide number of other safety measures apart from harm, such as safety culture or 
frequency of staff hand washing, which can provide a broader picture of safety related to the 
structures and processes of an organisation, and not to just the outcomes.  A broader 
approach to safety measurement can give a clearer indication of organisational risk and 
where interventions might be targeted.  
Harm measurement provides information on how safe an organisation was in the past, 
reflecting patient safety at the time of measurement. Although it can be helpful for 
identifying key risks in healthcare, and has previously been instrumental in raising the 
consciousness of the public, clinicians and policy makers and galvanising action, it is 
perhaps best seen as only part of the mechanism for safeguarding patient safety. Recently 
Professor Charles Vincent and colleagues have introduced a new framework for patient 
safety measurement (Figure 3).288 Drawing on approaches to safety from other high risk 
industries such as aviation and the nuclear industry, and the fact that no single approach to 
196 
 
measurement can capture all facets of safety, the new framework attempts to capture its most 
important dimensions. These dimensions are listed below and their interactions highlighted 
in the following figure: 
• Measures of harm 
• Measures of reliability 
• Measures of day to day operational safety 
• Measures of preparedness 
• Measures of integration and learning 
Figure 8.2 A Framework for safety measurement and monitoring  
 
 
Reproduced from Vincent C, Burnett S, Carthey J. The measurement and monitoring of safety. London: 
The Health Foundation, 2013 p3 
http://www.health.org.uk/public/cms/75/76/313/4209/The%20measurement%20and%20monitoring%20of
%20safety%20In%20brief.pdf?realName=jXdgR2.pdf  Downloaded 8th August 2013 
The authors indicated that this is an aspirational model, and that few NHS organisations 
would currently be in a position to deliver measurements for each of its dimensions. 
However, it would seem to address some of the disadvantages of harm measurement, in that 
measures of day to day safety and potential risks bring safety measurement from the past 
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into the present. A focus on measures of reliability will help tackle the burden of harm from 
omissions in care. Integration of information and learning is vital to organisational quality 
and safety improvement.   
Even though it is recognised that clinician involvement in improving the safety of the 
environment in which care is delivered is paramount, this has not been altogether successful 
to date. Donald Berwick, a physician who has spearheaded the championing of quality and 
safety improvement in US healthcare organisations, addressing the fact that relatively little 
progress had been made in tackling the common underlying problems that lead to serious 
patient harm, wrote that this was in part due to the fact that ‘doctors fail to see the 
problem’.289 In a recent article in the BMJ, Ian P Leistikow from the Dutch Healthcare 
Expectorate, echoed Berwick, identifying challenges to implementing patient safety 
initiatives which included invisibility, ambiguity and clinician autonomy.290 
 
8.6	Areas	for	Future	Research	
A key question that remains to be addressed is the degree of association between HSMR / 
SHMI and the proportion of preventable deaths found from case record reviews. To date 
only a small number of published studies from the US,21-24 and a modelling study from the 
UK,234 have been able to shed light on the likely relationship, which does not appear to be 
strong. I did explore this relationship in my correlations between proportions of preventable 
deaths across the sampled hospitals and a number of safety indicators including HSMR. 
Again, no strong association was found. However, the small number of hospitals in the 
sample limited the robustness of this finding. I have recently been the recipient of a further 
grant from the Department of Health to extend the PRISM study to a further 24 acute 
hospitals, which will provide an adequate sample size to detect any statistical association. 
Findings from this study, which was the first recommendation of a recent review of 14 acute 
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hospitals with higher than expected HSMR or SHMI, undertaken by the Medical Director of 
the NHS,271 will be available at the end of 2014.  
As mortality review based on RCRR is likely to remain a key aspect of harm measurement, 
future research should focus on methods that might improve the efficiency of such reviews, 
be these screening tools to enable deaths at high risk of preventability to be more reliably 
identified or the development methods of communication of findings from death reviews 
that can effectively drive organisational learning.  In addition, more needs to be understood 
about the factors that lead to the persistence of common causes of preventable death, such as 
missed diagnosis or poor clinical monitoring. Although it is unlikely that many more large-
scale, broad-based RCRR studies will be commissioned, given the consensus on the nature 
of hospital harm that has emerged from these studies, the need for in-depth exploration of 
specific harms and their underlying causes will persist. National Confidential Enquiries and 
specialty specific investigations of high risk areas can make valuable contributions, but 
careful consideration of the methodology around such investigations is required to ensure 
that the findings are robust and generalisable enough to justify service change. 
Little is known about the scale and scope of harm, including preventable death, in primary 
care. Although typical RCRRs may be difficult to conduct in this setting given the different 
structure of General Practitioner records and the need to capture information on care 
provided by the wider primary care team, suitable adaptations should make this possible.  
8.7	Conclusion	
The findings from my research have delivered the first accurate national estimate for the 
proportion of preventable deaths in English hospitals, based on a large random sample of 
deaths from within the NHS. This finding will be used as a national baseline against which 
future national estimates (derived from the new national indicator) will be compared. My 
work has also made an important contribution to the development of the approach to 
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mortality review, which has applications to both service and research settings. Its adaptation 
to become a new national indicator will see the introduction of mortality review based on 
this methodology across all NHS hospitals. For the first time, I have provided a robust 
estimate that can be used in international comparisons and it is somewhat reassuring to see 
that our proportion compares favourably with the estimation from the Netherlands. Much 
work remains to be done to reduce preventable deaths and serious patient harm, and it is 
somewhat discouraging that many of the underlying causes of the harm found in my study 
have been well known for many years. Given this fact, it is unlikely that progress will be 
easy. However, in the face of recent scandals in the NHS, hospitals managers and clinicians 
appear to be enthusiastic to meet this challenge. This thesis will form the basis of one tool 
that will support them in this endeavour.  
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